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ABSTRACT 
This research attempts to empirically examine the bank-lending channel in monetary policy 
transmission in Rwanda, using quarterly data for the period 1996Q1 to 2011Q4. The responses of 
the loans supply, real output, prices, and deposits to monetary policy innovations were investigated 
in this research, using impulse response functions and variance decompositions obtained from a 
Vector Autoregressive model (VAR). Estimation results revealed that the bank lending channel in 
Rwanda is less effective. The findings suggest that although monetary policies working through 
interest rates have a significant effect on bank loans, loans appear to not influence the real output 
level.  
As in other developing economies, the financial sector in Rwanda is still weak. As a result of the 
absence of long- term investment, bank customers bear the risk associated with the poor quality of 
loans in addition to the risk associated with high and variable inflation. These are likely to hamper 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement  
The potential impact of monetary policy on the real economy and the channels through which it 
operates, has been at the core of macroeconomic discussion for decades (Mies and Tapia, 2003).  
Popular and conventional wisdom suggest that although ineffective in the long run, monetary 
policy is a powerful tool in influencing economic activity at shorter horizons (Lungu, 2007). For 
instance, in the US economy, monetary policy actions impact on the real sector with an average 
delay of 4 months and this can last up to 2 years (Romer and Romer, 1989).  Additionally, Barth 
and Ramey (2000) postulate that small changes in short term interest rates could result in large 
changes in output.  
The most traditional explanation of how monetary policy affects output is through the interest rate 
channel.  The interest rate channel draws on the Keynesian IS-LM models. According to Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), the interest rate channel is based on the notion that reductions in the quantity 
of central bank money raises real rates of return, which in turn leads to a reduction in investment 
because fewer profitable projects are available at higher rates of return. However, in the interest 
rate channel the role of intermediation in the monetary economics literature has been ignored with 
the assumptions of perfect capital markets and homogenous financial structures (Lungu, 2007). 
Furthermore, the interest rate channel is important in developed countries with well-developed 
financial markets (Handa, 2000). Thus, it is in the above context that the credit view/bank lending 
channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism, which puts a special emphasis on the role of 
financial intermediaries or banks on aggregate economic activity, has assumed increased 
importance (Lungu, 2007). In most developing countries, the banking sector is the dominant player 
in the financial sector since the capital market is not well developed (Agung, 1998).  
Indeed, the models of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show that 
the economy in developing countries is dominated by small firms which depend on banks to 
finance their businesses and that this dependence affects the outcome of monetary policy. 
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The studies of ‘bank lending channel’ of the monetary transmission mechanism are motivated by 
a growing literature on asymmetric information in financial markets (Ford et al, 2003). Given that 
commercial banks play a dominant role as a source of finance and that there are significant 
information asymmetries in developing countries, the bank lending channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism is very important (Agung, 1998). Moreover, Ramlogan (2004) argues 
that in under developed countries financial markets tend to be relatively unsophisticated hence 
monetary policy is likely to affect the real sector by altering the quantity and availability of credit 
rather than the price of credit (Ramlogan, 2004 ).  
In the context of Rwanda, monetary policy falls within the responsibility of the National Bank of 
Rwanda (NBR). Like in many other African counties, the implementation of the IMF’s Enhanced 
Structural Adjustments Facilities (ESAF) in Rwanda began in 1990. A new banking system law 
was adopted in June 1997. This law has strengthened the NBR’s role in supervising financial 
institutions and enforcing rules of sound banking practice, that conform to international standards 
(Sayinzoga, 2005).   
Furthermore, the war and the genocide of 1994 severely affected the financial system in Rwanda. 
The situation left a terrible legacy and deeply affected not only human and natural resources, but 
also the economy as a whole. Real GDP fell by about fifty per cent as a result of the 1994 war and 
the genocide (Sayinzoga, 2005). Due to the negative effects of the 1994 Tutsi genocide and its 
economic implications, the NBR had to use sound policy and new banking regulations to improve 
banking management and to ensure that commercial banks meet with sensible rules of their lending 
activities. 
Since September 1997, the Rwandan money market as a main source of funds started operations. 
The NBR intervenes in the money markets primarily via the money market operations using 
treasury bills (Sayinzoga, 2005). However, the bank introduced a new instrument, the “repo” and 
this has been used since August 2008 (NBR, 2009). The reason for introducing the repo operations 
was to force commercial banks to forecast their liquidity sufficiently (NBR, 2008). By using the 
repo rates, the central bank directly controls liquidity in the money market. Indeed the new 
instrument aimed to enable long- term sterilisation of excess and liquidity from the banking 
system, which will facilitate efficient money market operations (NBR, 2009).  
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Given these policy shifts that have taken place in Rwanda; the questions that come to the fore are 
as follows: How effective is monetary policy in the face of financial sector liberalisation? Do 
changes in monetary policy still have effects in the supply of bank loans? How long does it take 
for monetary policy to take effect? How long does it take the commercial banks to pass on the 
effects of monetary policy change to their customers?  
1.2  Research Objectives  
The main goal of the study is to empirically investigate the existence of an active monetary policy 
transmission mechanism through the bank lending channel in Rwanda. This broad objective is 
explored through the following sub-objectives: 
(i) To review Monetary Policy in Rwanda from 1994 -2011 
(ii) To analyze the effect of changes in monetary policy on the behavior of banks regarding 
the supply of loans.  
(iii) To examine how long it takes for monetary policy to impact variables representing the 
real economy. 
(iv) To examine how long it takes commercial banks to pass on the effects of monetary 
policy change to their customers. 
1.3 The Methodology of the Study 
The research objectives will be addressed using empirical analysis of quarterly commercial bank 
loans, bank deposits, discount rate, real output and CPI ( the price level) data from 1996Q1 to 
2011Q4 from the National Bank of Rwanda. The study will employ a Vector Autoregressive 
Modeling (VAR) approach as used by a number of current studies on the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy (see for example Kakes and Sturm, 2002; Suzuki, 2004 and Hulsewig et al, 
2006) to examine the role played by bank lending in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
According to Ramlogan (2004), the VAR methodology is useful in this context because it allows 
the investigation on how the effects of shock(s) on the monetary policy are transmitted to the 
variables in the model, through impulse response and variance decomposition analyses. In doing 
so it assesses the dynamic responses of economic activity and the price level to monetary policy 
shocks. 
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1.4 Motivation for the research 
The mechanism by which the monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy has been the 
topic of extensive theoretical and empirical research in industrialized countries (Pruteanu, 2007). 
However, the transmission mechanism for monetary policy in developing countries in general, and 
in Rwanda in particular, has not received much attention and consequently is not well understood 
(Montiel, 1991). In underdeveloped countries financial markets are still at a relatively early stage 
of development hence monetary policy is expected to play a bigger role in driving economic 
activity and the price level by changing the number and availability of loans supplied by banks. In 
fact, with the deregulation of financial markets and the introduction of a more liberal monetary 
policy, there have been concerns relating to how economic activity reacts to monetary shocks 
(Smal and Jager, 2001). The above argument provides motivation for the present study.  
1.5 Organisation of the Study  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter two provides an overview of monetary 
policy, banking and finance in Rwanda. This intends to offer an outline of the monetary policy 
development in Rwanda and to shed light on the financial system and banking sector in Rwanda 
after 1994. Chapter three reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature concerning the bank 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Also discussed are the views of the classical and 
the Keynesian models/theories on the causality between money and the real sector of the economy. 
To provide a more detailed description of the connection between monetary policy and the real 
output and the price level, the chapter will also present brief explanations on the Phillips curve, 
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and Lucas-Sargent-Wallace (LSW) models. The 
estimation methodology followed in this research is provided in Chapter four that provides a model 
specification and a review of the relevant statistical estimation concepts and techniques for the 
study. The variables and their sources are also highlighted. 
Chapter five presents and discusses the empirical findings of the analysis for the entire sample 
period. Finally, Chapter six describes the conclusions, policy recommendations of this thesis, 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF MONETARY POLICY, BANKING AND FINANCE IN RWANDA 
2.1 Introduction  
Monetary policy is the set of policies a country’s central bank pursues to influence the money 
supply and interest rates in order to influence the level of economic activity and inflation in the 
country (Colander and Gamber, 2002: 376). The central bank, which is the agency responsible for 
monetary policy in the country, operates under certain national goals or objectives. Throughout 
the world, a number of central banks have adopted an inflation-targeting regime as a monetary 
policy framework and the central bank of Rwanda, the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR), is no 
exception to this rule. In this regard, the NBR’s ultimate objective remains achieving price stability 
to sustain a long-term growth of the economy.  
To meet its objectives, a central bank pursues monetary policy through one or more instruments 
(also known as policy tools) which are under the direct control of the policy makers. The choice 
of policy tools to use depends on the structure of the economy, i.e. the organization of a country’s 
financial markets and institutions, and tends to depend on the stage of development of the bond 
and stock markets (Handa, 2009). From 2008 to date, the NBR makes use of Repo as a monetary 
tool to keep inflation low and stable and to support domestic economic activity (NBR, 2010). The 
new instrument was to enable long- term sterilisation of excess and liquidity from the banking 
system, which will facilitate efficient money market operations (NBR, 2008).  
The goal in this chapter is to provide an overview of the developments in monetary policy in 
Rwanda since 1964, with special focus on more recent changes in conducting monetary policy in 
the late 1980s, 1990s and in 2000s till 2011. The chapter will also describe the financial system in 
Rwanda after 1994. Additionally, the chapter discusses the capital market in Rwanda.  
Section 2.2 refers to the evolution of monetary policy in Rwanda, while section 2.3 talks about the 
macroeconomic performance 1994 – 2012. Section 2.4 discusses the financial sector in Rwanda 
while section 2.5 considers the capital market in Rwanda. The final section is the conclusion. 
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2.2 Evolution of Monetary Policy in Rwanda 
Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had, until 1960, a common 
monetary authority. The DRC became independent in 1960 and acquired a political and monetary 
status different from that of Rwanda and Burundi. The Rwanda and Burundi common monetary 
system was then created and the "Banque d' Emission du Rwanda et du Burundi"/B.E.R.B 
(Emission Bank of Rwanda and Burundi) was established. The Rwandan and Burundian Franc 
was also legally created. The mission of B.E.R.B was to promote the economic development, the 
development of human and material resources as well as currency stability. The two countries, 
Rwanda and Burundi became independent from Belgium in 1962, and some economic and political 
reasons led the two countries to close the common monetary system. In January 1964, a liquidation 
committee was introduced that, in the agreement of 18th May 1964, recommended the termination 
of the common monetary law and of the issuing authority imparted to the B.E.R.B. The National 
Bank of Rwanda was established by the Law and came into existence on 19th May 1964 with the 
objective of achieving one of its main missions, namely the issuing of currency in the Republic of 
Rwanda.    
2.2.1 The monetary policy in Rwanda, before the Structural Adjustment Reforms 
Soon after its creation in 1964, the NBR was required to support the government plans for the 
realisation of the social and economic objectives. Moreover, the NBR was also required to 
implement monetary policy in order to attain particular macroeconomic goals. In this context, and 
in order to make the banking system conform to the objectives of the government,  
the National Bank of Rwanda decided, as was the case in most of the developing countries, to 
control the banking system using direct instruments. The central bank, to achieve this objective, 
then had to determine the credit given by the commercial banks to their clients. Additionally, they 
had to control the allocation of credit to the numerous sectors of the economy according to a scale 
of priority based mainly on the strategic requirements of the government. Furthermore, the NBR 
determined the level of interest rates in the economy.  
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To regulate the level of credit granted by the banking system, and thus control the money supply, 
the NBR performed, each time that it proved to be necessary, a change to the cost of credit. The 
purpose of this was to decrease the amount of funds demanded.  
The NBR defined the conditions the banks applied to their customers. These conditions were 
imposed on the entire of the banking system with the aim of achieving the economic objectives of 
the government and were not always comprehensive from a monetary policy viewpoint. The 
changes in question were mainly to the deposit and the lending interest rates, as well as the bank 
charges for their several facilities. 
Regulation of the rediscount rate 
The rediscount rate, i.e. the interest rates applied by the central bank to the commercial banks was 
a crucial component of the structure of interest rates (NBR, 2003). In this context, the rediscount 
rate was a reference determination of interest rates in the economy. Changing the interest rate by 
the central bank would change the lending rate paid by commercial banks’ customers. The NBR 
modified the rediscount rate, each time it wanted to reduce or increase the liquidity in the economy. 
A number of rediscount rates were thus applied, and differentiated according to the nature of the 
operations initiated by the banks concerned and depending on the sector that need refinancing 
(Sayinzoga, 2006). 
Credit to the bank’s customers was conditional on the constraints on resources available to 
commercial banks, and depended upon the possibility that the NBR would rediscount commercial 
bank securities. While influencing both the demand for, and the supply of credit in order to 
influence the behaviour of the banks, and thus moderate their capacities for monetary creation, the 
National Bank of Rwanda dedicated itself to credit control compatible with macroeconomic goals 
(Sayinzoga, 2006). Commercial banks were controlled to prevent them from hiding any financial 
intermediation not in accordance with the targets of credit control. 
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Control of the commercial banks’ free reserves 
The modification of the level of commercial banks’ free reserves by the central bank was the most 
important part of the monetary policy in Rwanda during the period of direct monetary policy 
intervention and followed the following method: 
Reserve requirement ratios 
In effort to control the money supply evolution, the NBR introduced reserve requirements in 1990 
(NBR, 2003). By convincing commercial banks to keep some of unused customers’ deposits as a 
reserve, the central bank sought to sterilize a part of banks’ resources usually used in extending 
credit. This process of keeping the required reserves on deposits at the NBR restricted credit 
growth and, subsequently, monetary progress rates. The process was not fragment of any structural 
adjustment plan, but may have been in expectation of such changes. 
The rule of required credit allocation 
Within the framework of its selective policy regarding credit, the NBR imposed on banks, in 
October 1987, the requirement that a part of their resources must be used to provide credit to the 
following operations:  
(i) Government projects within the budget funded by the issue of treasury bills;  
(ii) Those that require medium and long-term credit; 
(iii) Acquisition of shares in companies operating in the financial sector (Sayinzoga, 2006: 
78). 
This selective method of credit allocation was also intended to limit the commercial banks’ ability 
to extend credit  
Loans extension ceilings  
The NBR determined annually, a total amount they were ready to extend depending on the existing 
economic conditions and considering the expected variations in banking reserves, (NBR, 2003). 
Each of the individual commercial banks received this total amount. The particular distribution 
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was determined by the commercial bank’s main area of economic interest and their future expected 
lending and finance activities (Sayinzoga, 2006).  
At least three-quarters of commercial banks’ credit extension to the public was devoted to the 
financing of activities producing substantial value added or contributed to those actions that 
reduced balance of payments’ pressures (NBR, 2003). In the 1980’s, commercial banks came 
under pressure to progress credits to their customers and the commercial banks put pressure on the 
NBR for additional reserves. As a result, the central bank had to increase the total amount it was 
willing to extend to commercial banks. 
However, some of the economic actions considered a priority by the government were funded in 
other ways. These activities include those likely: (i) to contribute to the realization of self-
sufficiency in food production, (ii) to increase employment, (iii) to support the promotion of 
exports, (iv) to modernize the primary sector, in particular tea and coffee plantations, and mining 
production, (v) to support the promotion of international transport, and to stimulate housing 
construction ( Sayinzoga, 2006: 89). 
Financial intermediation control 
Commercial banks had to make an active contribution to the growth of the economy of the country 
according to required standards and without unfavourable effects on their financial position. 
However, the demand for loans was relatively large whereas financial resources available were 
comparatively limited, and the banking structure was hampered by a relative disability to perform 
satisfactory financial analyses necessary to the effective functioning of their activities (Sayinzoga, 
2006). It is in this compelling situation that the NBR required the banking system, as from October 
1987, to follow strict solvency requirements, and banks had to keep capital equal to 7 per cent of 
deposits if these deposits were greater than three billion Rwandan Francs (NBR, 2003). If deposits 
were lower, 10 per cent of deposits had to be held in capital reserves (NBR, 2003). The main 
challenge was that the central bank failed to inspect commercial banks on a regular basis. 
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Limitations of monetary policy before the implementation of the structural adjustment 
reforms 
The direct control of the banking system became inefficient in Rwandan economy. The use of 
money as a direct instrument of monetary policy led to the misallocation of available financial 
resources and the result was that the central bank credit authorization procedure did not permit the 
commercial banking system to do adequate risk analyses. A reason for this was that commercial 
banks interpreted the National Bank of Rwanda seal of approval to mean that risk considerations 
were minimal (Sayonzoga, 2006). Some inappropriate financing accrued to businesses by virtue 
of their being in economic agencies supported by government (NBR, 2003). There was also proof 
that some companies who did not qualify for loans used excessive influence on the authorities in 
order to acquire loans (Sayonzoga, 2006). 
Even if the central bank accepts the interest rate consistent with its money supply and monitors 
various commercial banks’ commissions in order to avoid any kind of abuse, this policy generated 
perverse effects in Rwandan economy (NBR, 2003). Resources were allocated inefficiently 
causing savings, investment and growth to decline as a result of undue liquidity spreading out. The 
main shortcoming of monetary expansion through credit control was that the interest rate was not 
determined by the market and did not offer an indication as to the lack of capital in the economy. 
2.2.2 The introduction of the structural reforms in Rwanda in 1990 
Since it was initiated in 1964, the NBR has to ensure that monetary and credit conditions were in 
harmony with the overall economic policies decided by the Rwandan government at least until 
1990, when the implementation of the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF) 
in Rwanda started. In this way, the NBR had the task of controlling the currency and managing 
operations in the money market, regulating banking structures and monitoring the foreign 
exchange market (NBR, 2003). It also had to manage the State’s portfolio at its disposal and ensure 
the execution of financial transactions on behalf of the State, that is, the NBR is the financial agent 
of the State for any credit, banking, and cash transactions (Sayinzoga, 2006). 
As in most other African countries, Rwanda has experienced structural and economic reforms 
since 1990 and has shifted from direct to indirect instruments of monetary policy. The main 
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financial reforms undertaken in Rwanda during the 1990’s had fundamental features such as 
liberalization of banks’ activities, the indirect character of current monetary policy and the market-
based financing of the budget deficit. The direct regulation characterized by government control 
on credit allocation and interest rates was gradually abandoned and the money market as a main 
source of funds was introduced. Indeed with the financial sector liberalization banks’ activities, 
that were subjected to rules and regulations imposed by the NBR and the required preliminary 
authorization from the NBR before commercial banks, could provide credit to their customers were 
removed and the determination of interest rates by the market was initiated. This new procedure 
conferred on commercial banks a superior obligation with regard to financial intermediation 
particularly in risk analysis. 
With regards to the market-based financing of the budget deficit, financing government activities 
by the NBR stopped and the process of issuing treasury bills and other negotiable securities was 
introduced in order to mobilize necessary domestic resources. 
However, the reforms that took place in Rwanda during the 1990s were suspended because of war 
and genocide in 1994 and the process restarted in 1995. The financial sector liberalization process 
made steady progress in the Rwandan economy and consequently monetary policy came to depend 
increasingly on indirect instruments. 
The war and the genocide in 1994 seriously affected the financial system in Rwanda. Hence the 
NBR had to move quickly with the essential counter actions to avoid its adverse effects, while at 
the same time proceeding with the revision of the regulations and the legal framework governing 
financial intermediation activities. The new banking rules recommend in particular, the need for 
strict banking supervision, making sure commercial banks complied with sensible rules of sound 
banking practice, and the minimum capital required by a commercial bank was raised to 1500 
million Rwandan Francs or about 17 million Rand (Sayinzoga, 2006).  
Soon after the 1994 genocide, the government of Rwanda engaged in an effort to rebuild the 
economy and restore macroeconomic stability initially using the IMF’s ESAF, and then using the 
IMF’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) programme, which is 
still the case (NBR, 2003). A law was passed in 1997, to give the NBR greater autonomy and a 
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new banking law was adopted and promulgated in June 1999, giving the necessary power to the 
board of the NBR to determine monetary policy (Sayinzoga, 2006). This law has also strengthened 
the NBR’s role in supervising financial institutions and enforcing rules of sound banking practice 
that are in conformity with international standards(NBR, 2003). 
2.3  Macroeconomic Performance 1994 - 2012 
In line with the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), the central 
bank of Rwanda was advised by the IMF and World Bank to implement a medium term inflation 
target of three per cent a year as an ultimate objective in 1998 (IMF, 1998: 7). At the same time, 
nominal GDP growth rates were shown to be fluctuating between five and six per cent per annum 
(NBR, 2003).  Inflation targeting only works in an environment of no adverse supply shocks. These 
positive growth rates provide some justification for moving to a policy of inflation targeting. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates inflation in Rwanda from the period 1994 to 2011. As is shown in Figure 2.1, 
Rwanda faces inflationary pressure, except in 1999, 2002 and in 2010. The inflation rate first 
reached the target in 1999 and in 2002, where the inflation rate was 2.1 and 2.0% respectively. 
This success was short lived as the rate of inflation reached 7.4% in the year 2003. However, one 
can say that the inflation rate was kept around the targeted figure of three per cent in 2000 (3.9 per 
cent) and in 2001 (3.4 per cent). The targeted rate also occurred in 2010, but the price level rose 
again to 8.7 % in the next year (2011) due to global and regional high inflationary pressures on 
energy and food.  In figure 2.1, it is also revealed that the inflation rate reached its highest level of 
64 in 1994. Against this background, the question arises as to whether inflation rate targeting has 
been successful in decreasing inflation in Rwanda, following the recent price increase. Indeed, 
looking at Table 2.1 which shows the inflation in Rwanda from 1978 till 2012, 5-year averages in 
%, one may realise that inflation targeting of 3 per cent a year didn’t succeed in Rwandan economy.   
In the table 2.1, it is shown that in the years between 1978 and 1982 inflation rate reached 10.5 per 
cent. However in the following years, i.e. between 1983 and 1987, inflation rate decreased to 2.4 
per cent. Inflation rose again from 1988 till 1992, to 8.7, and this may have been the results of the 
introduction of the structural reforms in Rwanda in 1990. In the period between 1993-1997 
inflation rate reached the level of 26.1 as it is shown in the table 1 and this was obviously caused 
by a war and genocide in 1994.   
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From the Table 2.1, the inflation rate figures from 1998 show that although the new framework 
made some improvements, but it did not reach the target in the Rwandan economy, and the current 
inflation rate illustrates that the situation is worsening. The inflation rate only approached the 
targeted rate of 3 per cent between 1998 and 2002 where inflation was 3.5. From 2003-2007 
inflation rate was 8.4 and it was 8.8 in the period from 2008 to 2012. Thus, the recommendation 
is that the policy makers in Rwanda should assess whether the current relationship between the 
operating target (interest rate), the intermediate instrument (aggregate M2) and the final goal (price 
stability) is valid in order to achieve a low and stable inflation rate.  
The financial system in Rwanda, which is still developing, could be the cause of the failure of the 
inflation targeting in Rwandan economy to keep inflation low. As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of 
the prerequisites of inflation targeting framework is the existence of a sound financial system. 
Indeed, the Rwandan economy suffers from institutional weaknesses related to risks associated 
with a poorly regulated financial system and a susceptibility to external shocks. The inflation 
pressure that Rwanda experienced in 2008, i.e. 22.3 per cent, was due to the increase in world oil 
and food prices. According to NBR (2011), the Rwandan banking sector suffers from the high 
level of non-performing loans. Banks respond to this situation by increasing the cost of borrowing. 
This is characterised by a large gap between the discount rate and the lending rate especially in the 
years between 2010 and 2012 as shown in Figure 2.5. The number of non-performing loans may 
even increase more, as individuals and businesses are forced to take credit at a higher price as there 
is no other alternative source of acquiring funds to finance their projects. Additionally, the 
financial system is struggling with the absence of long-term investment. The capital market in 
Rwanda is at its introduction as it only came into existence in 2008. Currently, only the 
government, some banks and other public or private institutions are directly involved in the money 
market engaged in the issuing of treasury bills and bonds, and not the small firms of Rwandan 
economic agents.  
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Figure 2.1:  Inflation in Rwanda from the period 1994 to 2011 
 
Source: Author using data from IMF country report, 1998, No. 117; IMF country report, 2013, No. 77; NBR, Annual 
Reports: 2003, 2006, 2008; NBR, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, 2011; NBR, Activities Report, 
2012. 
Table 2.1:  Inflation in Rwanda, 1978 - 2012 (5-year period averages ) 
Period Inflation (end of the year) (%) 
1978-1982 10.5 
1983-1987 2.4 
1988-1992 8.7 
1993-1997 26.1 
1998-2002 3.5 
2003-2007 8.4 
2008-2012 8.8 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2012; IMF report, 1998, No. 117; IMF country report, 2013, No. 77; 
NBR, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, 2011. 
The NBR uses M2, monetary aggregate as an intermediate instrument to control the inflation rate. 
Intermediate targets are financial variables that the central bank believes will directly help it to 
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achieve its goals (Mishkin, 2004). Indeed, the use of intermediate targets helps the central bank to 
reach its goal(s) which is not directly under its control, than it would if it focused solely on the 
goal (Hubbard: 2005). Thus, the NBR adjusts the level of M2 through changes in the monetary 
base, i.e. currency held by the public and reserves (operating targets) to attain its final goal of price 
stability. As the NBR has a responsibility to regulate money stock (M2) as an indicator for 
inflation, the achievement of the ultimate goal depends on the NBR being able to accurately 
forecast broad money M2. However, its choice of M2 is explained not only by its ability to adjust 
the level of prices but, also, by the constraints that the NBR faces. In this way, there are other 
forces that drive inflation pressure other than the M2. For example, according to Kanimba (2008), 
the high inflationary pressure that Rwanda experienced during the year 2008 was mainly attributed 
to the worldwide increase in the oil prices. Indeed Rwanda faces a continuous rise in the price 
level as can be seen from Figure 2.1 above that plots the inflation against time. 
Monetary aggregate M2 includes narrow money M1 (currency in circulation and demand 
deposits), time and savings deposits, and foreign currency assets. In Rwanda, M1 is the principal 
component of M2. For instance, M1 was 67.5 per cent of M2 in 1997, and constituted 76.9 per 
cent of the monetary stock in 2002 (Sayinzoga, 2006). In 2009, 2010 and 2011, the percentage of 
M1 to M2 was 59, 53 and 59 respectively (NBR, 2012). Figure 2.2 below illustrates the percentage 
change in M2 from 1994 to 2012. From Figure 2.2, one can see that M2 has been changing over 
time. In 1998, M2 shrank 0.8 per cent. This reduction was caused by a decline in the autonomous 
factors, that is, mainly a fall in net foreign assets (Sayinzoga, 2006). Figure 2.2 also reveals that 
M2 increased by 31.1 per cent in 2006. This rate which was significantly higher than the one 
recorded in 2005 (+16.6%) was the  result of an accelerated increase in net foreign assets and credit 
to private sector (NBR, 2006). The broad money also increased by 24.8 per cent in 2011 against 
20.3 per cent achieved in 2010, driven especially by the acceleration of foreign assets  and that of 
credit to private sector in 2011 (NBR, 2011). In 2012 however the monetary aggregate decreased 
to 17.0 per cent as is shown in the Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2:  Percentage change in monetary aggregate, M2 for the years 1994 to 2012.  
              
Source: Author using data from IMF country report, 1998, No. 117; IMF country report, 2013, No. 77; NBR, Annual 
Reports: 2003, 2006, 2008; NBR, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, 2011; NBR, Activities Report, 
2012. 
Simultaneously the forecast level of monetary aggregate M2 has to be consistent with economic 
activities in the country. For example, according to Kanimba (2008), to achieve a GDP growth 
ranging between 5.5 per cent and 6 per cent in 2008, the NBR sets the monetary aggregate M2 at 
444, 4 billion Rwandan francs and inflation target at 7 per cent (Kanimba, 2008:23). 
The currency of Rwanda is the Rwanda franc (Rwf). On March 6, 1995, the authorities launched 
a market-determined exchange rate system, where the exchange rate of the Rwanda franc is 
determined freely in the exchange market in which commercial banks and licensed foreign 
exchange bureaus operate (IMF, 1998:44). Since October 1995, the NBR no longer posts official 
Rwanda franc exchange rates, but calculates and publishes daily, for reference purposes, the 
average rate based on the bank foreign exchange transactions by commercial banks and the NBR 
(IMF, 1998:44). After the liberalization of the exchange rate system in 2001, an auction system 
was introduced to ensure the market determination of the exchange rate and the adoption of a 
policy to allocate foreign exchange guided by the NBR’s net foreign asset target (IMF, 2009: 18). 
When the new foreign exchange system was put in place in Rwanda, the foreign exchange market 
was characterized by a preference for cash US dollar and an active parallel market to cover some 
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operations such as tourism and business travel, and also regular import operations (IMF, 1998). 
Currently, the US dollar remains the most frequently used foreign currency in the Rwandan 
economy.  
A change in the exchange rate can either be depreciation (a reduction in the value of the domestic 
currency) or an appreciation (increase in the value of the domestic currency). A depreciation of 
national currency can lead to inflation.  
Figure 2.3 illustrates that the Rwanda franc exchange rate against the US dollar has been 
fluctuating over time. In 1994, the Rwf depreciated by 52.4 per cent against US dollar.  During the 
year 2000, the Rwandan franc also depreciated by 25.5 per cent against the US dollar, but it 
depreciated only by 1.6% against the US dollar, trading between Rwf 594.45 end-December 2010 
and 604.14 end-December 2011 per dollar. This stability was explained by the banking system’s 
capacity to respond to high demand for foreign exchange (NBR, 2011). In 2012, the Rwf 
depreciated by 4.3 per cent against the US dollar as demonstrated in the Figure 2.3.   
Figure 2.3: Percentage change in Rwanda franc per US dollar, 1994 - 2012  
     
Source: Author using data from IMF country report, 1998, No. 117; IMF country report, 2013, No. 77; NBR, Annual 
Reports: 2003, 2006, 2008; NBR, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, 2011; NBR, Activities Report, 
2012. 
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The economy of Rwanda is categorized into three main sectors: agriculture, service, and industry. 
Rwanda has achieved notable economic growth from the time when the genocide came to an end 
in 1994. Its GDP per capita has increased from less than 200US$ in 1994 to 540 US$ in 2010 
(African Development Bank, 2010). The average annual growth rate of GDP is 9.5 per cent 
between 1995 and 2011 (Malunda, 2012). From 1994 to 2005 the agriculture sector maintained 
first position in the shares of the GDP. In the 2001-2005 periods, the average contribution of 
agriculture to the GDP was 43 per cent while the average share of service and industry sectors to 
the GDP was 38.0 and 12.7 per cent respectively (NBR, 2006). The period 2006 to date has shown 
some changes in the economy as the service activity replaced agriculture as the major contributor 
to increases in output. The lowly performance in agriculture is due to the to poor weather 
conditions as the Rwandan current climate is characterized by heavy rains which destroyed some 
crops. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the percentage of real GDP growth from 1994 to 2012. As is seen 
in Figure 2.4, Rwanda’s economy grew by 8.6 per cent in 2011, against 7.5 per cent achieved in 
2010. This increase is due to the better performance of the services sector that showed a high 
increase in petroleum companies, banks & insurance companies, garage services, transport and 
storage services and trade services (NBR, 2012). In 2012, real GDP recorded a growth of 7.7 per 
cent. Despite high inflationary pressures (due essentially to the increase in world oil and food 
prices), the Rwandan economy maintained a noticeable performance in 2008, reaching 11.2% of 
real GDP growth, following 7.9% recorded in 2007. This growth was backed by the recovery of 
the agriculture sector which registered a growth rate of 15% compared to 0.7% in 2007, and a 
noticeable improvement both in the service and industry sectors which increased by 10.7% and 
7.9% respectively (NBR, 2008). Gross Domestic Product in real terms recorded a moderate growth 
of 3.4% in 2003 against 9.4% in 2002 (NBR, 2003). This slowdown of economic growth was due 
to the moderate performance of the agriculture sector that was hit by climatic vagaries (NBR, 
2003). Furthermore, Figure 2.4 indicates that the real GDP fell by about 50 per cent following the 
1994 war and the genocide in Rwanda. 
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Figure 2.4: Real GDP growth in Rwanda (% change), 1994-2012  
 
Source: Author using data from IMF country report, 1998, No. 117; IMF country report, 2013, No. 77; 
NBR, Annual Reports: 2003, 2006, 2008; NBR, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, 2011; 
NBR, Activities Report, 2012. 
Regarding the interest rates development, the average lending rate experienced fluctuations. For 
example, as shown in Figure 2.5, lending rates reached 16% in December 2009. At the end of 
2010, the lending rate increased to 16.9 %. In 2011, the lending rate expanded to 17%. Concerning 
the discount rate, in 2009, NBR kept its discount rate at 12.17%. In 2010, the Monetary Policy 
Committee decided to maintain the low discount rate with the objective of releasing more liquidity 
into the system by keeping the cost of funds for banks at a low level and to limit incentives for 
banks to invest on the money market. Thus, the discount rate was reduced progressively from 
12.17% to 10% in December 2010 (Gatete, 2011). In response to developments in inflation, the 
NBR increased its interest rate in 2011 to 11% as shown in the Figure 2.5.  
According to Gatete (2011), the upward trend in lending rates relative to the level of discount rate 
in Rwandan economy, is due to the uncertainties in credit markets and the level of nonperforming 
loans among other factors. 
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Figure 2.5: Interest rates Developments from 1995 to 2011 (%)  
 
Source: Author using data from NBR, Annual Reports: 2003, 2006, 2008; NBR, Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability Statement, 2011; NBR, Activities Report, 2012. 
 Instruments of monetary policy in Rwanda 
One of the main responsibilities of the National Bank of Rwanda is to regulate the banking 
system‘s liquidity by monitoring the liquidity and regulating the money market on a daily basis 
(NBR, 2009: 59). With its current indirect monetary policy, the NBR utilises monetary policy 
instruments to adjust commercial banks’ free reserves and ensure that the supply of base money 
does not diverge from levels consistent with the inflation targeting (Sayinzoga, 2006). Thus, the 
indirect monetary instrument used by the NBR is the Open-market operations.  
OPEN-MARKET OPERATIONS  
As a replacement for direct credit distribution to commercial banks, the NBR introduced a money 
market as part of its agenda to attain better control over the money supply (NBR, 2003:38). Banks 
began borrowing and lending in a short-term liquidity market and the decisions for monetary 
policy were enhanced by the creation of a Monetary Policy Committee that meets weekly to 
evaluate the state of monetary policy and conditions in the foreign exchange market (NBR, 
2003:47-51).  
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Indeed, this committee has to: 
(i) assume a backward-looking analysis of the present monetary situation and determine how 
monetary policy has to adjust to any changes in the liquidity of the banking system; 
(ii) forecast base money for the next week, in order to establish the necessary intervention of 
the NBR in the money market to achieve its macroeconomic goals; 
(iii) recommend any other activities the NBR might embark on to uphold control over the 
money supply and bring backing to continued bank supervision (NBR, 2003:47-51). 
2.4 The Financial Sector in Rwanda  
As mentioned above, after 1994 Rwanda introduced a liberalized economic system that led to a 
profound reform of the legal and institutional financial system environment. In 1999, the NBR Act 
was revised to grant it independence to formulate and implement monetary policy and ensure 
financial sector stability (Rusagara, 2008). 
The three primary goals of the Rwandan Financial Sector Development Program (FSDP) 
(implemented in 2006 as a key component of EDPRS), include:  
(i) Improving access to finance, i.e. banking and other financial services, by developing a 
strong, efficient and competitive banking sector offering a diversified array of financial 
products and services;  
(ii) Enhancing savings mobilisation by creating the appropriate environment, developing 
institutions and fostering market incentives for the development of long-term financial 
instruments and an efficient capital market; 
(iii) Mobilizing more long-term investment (Rusagara, 2008; and Murgatroyd, et al., 2007).  
Rwanda’s financial system comprises mainly the banking sector, microfinance institutions and 
non-banking financial institutions (insurance and pensions). The banking industry dominates 
Rwanda’s financial sector. For example in 2011 the banking industry controlled 83.4 % of the total 
financial assets, against 10.6% and 6% for non-bank financial institutions and microfinance 
institutions respectively (BNR, 2011). Each of these institutions is discussed in the following sub-
sections.  
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2.4.1 The Banking Sector   
In line with the FSDP, the NBR expanded access to credit and financial services to the population 
by facilitating conditions to open bank accounts, increasing the bank’s branches network and 
licensing new banks. During the first half of 2009, three new bank branches were opened and a 
Kenyan bank received a license to operate in Rwanda (NBR, 2009). Furthermore, the 
transformation of Banque Populaire du Rwanda as a commercial bank has dramatically increased 
the number of bank branches offering a complete range of financial services to the population 
(Kanimba, 2008).  
During the year 2011, activities to enable access to banking services were undertaken by the 
expansion of banks’ branch networks and the introduction of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) 
(Gatete, 2012). The entry of new banks into the financial sector is expected to foster more growth, 
improved access to financial services and increased competition and ultimately to improved 
service delivery (NBR, 2009).  
Currently, Rwanda’s banking sector is composed of 14 financial institutions, including  nine (9) 
commercial banks, KCB (Kenya Commercial Bank), ACCESS BANK (Rwanda) Ltd, 
COGEBANK (Compagnie Générale de Banque), BCR (Banque Commerciale du Rwanda/ 
Commercial Bank of Rwanda), BK (Bank de Kigali/ Bank of Kigali), BPR ( Banque Populaire du 
Rwanda), ECOBANK, FINA BANK and EQUITY BANK, one (1) development bank (BRD: 
Bank Rwandaise de Development/ Rwanda Development Bank), three (3) microfinance banks 
(Urwego Opportunity Bank (UOB), UNGUKA Bank Ltd and AGASEKE Bank Ltd) and one (1) 
cooperative bank (Zigama CSS); all regulated under the banking law (Gatete, 2011). Commercial 
banks occupy the largest share of the total assets of the banking industry. For example in 2011, the 
breakdown of the total assets for the banking sector indicated that commercial banks represented 
82.4 percent of the total banking sector assets (NBR, 2012). Table 2.2 shows the total assets of the 
banking system in Rwanda. 
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Table 2.2:  Total assets of depository corporations and BRD from 1995 to 2011(in RWF 
million)  
Years Reserves  
& Other 
claims on 
NBR 
Foreign 
assets 
Credit on 
Gvmt 
Credit on 
public & 
private sectors 
Other 
assets 
Total 
1995 8787.5               15565.6 4527.8 28839.6    11219 68939.5 
1996 13836.7 20151.8 4968.5 28972.8 10842.8 78772.6 
1997 16080 22293.2 5573.2 45282 13327.4 102555.8 
1998 11885.2 24094.2 6993.8 54988.6 14960.5 112922.3 
1999 15868.2 19680.1 7746.8 60900 19399.2 123594.3 
2000 11123 32948.8 7265.7 70800 20683.1 142820.6 
2001 15381.2 33763.9 7605.8 76500 23656.8 156907.7 
2002 12608.5 39106.0 14409.8 85490.8 27034.4 178649.5 
2003 13209.8 49800 14861.8 97199.6 32536.6 207607.8 
2004 16258.9 60758.7 21015.0 107584.2 31549.7 237166.5 
2005 15160.3 52617.6 24760.0 130994.5 30075.3 253607.7 
2006 17034.6 70998.1 26367.9 162164.6 36928.4 313493.6 
2007 28139.2 86893.7 46977.2 196122.6 45267.8 403400.5 
2008 44682.6 96751.9 29541.2 246355.2 64496.5 455237.4 
2009 108078.9 107466.2 20070.6 346181.4 90029.8 671826.9 
2010 107191.1 148372.1 84804.0 375560.8 118543.1 834471.1 
2011 156036.5 149713.7 85633.0 711540.8 170017.6 1272940.8 
Source: National Bank of Rwanda, Annual reports: 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, And 2012 
Depository corporations include: BK, BCR, FINA BANK, ECOBANK, ACCESS BANK, 
COGEBANQUE, UOB, BPR, KCB RWANDA, UNGUKA, AGASEKE, CSS and EQUITY BANK 
NB: (1) UOB, KCB and EQUITY BANK were included from 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively; (2) Gvmt 
stands for Government  
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In Table 2.2, one can see that the total assets of the banking system in Rwanda have increased 
during the year under consideration. The years 2009, 2010 and 2011 are characterised by an 
improved asset quality and with strong liquidity. In 2009, the commercial banks’ assets showed 
an increase of 47.5% against 12.8% realized in 2008. This significant growth of total assets was 
driven principally by the growth in loans. Loans increased by 50.5% in 2009 against an increase 
of 25.6 in 2008. Indeed this performance is due to the entry of new banks (UOB, KCB and 
EQUITY BANK) into the financial sector. In 2011, the industry’s total assets grew by 52.5 per 
cent. The increase of the asset base in 2011 was mainly attributable to new entrants and the two 
micro-finances (UNGUKA bank Ltd and AGASEKE bank Ltd) that upgraded to microfinance 
banks (NBR, 2012). Additionally, the start of 2011 saw the introduction of the expansion of banks’ 
branch networks to enable access to bank services, i.e. bank loans and deposits to bank customers. 
During the year 2011, the total deposits of deposit banks increased by 27.3% as shown in Table 
2.3, while loans grew by 89.4% in 2011 in Table 2.2.   
Furthermore, Table 2.2 shows that credit in the public and private sectors is the principal 
component of total assets of the banking sector in Rwanda. For instance, loans from the 
commercial banks were 52%, 60%, 61% and 59% of the total assets in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 
respectively. In 2010 and 2011, credit to the economy constituted 57% and 56% of the total assets 
of the banking sector. In the same way, loans to the economy are also the main section of the total 
assets of the Rwanda Development Bank. Credits supplied by BRD to the economy constituted 
71%, 81%, 83% and 75% of the BRD total assets in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Compositions of the Total Deposits of deposit banks (in RWF million) 
Years Transferable 
deposits 
Nontransferable 
deposits 
Foreign currency 
deposits 
Total  
1995 22184.7 7028.2 15153.0 44365.9 
1996 24363.4 8716.6 14132.9 47212.9 
1997 33609.2 17228.7 15920.5 66758.4 
1998 31041.5 20451.0 18513.6 70006.1 
1999 36279.4 19172.5 19505.2 74957.1 
2000 36778.4 24081.6 26683.6 87543.6 
2001 38421.1 26888.6 27850.7 93160.4 
2002 44916.0 39543.9 29356.7 113816.6 
2003 50849.9 38272.6 41523.8 130646.3 
2004 61372.9 53732.0 51013.8 166118.7 
2005 84621.3 70754.2 43672.7 199048.2 
2006 97770.5 108988.6 59178.4 265937.5 
2007 154690.3 138663.2 68634.0 361987.5 
2008 133485.2 158407.9 82338.2 374231.3 
2009 190105.3 162437.7 97036.9 352543.1 
2010 240090.6 186137.5 99229.6 426228.1 
2011 279108.6 263309.3 135569.5 542417.9 
Source: National Bank of Rwanda, Annual reports: 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, And 2012 
In the Rwandan banking system, deposits are a major part of the total liabilities. For example, in 
2008 deposits constituted 65 per cent of total liabilities and it was 50 and 51 per cent of total 
liabilities in 2010 and 2011 respectively (NBR, 2012). Table 2.3 demonstrates the compositions 
of the total deposits of commercial banks from 1995 to 2011. In the period under review, 
transferable deposits constituted the largest part except in 2006 and 2008 where non-transferable 
deposits exceeded transferable deposits. 
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Table 2.4: Total banking-sector loans to gross domestic product 
Years LOANS ( in 
RWF billion)  
GDP ( in RWF 
billion) 
Loans/GDP (%) 
1995 28.84 92.08 31.32 
1996 28.97 113.70 25.48 
1997 45.28 145.12 31.20 
1998 54.99 153.79 35.75 
1999 60.90 155.58 39.14 
2000 70.80 175.32 40.38 
2001 76.50 191.07 40.03 
2002 85.49 212.20 40.28 
2003 97.19 267.45 36.33 
2004 107.58 322.67 33.34 
2005 130.99 384.20 34.09 
2006 162.16 457.86 35.41 
2007 196.12 553.05 35.46 
2008 246.36 687.24 35.84 
2009 346.18 778.30 44.47 
2010 375.56 861.45 43.60 
2011 711.54 980.12 72.60 
Source: National Bank of Rwanda, Annual reports: 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, And 2012 
Table 2.4 depicts the total loans size of the banking sector, GDP and Rwanda’s total loans-to-gross 
domestic product ratios from 1995 till 2011. From the Table 2.4, it is perceived that total loans and 
GDP have increased during the period under review. Regarding the loan-to-GDP ratios, the total 
loans to total gross domestic product shows a small number from 1995 to 1998. This is justified 
by huge funds from a large number of NGOs that were present in the post-1994 genocide and that 
granted credit mainly in the form of gifts. As the number of NGOs started to decrease however, a 
number of households and firms that needed to borrow money from the banks increased. A 
decreased loan to GDP ratios also happened from 2003 to 2008.  
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According to the NBR 2008, a large number of non-performing loans characterised those years. 
This large number of non-performing loans may have resulted from a high level of inflation that 
marked those years.  
In 2008, the inflation rate was 22.3 per cent while it was 12.6 in the beginning of 2007. The 
inflation rate was 10.3 and 11.5 per cent at the start of 2004 and 2005 respectively (IMF, 2012). 
Indeed, the consequence of high and volatile inflation on small businesses wanting to expand is 
that economic decision-making becomes more risky, costs are higher, and choices are more 
limited. If there is uncertainty about future inflation, commercial banks may want to protect 
themselves against future higher than expected inflation by increasing interest rates on lending. 
This is characterised by a gap between the lending rate and the discount rate as shown in the Figure 
2.5. From 2009 to 2011, the loan-to-GDP ratios showed improvements as illustrated in the Table 
2.4. This performance is due to the entry of new banks and the improvement in the banking system 
to allow access of funds to bank clients that happened in 2011. 
Although the banking industry tries to show an improvement, especially from 2009 to 2011, a 
number of non-performing loans were still observable. Growing volumes of non-performing loans 
definitely lead to lower profitability, reduced liquidity, reduced lending, and increased 
intermediation costs. The banking supervision department in the National Bank of Rwanda 
highlighted some of the reasons for the high magnitude of non- performing loans in the Rwandan 
banking sector. These include  
(i) Unruly borrowers. The financial chaos which prevailed during the war as well as the 
inefficiency of courts enabled some delinquent debtors  of the banking system to escape 
the repayment of their debts;  
(ii) Lack of long-term resources. Due to a lack of long-term resources in the Rwandan 
financial sector, bankers chose to finance, on a short-term basis, projects that normally 
require a financing of a medium or long-term horizon, which increased the borrowers’ 
financing charges. Borrowers had to incur large monthly payments (principal and 
interests) that were not in line with the level of their available revenues;  
(iii) Ineffective measures of collection. During the collateral collection process, banks 
generally face different challenges such as:  
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 inadequate monitoring relating to the effective raise of guaranties after credits 
disbursement; 
 An incorrect collaterals creation generally due to inexperienced staff; 
 An erroneous collateral value evaluation at the time of loans granting and lack of 
periodic interval updates of this value later on. 
 Lack of professional evaluators operating on the basis of recognized 
evaluationtechniques and applied uniformly as well as according to the principles 
of independence and fairness (NBR, 2008). 
In order to overcome this problem, an interbank commission composed of managing directors of 
the banks and BNR’s representatives was created in2002 and serious measures were taken. Some 
of them are as follow:  
(i) The Central Bank issued regulations that forbade banks from granting loans to customers 
who were classified as customers with past due loans over three months. 
(ii)  the NBR authorised banks to publish immediately their names of those whose cases have 
already been subjected to judicial action and to write a last letter of enforcement notice to 
those whose files have not yet been brought before the court, so they can negotiate a 
reasonable reimbursement plan with their banks. Otherwise their names will be published 
and cases sued within a period of six months (NBR, 2009).  
(iii) In addition, the Central Bank has set the principles of minimum control in relation to loans 
management. It was especially the requirement for financial institutions to have credit 
policies as well as methodologies that must drive the process of granting credits (NBR, 
2008). Furthermore, the commercial banks have the authority to sell the borrower’s 
property in case the later fails to reimburse the money to the bank on time.  
According to NBR 2008, the non-performing loans represented 36.1, 32.9, 30.9 and 29.5 per cent 
of gross loans in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. In 2006 the non-performing loans 
represented 25.6 per cent while in 2007 represented 18.1 per cent of the total loans (NBR, 2008).    
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Even though non-performing loans have not dropped over the period, one notes a high reduction 
as the rate which was of 36.1 per cent in 2002 has reached 18.1 per cent at the end of 2007 
indicating that the measures taken by the NBR had a positive effect on the banking activity.    
2.4.2 Non-bank financial sector 
Insurance companies and pension schemes are commonly referred to as non-bank financial 
institutions in Rwanda that the NBR is currently supervising. Like banks they play an intermediary 
role of savings mobilizations, allocation of resources by investing in different financial and non-
financial assets. The National Bank of Rwanda is mandated to regulate and supervise these 
institutions in order to protect the interest of pensioners and policy holders by ensuring that these 
institutions are financially sound and stable (Gatete, 2012). 
Insurance sector 
The Rwandan insurance sector comprises eight insurers, 102 insurance agents and four loss 
adjusters. The size of the insurance industry has grown over the past years as depicted by insurance 
penetration of about 2.3 per cent although still less than the 10 per cent for middle income 
economies (NBR, 2010). NBR’s target is to achieve a 10% insurance penetration ratio by 2020 
and with the current reforms going on and minimization of the existing challenges, it is hoped this 
target will be achieved.  
Pension sector  
Rwanda’s pension sector is still developing as its coverage ratio stands at approximately 5.7% of 
the active population far too low compared to coverage ratio within middle income economies 
with about 25% (Kanimba, 2010). The reason behind the low coverage is the lack of a proper legal 
framework for private pensions and limited sensitisation of the public (NBR, 2010). In order to 
solve  this problem, NBR developed the legal framework for the regulation and supervision of the 
pension sector by drafting the pension law and implementing core regulations, namely, regulations 
governing the establishment of pension schemes and licensing service providers and regulations 
governing pension fund management (Gatete, 2011). 
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2.4.3 Microfinance sector 
After 1994, most of NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and sponsors intervened during the 
emergency period to help the Rwandan population. These later transformed into microfinance 
institutions, granting credit mainly in the form of gifts. Thereafter, the number of microfinances 
increased uncontrollably between 2003 and 2005. Given the fact that they started in a chaotic 
policy formulation challenge, without even an authorisation from the National Bank of Rwanda, 
their activities were characterised by a lack of coordination of different actors, lack of 
governmental policy for the sector and the existence a high risk of the financial intermediation 
activity which did not grant any security to public deposits. 
The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning became sufficiently 
concerned to establish a planned frame of national policy and strategy regarding microfinance and 
jointly organised a public awareness campaign from April 2005 for the microfinance sector 
management. Strict regulations came into force in order to regulate and stabilise this sector 
(Kanimba, 2008). Every microfinance institution received a number of complying conditions in 
order to obtain a license from the NBR and microfinance institutions that were not able to comply 
with the overall licensing conditions were instructed by the National Bank of Rwanda to close 
down their activities (NBR, 2009).  
Currently, there are 3 performing microfinances institutions (MFIs) which are considered as banks. 
Those include Urwego Opportunity Bank, UNGUKA Bank Ltd and AGASEKE Bank Ltd. 
However, there are other small microfinances, but their financial situation remains weak in terms 
of liquidity and most of them still work under a provisional license. The NBR has committed its 
self to evaluating their activities in order to support, regulate and stabilise this sector.  
2.5 Capital market in Rwanda 
The Capital markets in Rwanda remain weak due to limited income, and the small size of the 
private sector, which makes investors and issuers scarce. Indeed, it is difficult to run capital 
markets in some African countries with limited capacity and small markets given the fact that the 
capital markets entail huge start-up and operating costs for both the regulators and the market 
participants (Masafumi, 2012). According to Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), there 
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exists a certain minimum-efficient size of bond markets, because large issuance and trading 
volumes are more economical. 
2.5.1 Government Bond Market 
The bond market in Rwanda is in its infancy. The country does not have a wide range of treasury 
bills and bonds. The most promising avenue to stimulate the securities market in Rwanda is via 
greater issuance activity by the government (IMF, 2011). This could be due to the absence of large 
corporations that have the capacity to issue bonds. The Capital Market Advisory Council (CMAC) 
was officially launched at the beginning of 2008 by the President of the Republic (NBR, 2008). 
The first ever issue of two–year government bonds took place on January 17 and 31, 2008, for two 
respective amounts of RWF 5 billion and RWF 4 billion. (NBR, 2008). 
On 20 September 2011, a law regulating Collective Investment Schemes in Rwanda was published 
(NBR, 2012). In August 2010, the securities listed on the Capital Market included the Government 
three year 5 Billion Rwanda Francs (7,867,238.7 USD) issued in February 2008 with a coupon 
rate of 8.25% (NBR, 2010). Two more Government Bonds of 2.5 billion (3,933, 619.3 USD) (two 
years) and 1.5 billion (2,360,171.6 USD) (three years) were issued in January and April 2010, and 
their respective coupon rates are 9.5% and 9.75% (NBR, 2010). In September 2011, transactions 
on the Market for Treasury Bonds were minimal as the turnover only recorded RWF 500 million 
(786,723.8 USD) as the security holders preferred to keep them until maturity (NBR, 2012). This 
movement is expected to change in time to come as the NBR is trying to take new measures in 
terms of security allocation (NBR, 2012).   
The CMAC was established as a transitional body tasked by the Government to develop the capital 
market in Rwanda and it operated as both the regulator and the market operator (NBR, 2011). 
Since June 9th, 2011, the CMAC was transformed into a fully-fledged regulator, the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), whose focus is to regulate the size of the market and the Rwanda Stock 
Exchange (RSE) as the market operator (CMA, 2012). Indeed one of the statutory objectives of 
the CMA is to promote and develop the capital markets industry in Rwanda. In order to fulfil its 
mandate, CMA is planning to put in place a legal framework for a commodities exchange market 
that is conducive and attractive to both domestic and foreign market users (CMA, 2012). 
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2.5.2 Stock Market 
The exchange that was established by the CMAC in January 2008 started as an over the counter 
(OTC) market (Allen et al, 2011).  
The equity market was initiated in the first half of 2009, with the cross listing of the Kenya 
Commercial Bank on the Rwanda OTC Market (NBR, 2010). Additionally, the Government of 
Rwanda has approved the privatisation program of its shares through the Rwanda Capital Markets. 
The privatisation of BRALIRWA (Brasserie et Limonaderie du Rwanda) is at an advanced stage 
and the government has nominated its team of advisors (NBR, 2010). More domestic companies 
are expected to list on the Rwanda OTC market after BRALIRWA. 
Bank of Kigali (BK) listed its shares on the RSE market on September 1st, 2011 following a 
successful Initial Public Offer (IPO) which was oversubscribed by 276 per cent (NBR, 2012). The 
Bank of Kigali’s IPO attracted 6,721 applicants compared to 3,939 applicants for BRALIRWA 
and this shows the increasing interest by the public to invest in the capital market (NBR, 2012). 
From September 1st, 2011 to the end of 2011, the equity market recorded a turnover of more than 
RWF 12.7 billion from about 14.5 million BRALIRWA shares and 61.4 million BK shares traded 
in 1,038 transactions (NBR, 2012).   
From August 2011, the capital market industry registered some notable developments mainly in 
the legal framework. As part of its Financial Literacy Campaigns, a university challenge was 
launched in September 2011 (NBR, 2011). The purpose of the university challenge is to raise 
awareness among the youth and introduce a culture of mobilising savings and investing in capital 
market products. However, the mobilization of long-term stable financing for the real economy 
remains as a major challenge, given the small and underdeveloped local capital market (IMF, 
2011). The opening of the Rwanda Stock Exchange is likely to play a minor role in helping to meet 
this challenge in the near future (IMF, 2011). 
During August 2011, one Treasury bond worth RWF 5 billion matured and another one valued at 
RWF 3.5 billion was listed on Rwanda stock exchange (RSE). In the same period, 5 Treasury 
Bonds worth RWF 13.5 billion and one Corporate Bond (BCR Bond), with a face value of RWF 
1 billion, were on RSE (NBR, 2011). 
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Although the capital market in Rwanda is still at its introduction stage, there has been a conscious 
effort to make changes by promoting and developing the capital markets industry in Rwanda. 
Currently, the Central Bank together with the Capital Market Authority and other stakeholders 
have put in place new strategies to improve the development of the financial market in Rwanda. 
These strategies include, among others: 
• Financial awareness campaigns to educate the public on long-term investments through TV 
and Radio programs, newspapers, social media networks, road-shows, training, seminars and 
workshops, 
• New products on the market to increase the number and types of securities listed on the 
market, 
• The process of procuring an Electronic Trading Platform at the Rwanda Stock Exchange 
(RSE) whose go-live date is targeted for June 2012. 
• Financing the development of the guidelines to support the issue of municipal bonds, 
commercial papers and infrastructure bonds, 
• Putting in place regulations for Small and Medium Enterprises wishing to raise long-term 
capital through the capital market (NBR, 2012: 45). 
2.6 Conclusion  
Since its creation in 1964, the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) became responsible for 
establishing and assisting the realization of government social and economic policy. In this 
context, the NBR dedicated itself to direct monetary control to achieve macroeconomic objectives. 
Credit controls were attained by allocating credit to commercial bank customers and the level of 
interest rates in the economy was determined by the NBR. Two methods used by the NBR to 
control the commercial banks’ free reserves, which was the most important part of the monetary 
policy in Rwanda, were the reserve requirement ratios and the rule of required credit allocation.  
In November 1990, Rwanda shifted from direct to indirect monetary policy and financial reforms 
were among the key issues addressed. Direct control of prices and interest rates were abolished to 
allow for the determination of prices by market forces. Nevertheless, the efforts undertaken with 
structural reforms in order to reduce the role of the government in the economy were soon 
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suspended following the war and the genocide in 1994. These policies were reactivated in 1995 
and the liberalisation process made steady progress. In this new environment, monetary policy 
came to rely more and more on indirect instruments. 
In 1998 the National Bank of Rwanda came under pressure from the IMF to adopt an inflation 
targeting framework of three per cent a year as the objective of monetary policy. As inflation is a 
variable that the NBR cannot control directly, the central bank uses M2 as an intermediate 
instrument of control. The assumption being that if M2 is reduced, then inflation will fall. 
Simultaneously the forecast level of monetary aggregate M2 has to be consistent with the 
economic activity of the country. The economy of Rwanda is categorized into three main sectors: 
agriculture, service, and industry. The current situation shows that the service activity is the major 
contributor to increases in output. 
The financial system in Rwanda comprises the banking sector, non-bank financial institutions and 
microfinance institutions. The banking industry dominates Rwanda’s financial sector while the 
commercial banks control the banking sector. The loans supplied by banks remain the main source 
of domestic economic activities and the deposits found to be the key foundation of funding for the 
banking sector in Rwanda.  
Insurance companies and pension schemes are regarded as the two non-bank financial institutions 
operating in Rwanda. Although they are still developing, the National Bank of Rwanda has put 
aside the measures to strength those sectors.  
Regarding the microfinances, the current situation registers 3 performing microfinances, but there 
are other small microfinances, nevertheless the lack of enough capital remains a major challenge 
to them.  
The capital market in Rwanda is at its early stages. The Rwanda Stock Exchange started operations 
in 2008. Currently the National Bank of Rwanda has put in place new policies to improve the 
capital markets industry in Rwanda. These include financial awareness campaign to teach the 
public on long term investments and setting up regulations for Small and Medium Enterprises 
wishing to raise long-term capital through the capital market. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Most economists would agree that, at least in the short term, monetary policy can have a significant 
impact on the real sector of the economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). For example, according to 
Christiano et al., (1994a) and Romer and Romer (1989), the monetary policy activities are 
followed by movements in real output that may last for two years or more. However, the 
mechanisms through which monetary policy can influence the economy differ from one country 
to another depending upon their legal and financial structures (Buigut, 2010).  
In advanced countries with well-developed financial markets, the interest rate channel is viewed 
as an essential monetary policy transmission mechanism (Handa, 2000). However, monetary 
policies in developing economies are characterised by the poorly developed nature of the financial 
sector and the bank-lending channel can be regarded as an important view of monetary policy 
transmission in those countries. Indeed, in underdeveloped countries, many bank dependent 
borrowers dominate the economy and the supply of loans is directly influenced by changes in 
policy (Ramlogan, 2004). A bank-lending channel is supposed to operate in addition to the 
conventional interest rate channel (Kakes, 2000). 
The rest of Chapter three is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical background 
of the interest rate channel and the bank-lending channel. Section 3.3 illustrates the main results 
of the empirical literature on the bank-lending channel and the chapter will finish with a brief 
conclusion.  
3.2 Theoretical Literature 
The causal direction between money and real economy has been debated since modern economics 
began in the last quarter of the 18th century (Hoover and Perez: 1994). Economists differ in their 
interpretations of the confirmation. As a result, they propose different explanations for the causes 
that output may (or may not) vary with the changes in the money supply (Hubbard: 2005). This 
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section looks at the views of Classical and Keynesian economists. The Phillips curve, the 
expectations- augmented Phillips curve and Lucas-Sargent-Wallace (LSW) models will offer a 
further explanation on the connection between money and real sector of the economy. In contrast 
to the interest rate channel, the bank/credit lending channel will provide a better understanding on 
how monetary policy affects the output and the price level especially in developing economies. 
Lastly, this section will provide some theories on the inflation targeting regime.   
3.2.1 Classical model 
According to the traditional classical economics, a change in money supply in the economy causes 
a proportionate change in the price level (Handa: 2009). In the Classical schools, the markets are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive (perfect knowledge), and trade only occurs when market 
clearing prices are established (Mishkin: 2004). Furthermore, they believe that wages and prices 
are completely flexible so that the economy has an inherent tendency to operate at full employment 
equilibrium (Hillier: 1992). 
Additionally, the modern classical and the new Classical schools believe that due to an expected 
increase in the money supply, the public uses rational expectations in forecasting the aggregate 
price level and real output is not affected (Handa, 2000). Likewise, with rational expectations by 
the public about the price level, new classical economists assume that, on average, the actual and 
expected price levels are close, so the central bank gains little by utilizing unexpected changes in 
the money to stabilize output fluctuations. They recommend that the authorities shouldleave the 
economy alone since the use of expansion of the money supply would only affect price level and 
the nominal national income but not real income or employment (Handa: 2000).  
3.2.2 The Keynesian Model    
The Great Depression of the 1930s in Western economies was a period characterized by a 
prolonged unemployment, i.e. the price and wage flexibility failed to return the economy to full 
employment. Keynes argued that national income equilibrium does not always match the full 
employment level, and when a significant divergence exists between the two, appropriate 
monetary and fiscal policy will increase or decrease output and employment in the economy 
37 
 
(Hillier:1992). Thus, Keynesians support the use of discretionary monetary and fiscal policies to 
reduce deviations from full employment. This thesis focuses on the monetary policy. 
Additionally, Keynesian approaches argue that the market for labour is diverse, separated by skills, 
different firms etc. and with implicit long-term contracts and insider-outsider trading, and so forth, 
and is therefore considered as being inefficient since it does not have instantaneous market 
clearance i.e. the market instantly doesn’t bring back equilibrium after any change in demand or 
supply (Handa: 2009).    
Keynesian thoughts are organized into the IS-LM framework. The IS-LM model, i.e. the model of 
behaviour in the market for goods and services and in the market for financial assets, represents 
Keynes ideas on short-run macroeconomics, about the determination of output and interest rates, 
under the simplifying assumption of money wage and price rigidity (Angeriz et al, 2008). This 
model focuses on the equilibrium of goods and financial markets at a point in time (Mishkin: 
2004)).  
In the Keynesian analysis (with a closed economy), the primary way that interest rates affect the 
level of aggregate output is through their effect on planned investment spending (Mishkin: 2004). 
The expected real interest rate represents the cost of funds for investment. An increase in the 
expected real interest rate lowers the demand for investments and therefore the equilibrium level 
of aggregate demand, while a decrease in the expected real interest rate raises investment spending 
and equilibrium aggregate demand. 
According to the Keynesian School, the demand for money is positively related to aggregate output 
and negatively related to interest rates. A rise in income in the economy increases the volume of 
transactions, which in return raises the demand for money to carry out those transactions (Colander 
and Gamber: 2002). The opportunity cost of holding money is the interest rate sacrificed by not 
holding the other assets such bonds as a substitute (Hubbard: 2005). As interest rates rise, the 
opportunity cost of holding money rises, and the demand for money drops. In this model, the 
supply of money by the central bank is assumed to be fixed. The level of interest rate is determined 
by equilibrium in the money market, at which point the quantity of money demanded and the 
quantity of money supplied are equal.  
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The IS-LM framework determines the demand for commodities and this demand has to be set 
against the supply of commodities to determine actual real income or output in the economy and 
the price level at which this output will be traded (Handa: 2009). The demand for commodities or 
aggregate demand describes the relationship between the quantity of aggregate output demanded 
and the price level when other variables are held constant. The AD (aggregate demand) curve 
specified by the IS-LM model slopes downward and to the right representing an inverse 
relationship between the aggregate demand for commodities and the price level. The AD curve is 
downward-sloping because a decrease in price level, holding the nominal quantity of money 
unchanged, leads to larger real money balances (in terms of the goods and services it can buy), 
causing the real interest rate to drop making investment more profitable thereby increasing 
aggregate demand. On the other hand, an increase in the price level decreases the real money 
balances leading to a rise in the real interest rate. An increase in the real interest rate makes firms 
less willing to invest in plants and equipment, decreasing investment spending and the quantity of 
aggregate output demanded.  
Some factors that prevent wages and prices from rising fully with a rise in the expected price level 
identified by the new Keynesians include long-term employment contracts, efficiency wage theory 
and a theory of rigid or sticky prices (Handa: 2009).  
Long-term labour contracts are one of the sources of rigidity that prevent wages from responding 
fully to changes in the expected price level in the short run. According to the Keynesians view, the 
wage rate will not adjust to the higher expectation about the price level as the workers are locked 
into a wage agreement, but when the contract is negotiated again, firms and workers may put the 
expected inflation rate into their agreements, but they cannot do so immediately. Efficient wage 
theory is also a source of wage rigidity. The efficient wage model assumes that the effort is a 
function of the worker’s wage (Handa: 2009). Firms may be unwilling to change wages frequently 
because such changes may affect the worker effort of the labour force. In the case of high 
unemployment for example, a firm may keep the wage rate of its employees unchanged instead of 
lowering them to avoid a poorer worker performance (Mishkin: 2004). 
Price stickiness may occur because it is costly for firms to change prices frequently. Changing the 
set prices involves a range of costs known as menu costs such as reprinting price lists and 
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catalogues, informing customers and so on (Colander and Gamber: 2002). In addition, the firm 
may not find it profitable to reply to demand changes with price changes since the inconvenience 
and costs of frequent price changes are likely to be resented by the firm’s customers (Handa: 2009).  
These opinions imply that in the short run, the firm will not change its price regularly, but will 
respond to intervening changes in demand by changing its output at the existing price, leading to 
the Keynesian conclusions that the monetary policy, through aggregate demand, affects output in 
the short run though it is neutral in the long run (Handa: 2009). 
Indeed, the new Keynesian model states that in the short run, the price and the nominal wage 
adjustments are staggered over time, leading to a slow adjustment of the price level, so that the 
real value of aggregate demand would remain higher than the initial equilibrium and the firms 
would be generating greater output (Handa: 2009). Hence, an expansionary monetary policy will 
result in a greater output during the adjustment process and would not be neutral as suggested by 
the classical economists. In the long run however, once all adjustments are done, all prices 
adjusted, so that the relative prices and output are as in the initial equilibrium, the price level will 
increase in proportion to the increase in aggregate demand and monetary policy will become 
neutral (Mishkin: 2004). This Keynesian long run equilibrium conclusion of the economy having 
full employment and money neutrality is the same as in the classical paradigm. 
The interest rates link between money and output forms a vital component of the transmission 
mechanism in the Keynesian model (Handa, 2000). This channel through which changes in money 
supply affect aggregate demand and output is described as the money channel (Hubbard, 2002) or 
interest rate channel (Angeriz et al., 2008). Under this monetary transmission mechanism, i.e., the 
impact of a change in the monetary policy instrument (e.g. the short-term interest rate or base 
money) on intermediate variables (such as broad money or domestic credit) and final objective 
(inflation), the increase in the real interest rate is assumed to dampen aggregate demand and 
thereby reducing the rate of inflation (Amitava, 1990). 
3.2.2.1 Phillips curve. 
Keynesians beliefs were supplemented during the late 1950s and 1960s by the Philips curve which 
stated that there could be an exploitable trade-off between inflation and unemployment so that 
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policy-makers could apparently choose which combination of inflation and unemployment they 
desired; subject to the constraint that lower unemployment implied higher inflation (Gordon, 
2011). During this period the Phillips curve offered the economic instrument to support the 
economic theories of the Keynesians that the monetary and fiscal authorities should try to attain 
better levels of output than the economy would generate on its own, although doing so would 
indicate a higher inflation rates (Handa: 2009). This belief was to be a major aspect of most central 
banks’ policies till 1970s where, during the severe recession of 1974-75, the economy experienced 
high levels of unemployment coexisting with a high inflation rate (Rubene and Guarda: 2004). In 
this way, Friedman argued that only a part of inflation that is unexpected could influence output. 
The fundamental contribution of Friedman yields an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, in 
which the simple Phillips curve is combined with expected inflation (Hubbard: 2005). 
3.2.2.2 The expectations-augmented Phillips curve. 
While Phillips claimed that the monetary policy can exploit a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment rates to manage aggregate demand, the 1970s were a time of expansionary monetary 
policy but accompanied by stagflation in Western economies (Handa: 2000). Yet, after a period of 
low inflation in the 1980s and the early 1990s, economists have again worked on the structural 
interpretation of the Phillips curve (Leva and Paola, 2004). Friedman Milton (1977) and Phelps 
Edmund (1968) warned that the apparent trade-off would prove deceptive since economic agents will 
adapt their inflation expectations to a new policy environment and at the expected inflation rate, the 
unemployment rate would be the natural rate i.e. the normal rate of unemployment due to frictions in 
the job market, as workers search for jobs and firms search for workers (Leva and Paola, 2004). In 
the long run, they argued, the economy cannot deviate from the “natural” rate of unemployment 
except if agents’ inflation expectations are systematically wrong, meaning that money is neutral 
(Friedman, 1968a ). Thus, Friedman declared that there is always a temporary trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment and that there is no permanent trade-off. The temporary trade-off comes 
not from the inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation (Laidler, 2006).    
The role of expectations proved crucial to the impact of changes in inflation on output and 
unemployment, and led to the modification of the Phillips curve to the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve (Hubbard: 2005). In the expectations- augmented Phillips curve model, expected 
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inflation plays a central role in wage bargaining, because nominal wages are predetermined at the 
beginning of every period, and before the actual price level is known (Sargent and Wallace 1975). In 
setting the equilibrium nominal wage between firms and workers, an increase in the firm’s expected 
price level induces firms to agree to higher contractual nominal wage and an increase in the 
household’s expected price level encourages workers to demand higher nominal wage during wage 
negotiations so that a higher nominal wage will be put in the wage contracts (Handa: 2009).  This 
implies that in nominal wage negotiations, a firm bases its employment and production on its expected 
price level rather than on the price level. During the production process however, the firm would 
know the actual price of its product as a joint part of its production and pricing decision so that actual 
employment and output will depend on the actual real wage (nominal wage divided by the actual 
price level) rather than on the expected real wage (nominal wage divided by the expected price level) 
(Leva and Paola, 2004).    
Without an accompanying change in the price level, an increase in nominal wage, will increase the 
actual real wage and reduce employment, but for the given contractual nominal wage, a rise in the 
actual price level decreases the real wage and raises employment levels (Handa: 2009).  However, 
a proportionate increase in both the expected and actual price level will leave the employment 
unchanged.  
If the expected price level for the firms and the price level expected by workers equal the actual 
price level, that is when there are no errors in expectations; actual employment will be equal to the 
expected employment level, and is taken to be the full employment level. If the actual price level 
is higher than both the expected price level for the firms and the expected level of workers, actual 
employment is greater than the expected employment level and vice versa. According to Hubbard 
(2005), if the actual price level is higher, labour will be surprisingly cheaper and firms will employ 
more than they had expected to employ, leading to a higher output than at full employment level. 
Thus, the deviation in employment from its expected level is positively related to the errors in 
expectations. 
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3.2.2.3 Lucas supply function and the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace (LSW) model. 
While Friedman’s expectations- augmented Phillips curve placed emphasis on the labour market, 
Lucas (1972, 1973) focused on the commodity markets. The central result of the Lucas supply 
function is that policy-makers will be able to affect the level of output, ( y ) only if their actions are 
not anticipated by the public (Romer: 2001). Thus, according to Lucas, the total output supply, s
tY  
depends on the difference between the actual price level, tP  and the expected price level, 
e
tP . This 
theory developed by Lucas, is known as a theory of price misperceptions (Hillier, 1992). The idea 
is that individual sellers who observe changes in the market price of their own product may not 
know whether any particular price change is caused by a change in the aggregate price level or by 
a change in the good’s relative price (Kimbrough, 1984). According to Lucas, this incomplete 
information concerning the state of the economy leads sellers to form rational expectations (Clive 
and Roman: 1980). Thus, in the price expectations by the firm, the Lucas version includes 
uncertainty in the estimation of the actual price level (Snowdom and Vane: 2005).  
The Lucas supply function is expressed as: 
 tt
s
t PPyy  
*
  
The Lucas supply function is the aggregate supply function based on errors in the expectations of 
the relative prices in commodity markets (Handa: 2009).   is the output change given the 
expectation error  ePP   while   is the revision of 
eP  from its previous value P . If the relative 
prices are expected to be stable i.e.   = 0, the Lucas supply function becomes ft
s
t yy   where 
f
ty  
is the full employment level of output. In the absence of errors in expectations, the short run 
equilibrium output 
*y equals s
ty  .   
Based on the Lucas supply function, the Lucas-Sargent–Wallace model examines the effects of 
systematic and unanticipated money supply changes on output and prices. It identifies the markets 
for commodities and money, with the assumption of equilibrium in these markets (Romer: 2001). 
In the LSW model the demand for output is stated as: 
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d
ty =   tt pm  + t      >0     
Where: 
dy  is the aggregate demand, m  is nominal money supply (and E  is expected) and   
represents the random term.  
The equation of money supply specified by the monetary policy is: 
0mmt   +  1tDy  + t     <0   
According to the equation of money, the monetary policy increases the money supply if the last 
period’s output was below the full employment level ( 1tDy < 0). 
The equilibrium condition for the commodity market is: 
s
t
d
tt yyy    or          
s
t
d
tt DyDyDy   
The output determination in the LSW model is expressed as: 





 
ttt
tt DyDy 1
 
Since the systematic policy parameters 0m and  do not occur in the output equation, the authorities 
cannot utilize systematic monetary policy to influence ty . Since t does present in the output 
equation, errors in predicting money supply influence ty , but if the monetary authorities were to 
rise such errors would only increase the variance of ty without any effect on output level.  
According to this model, although output can differ from its full employment level, non- random 
policy has neither a long-run nor short-run effect on real output. Therefore, there is no stabilization 
role for monetary policy in this model. 
According to Handa (2009), the equation of the expected price level is stated as: 
etp       1//1  t
f
tt DyymE        10 //1  t
f
t Dyym    
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From the equation of the expected price level above, 1/  t
e
t Emp  ( is changes) indicating that 
the expected price level rises in the same proportion in the same period with the systematic 
component of the nominal money supply, and reacts to the policy parameters  and 0m , but not to 
the random part t of the money supply. The conclusion is that, a rise in the systematic money 
supply proportionately changes the price level and the expected price level while leaving output 
unchanged, whereas random changes in money supply modify both the price level and real output 
but not the expected price level.  
The new Keynesians economists recommend that the central bank uses the interest rate as its 
primary tool of monetary policy and acts as if it decides on the interest rate through a Taylor rule 
(Woodford, 2001). A Taylor rule is a monetary policy rule that stipulates how a central bank should 
change its interest rate policy tool in a systematic manner in response to developments in inflation 
and macroeconomic activity (Taylor, 1993). The rule, based on the USA experience in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, suggested that the federal funds rate ( r ) should be set and could be 
explained by a simple equation: 
)2(5.05.02  pypr  
where p  is the rate of inflation of the last four quarters and y represents the percent deviation of 
real GDP from trend (Asso, et a.l, 2007).  
In 1997, the initial Taylor rule was revised to incorporate an explicit role for forecasts in a 
monetary policy rule.  
The new revised Taylor rule, i.e. the forward- looking Taylor rule is specified as: 
    tttttttTt ExEDrrr    1111 1  
where Tr is the real interest rate target of the central banks 
            0r  
is the long run real interest rate 
            T  is the target inflation rate 
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             1ttE   represents the expected future levels of inflation 
            1tt xE  Stands for the expected future levels of output  
             1tDr  
is the deviation of the previous period’s interest rate from its long run equilibrium 
level (Handa: 2009). 
Currently, the revised Taylor rule has become a part of a broader movement in which commitment 
(and therefore credibility), transparency and independence, replaced a culture of discretion and 
occasional political influence (Mishkin: 2004). In the USA, various versions of the Taylor rule 
became integrated into macroeconomic models and sometimes the policy makers based policy 
positions on the recommendations of the forward- looking Taylor rule (Handa, 2009). But the 
Taylor rules are grounded on the developed economies (Mohammed: 2009). In the context of 
developing countries with a complex structure of the economy (weak financial institutions, small 
information set, low capacity of professionals), it is often difficult to follow some rules (Malik and 
Ahmed: 2007).  
3.2.2.4 Problems underlying the use of IS-LM model  
Indeed, the interest rate channel is applicable in advanced economies. In the interest rate channel 
of the Keynesians approaches, central bank policies that modify the supply of bank reserves affect 
the interest rate that commercial banks charge for very short-term lending. Arbitrage across the 
maturity spectrum transmits these effects to the rate of return on long-term bonds. Long-term real 
interest rates are affected by price stickiness and rational expectations that influence the demand 
for a broad range of capital goods (Montiel and Mishra, 2012). In this way, for monetary policy to 
have a desired effect on the real output and inflation, which is the ultimate objective of monetary 
policy, the economy needs an economy with a highly developed and competitive financial system 
like that in industrial countries.   
According to Montiel and Mishra (2012), the economy in advanced countries is characterised by 
a strong institutional environment in which loan contracts are protected and financial 
intermediation is conducted. This is achieved through formal financial markets, an independent 
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central bank, a well-functioning and highly liquid interbank market for reserves, a well-functioning 
and highly liquid secondary market for government securities with a broad range of maturities, a 
well-functioning and highly liquid markets for equities and real estate, a high degree of 
international capital mobility and a floating exchange rate. The economy in underdeveloped 
countries is characterised by underdeveloped financial markets. These markets have a limited 
portfolio of financial assets available to the private sector, a lack of organized securities markets, 
underdeveloped money markets in which the central bank conducts open market operations, 
interest rates that are controlled and fixed by applicable legal norms and equity markets that are 
small or non-existent (Montiel, 1991 cited by Bangura, 2011: 11).  
According to Kovanen (2011) the features of financial markets in underdeveloped countries 
introduce challenges for monetary policy implementation and contribute to the weaknesses in the 
transmission through the interest rate channel.  
An even more important question to ask is whether changes in monetary policy still have effects 
in the supply of bank loans given the features of underdeveloped countries financial markets and 
taking into consideration the financial reform and financial liberalisation that took place in 1990s 
in many developing countries? Insights into the above question in terms of the Rwandan economy 
are examined in Chapter five of this study. 
Additionally, the IS-LM model, assumes that investment depends on interest rates alone. 
Nevertheless, the investment determination depends on other factors as well. One factor is credit 
conditions, the willingness of banks to lend, independent of the real interest rate. Low interest rates 
do not automatically mean that banks will make more loans. Instead, banks care about the risk 
adjusted spread, the difference between the lending rate and the borrowing rate, adjusted for risk 
(Colander and Gamber: 2002). That spread may vary even when interest rates are unchanged, and 
banks sometimes change their lending standards without changing the interest rate (Mishkin: 
2004). 
Likewise, the model assumes that borrowers are indifferent to how or from whom they raise funds 
and regard alternative sources of funds as close substitutes, permitting us  to focus on the market 
for money, where the supply and the demand for money determines the interest rates, which 
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influence spending decisions by households and businesses (Hubbard: 2005). Conversely, the 
actual financial system is more complex than the one explained in the money channel. In particular, 
banks perform information services that are not matched by financial markets, and households and 
businesses do not have equal access to funds that they need to buy the durable goods and to make 
investments (Favero, et al., 1999).  
3.2.2.5 Information problems in lending  
In making transactions in financial markets, borrowers and lenders (savers) may have different 
information. Asymmetric information describes the situation in which one party in the transaction 
has better information than the other (Hubbard, 2008: 229). Most typically, a borrower knows 
more about his financial condition and his future prospects than the lender (Masako and Neal, 
1986). Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) argue that information asymmetry problems are more present 
in underdeveloped economies where the economy is controlled by small firms that are mostly 
financed by bank loans. The presence of asymmetric information in financial markets has serious 
consequences for corporate finance and makes it very costly for lenders and borrowers to make 
exchanges in financial markets (Karl, et al., 2002). According to (Mishkin: 2004), the asymmetric 
information can be either in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard costs.  
Selecting to whom to give more of your money is a very important part of managing risk. A lender 
suffers adverse selection when he/she is not capable of distinguishing the good-risk applicants 
from the bad- risk applicants before making an investment (Hubbard: 2005). Potential bad credit 
risks are the ones who most actively search for loans, implying that the parties who are the most 
likely to generate undesirable results are the ones most likely to want to engage in the transaction 
(Mishkin: 2004). In this context, those bad- risk applicants find it suitable to hide the true nature 
of a project, thereby exploiting the lender’s lack of information (Karl et al, 2002). 
Thus, there is no guarantee that the borrower will repay the loan. Consequently, since the outside 
investors or creditors have less information about a firm’s investment plans, they require high costs 
of funds to compensate them for having to find out information about the firms. This makes 
external financing more expensive, especially for small firms, as the larger businesses alternatively 
may turn to the stock and bond markets for investment funds (Hubbard: 2005). In most developed 
48 
 
countries, government agencies set requirements for information disclosure for firms, and private 
firms try to collect information on individual borrowers and sell it to savers, reducing the costs of 
adverse selection, although it may be difficult to eliminate them (Hubbard: 2005). This case is 
different from developing economies where there are no such activities of information disclosure. 
Also since large firms contribute a bigger share in the economy of industrialised economies, the 
information costs are less likely to constrain capital investment spending, as those firms have a 
greater net worth (the difference between assets and liabilities).    
When the money is given to someone, it is less likely that the money will come back (with interest) 
if it is misused or lost through excessive risk-taking. Moral hazard is the risk that the receivers of 
funds will not use the money as was intended or they may take unnecessary risks or not be vigilant 
in reducing risk (Masako and Neal, 1986). Again, moral hazard occurs because of asymmetric 
information as the borrower knows more than the lender does about how the loan will actually be 
used, and the resulting problems raise the lender’s costs (Mishkin, 1990). Monitoring problems 
increases the information costs inducing lenders to charge higher interest. In this way, some small 
businesses may even find that funds are not available to them. The Principal-agent problem is a 
type of moral hazard that may arise when managers do not own much of the firm’s equity and thus 
do not have the same incentive to maximize the firm’s value as the owners do (Hubbard, 2005: 
234).  
The principal’s (investor or employer) interests are not perfectly aligned with those of the agent 
(manager who manages the investor’s money or employee). This means that employees can 
advance their own benefits at the expense of those of the employers. Investors can react to the 
managers’ problems by increasing the monitoring, and this could be achieved by enhanced 
management’s inspection of managers’ work thereby increasing the investors’ costs (Grossman 
and Hart, 1983). 
Indeed, the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard make direct financing costly (especially 
for small firms), since people are unwilling to lend or invest money in unknown entities (Antje 
and Anurag, 2008). Similarly, those risks make it difficult for good borrowers to raise funds in 
financial markets (since lenders will charge higher interests) and lower the returns obtained by 
lenders, reducing the efficiency of financial markets (Mishkin: 2004). 
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With their expertise in gathering reliable information at reduced cost, financial intermediaries can 
extend financing to many firms or individuals who would otherwise not get it (Mishkin, 1995). 
Indeed, financial intermediaries, particularly banks, specialize in collecting information about the 
default risk of many borrowers reducing the costs of adverse selection (Colander and Gamber: 
2002). Banks raise funds from the depositors and, utilizing their superior information, lend them 
to borrowers that present good risks. Because banks are better able than individual lenders (savers) 
to differentiate competent borrowers from incompetent ones, banks make a profit by charging a 
higher interest rate on their loans than the rate they pay to depositors (Hubbard: 2005). Since banks 
as a larger investor hold a bigger mass of shares and earn profits, they have an incentive to 
supervise how their funds are used, resulting in the reduction of the information costs of moral 
hazards (Mishkin: 2004). Hence, banks reduce the costs of asymmetric information in the financial 
system and facilitate savers to channel their funds to borrowers more efficiently.  
3.2.3 The bank-lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism 
In the money channel presented above, the central bank, by manipulating the bank’s reserves is 
assumed to be able to control the quantity of money (deposits with the banks) thereby affecting 
the nominal interest rate. In turn, changes in nominal interest rate are expected to translate into 
changes of the real interest rate (prices are sticky in the short-run) affecting the economy through 
aggregate demand (IS/LM framework). Thus, according to the money view, the monetary 
transmission mechanism operates through the liability side of banks’ balance sheets (Mishkin: 
2004). In this view, the loans by financial institutions play no special role in the money supply 
process and banks are important only because they create money by issuing deposits (the liability 
side) and play no role on the assets side (bank loans) (Kashyap, et al., 1994). 
However, the model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), showed 
that some borrowers, especially those with small firms, have limited access to the capital market 
and depend on bank credit for external funding. Bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes and 
changes in the composition of bank assets influence investment financing. These economists focus 
on the ‘bank-lending/credit channel’ of monetary transmission mechanism, placing emphasis on 
the behaviour of bank-dependent borrowers and the role played by banks in the transmission of 
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monetary policy (Hubbard, 2005). Thus, unlike the interest rate channel, the bank-lending channel 
recognizes differences among borrowers in the financial system. 
According to the bank-lending view, monetary policy works by affecting bank assets (loans) in 
addition to banks’ liabilities (deposits), meaning that  monetary policy besides changing the supply 
of deposits also changes the supply of bank loans (Ford, et al., 2003). In this situation, the crucial 
response of banks to monetary policy is their lending response and not their role as deposit creators 
(Meltzer, 1995). Thus, in the bank-lending channel, with a monetary contraction, output declines 
for two reasons: (1) a decrease in households’ and firms’ spending due to an increase in the interest 
rate; and (2) a decreased availability of bank loans (Hubbard et al, 2002). In the bank-lending 
channel, a change in a bank’s ability or willingness to lend affects bank-dependent borrowers 
‘ability to finance their spending plans (Hubbard, 2005: 641). The bank-lending channel focuses 
on bank loans and suggests that a monetary policy expansion (contraction) increases (decreases) 
the banks ‘ability to lend. Increases (decreases) in loans to bank-dependent borrowers enlarge 
(reduce) their expenditure (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Aggregate demand and output rise (drop) 
by more than can be accounted for by the conventional money channel (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). 
This is shown in the Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below 
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Figure 3.1: Monetary Expansion effects in the Money Channel 
 
Source: Hubbard (2005: 642) 
Figure 3.2:  Monetary Expansion effects in the Bank-lending Channel 
 
           Source: Hubbard (2005: 643) 
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From Figure 3.1 (a), an increase in the money supply (MS) from MS0 to MS1, leads to a decline in 
the interest rate (r) from r0 to r1 in the short run. In figure 3.1 (b), a rise in the money supply 
increases the aggregate demand (AD) and the AD curve moves to the right from AD0 to AD1. At 
the new equilibrium, E1, output, Y1 is greater that the initial level of output, Y0 at E0. The higher 
level of current output raises money demand, and the money demand (MD) curve shifts from MD0 
to MD1 in Figure 3.1 (a) and interest rate rises from r1 to r1’. Therefore, in the interest rate channel, 
a monetary policy expansion decreases the interest rate and increases output level in the short run. 
The predictions of the bank-lending channel are related to those in the money channel in one 
respect, namely when banks enlarge deposits by providing more loans, the increase in bank 
reserves lowers loans interest rates (Hubbard, 2005). Various borrowers can decide on whether to 
borrow from the commercial banks or from other non-bank sources, so lower bank loan rates 
produces lower interest rates in financial markets (Hubbard, 2005). The bank-lending channel 
holds further, however, that monetary policy affects the economy through the volume of bank-
lending to and spending by bank-dependent borrowers (Hubbard, 2005: 642). In the Figure 3.2 (a), 
the increase in the money supply from MS0 to MS1 leads to a reduction in the interest rate from r0 
to r1.  
In the bank-lending view, the AD curve moves to the right as a results of an increase in spending 
from a decline in the rate of interest and an increased availability of loans supplied by the banks 
(Hubbard, 2005). Thus, from the initial equilibrium at E0, the shift of AD curve from AD0 to AD1 
in Figure 3.2 (b) is bigger than in the interest rate channel (Figure 3.1 (b)) and at the new 
equilibrium E1, a rise in output from Y0 to Y1 is greater than that presented in Figure 3.1 (b). 
Banks finance themselves from deposits. In accordance with Mishkin (1995), the bank-lending 
channel can be schematically presented as follows: 
Repo rate↑⇒ bank deposits ↓, bank loans ↓⇒I, C ↓⇒Y↓, P↓ 
The Mishkin’s expression states that, an increase in the repo rate by the central bank (NBR) 
decreases bank deposits and demand for loans to finance investment (I) and consumption (C). The 
results may lead to a fall in both, the national income (Y) and the price level (P). 
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Since banks reduce costs of asymmetric information in lending and that there are significant 
information asymmetries in developing countries, bank credits are very important in such countries 
(Agung, 1998). The economy in developing countries is dominated by small firms which depend 
on the bank loans. While bank credits are the main source of finance to small firms, large firms 
may have a variety of financial sources (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). As a consequence, small 
firms bear the full brunt of the reduction in bank loans (Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Monteil (1991) 
stated that since alternative sources of credit are very limited or even non-existent, customers in 
developing countries cannot replace lost bank credit with other types of finance and so are forced 
to cut back on investment spending following a contractionary monetary policy.  
In addition, Handa (2009) argues that some countries mainly among the less developed countries 
have a large informal financial sector and large legally unaccounted funds, i.e. ‘black money’. 
Since ‘black money’ cannot be deposited in formal financial institutions where it could be loaned 
out, it reduces the increase in money supply and the significance of the money channel relative to 
the lending channel. This indicates that the money channel is more important in industrialized 
countries where financial markets are developed while the lending channel can be quite important 
in any given less developed countries (Handa: 2009).  
According to Stiglitz (1994), less developed countries must expect that firms within their 
economies will have to rely heavily on bank-lending, rather than on securities markets as a source 
of funding, because asymmetric information makes it difficult to issue securities.  
The Rwanda’s financial system is composed of the banking sector, non-bank financial and 
microfinance institutions. The banking industry dominates Rwanda’s financial sector, controlling 
83.4% of the total financial assets (BNR, 2011).  
Definitely, in most developing countries, the banking sector is the dominant sector in the financial 
sector since the capital market is not well developed (Agung, 1998). Indeed, the bank-lending 
channel, stresses a unique role of banks arising from their ability to extend credit to borrowers 
who, because of informational problems, find it difficult to obtain external funding without paying 
high costs (Hulsewig, et al, 2002).  
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The bank-lending channel operates when the central bank actions affect the supply of loans from 
depository institutions (banks) and in turn, the real spending of bank borrowers (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996). According to Ramey (1993), two key conditions must be satisfied for a lending 
channel to operate. Banks cannot shield their loan portfolios from changes in monetary policy, and 
borrowers cannot fully insulate their real spending from changes in the availability of bank credit.  
Ramlogan (2004) reports that changes in policy have a direct influence on the supply of loans in 
developing countries. In those countries, banks do not have other sources of funds to replace the 
lost deposits following a policy tightening exercise (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). In Rwanda, 
deposits are the main source of funding for the banking sector and constituted 75 per cent of total 
liabilities in December 2008 (NBR, 2009). 
Many borrowers in underdeveloped countries are considerably bank-dependent and the banks have 
the ability to overcome the information problems in credit markets. A monetary policy in 
developing countries that has a direct effect on bank-lending because the drop in deposits caused 
by a tightening monetary policy cannot be completely offset by issuing other forms of funding, the 
bank-lending channel is really more relevant in developing countries.  
The bank-lending channel (also referred as narrow credit) is one vision of the two versions of the 
credit channel. Another vision is the balance sheet channel. The balance sheet channel also arises 
because a change in policy rate affects not only market interest rates but also the financial position 
of private economic agents because changes in interest rates affect bank balance sheets, cash flows 
and the net worth of businesses and households (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Like the bank 
channel, the balance sheet channel also occurs from the existence of asymmetric information 
problems in the credit market. According to the balance sheet channel, a tight monetary policy 
weakens the borrower´s financial position (reduced cash flow due to higher interest payments on 
short term liabilities and a reduced net worth due to decreasing asset prices), which raises adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems on credit markets burdened with informational asymmetries 
(Neyer, 2000). These problems lessen bank-lending and consequently aggregate investment and 
output (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 and Mishkin, 2004). In the balance sheet view, this drop in net 
worth raises the cost of external financing by more than the increase that is implied by higher 
interest rates and lessens the firms’ investment capacity thereby reducing aggregate demand and 
output (Hubbard: 2005).    
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3.2.4 Inflation targeting  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the current NBR’s main tool of monetary operations is repo 
transactions with commercial banks. A change in the repo rate affects the lending rate; the 
economic activity and the price level. In 1998, the IMF and World Bank advised the National Bank 
of Rwanda to consider a medium term inflation target of three per cent a year as a goal for monetary 
policy. In the same way, since the early 1990s, an increasing number of central banks have adopted 
inflation targeting as their preferred framework for monetary policy. For this, the Classical 
economists argued that using the expansion of money supply would only affect price level and the 
nominal national income but not real income (Hubbard, 2005). Under the long-run neutrality of 
money thought of Classical and Keynesians economists, what the central bank can do is to protect 
the value of the currency by controlling inflation. 
A low inflation rate (say between 1 and 3 percent), is considered to be successfully consistent with 
the price level stability, with the increase in prices simply reflecting the continual advancements 
in existing products and the introduction of new ones (Handa, 2009). A positive but low rate of 
inflation is considered beneficial to the economy as a whole. This approach provides firms with 
the flexibility to respond to changes in the relative demand or supply of different products as well 
as different kinds of workers, as firms are able to respond to smaller decreases in output with no 
reduction in nominal wages of workers, which could produce industrial instability (Mishkin, 
2004).  
Inflation leads to an increased uncertainty that makes economic decision-making more difficult 
(Kahn, 2009). High inflation is usually associated with greater price variability. Confusing price 
signals make the price system less efficient, and result in lower levels of investment and growth 
(Reka, 2008). This leads the central banks to believe that the best contribution that monetary policy 
can make to growth is to provide a low, pre-announced and credible inflation targeting to improve 
the real performance of the economy (Epstein, 2007).   
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that includes five main elements, namely 
(i) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation;  
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(ii) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to 
which other goals are subordinated;  
(iii) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary 
aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments;  
(iv) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the 
public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary 
authorities; and  
(v) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives (Mishkin, 
2000: 1).  
3.2.4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
According to Heever (2001), inflation targeting has numerous important advantages. These include  
(i) transparency – the concept is easily understandable, with the ultimate policy objective 
translated into an explicit target value;  
(ii) enhanced clarity a private and public sectors; improved accountability of the central bank;  
(iii) elimination of the need to rely on a stable relationship between the money stock and 
inflation, which has become increasingly difficult to identify; 
(iv) enhancement of economic policy co-ordination, with government and the central bank 
publicly committed to the same inflation target; and 
(v)  providing an anchor for inflation expectations and price and wage setting, thus, reducing 
the friction which arises from widely divergent inflation expectations.  
Due to these advantages, the inflation-targeting regime becomes more reliable compared with 
other frameworks. It makes the process of monetary policy more transparent, provides 
accountability, and contributes to the improvement and stabilization of investor sentiment (Tutal, 
2002).  
Despite the advantages discussed above, the inflation-targeting framework has several 
disadvantages. One of the limitations of inflation targeting is that it is a more complicated regime 
to implement relative to monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting frameworks (Jonsson, 
1999). Inflation targeting is a forward-looking policy (Bongiwe, 2006). In the forward-looking 
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nature of inflation targeting, monetary policy requires that it be able to react to the deviations 
between the inflation target and the inflation forecast at different policy horizons (Heever, 2001). 
Thus, the central bank has to have access to both an effective inflation-forecasting model and 
policy tools, which impact the inflation forecast with reasonable precision (Tutal, 2002).    
The inflation targeting process is even more complicated to implement in developing countries. 
Some of the prerequisites of inflation targeting are the presence of a well-developed technical 
infrastructure, the existence of a healthy financial system, central bank independence and lack of 
fiscal dominance (Angeriz and Arestis, 2005; Batini, et al., 2005). According to Batini, et al., 
(2005), since inflation targeting is a forward- looking policy, central banks require to have well 
developed inflation forecasting and modelling capabilities in place. Furthermore, central banks 
need to have the ability to collect relevant data and make it available for modelling and forecasting 
purposes (Bongiwe, 2006).  
In some cases, it is immediately clear that most underdeveloped countries do not meet these basic 
requirements for adopting inflation targeting (Manson, et al., 1998). Studies of central bank 
independence in developing countries have found that their monetary authorities face 
environments that differ radically from those faced by central banks in advanced economies 
(Manson, et al., 1998). In particular, three main factors hamper the scope for central banks in 
developing countries to conduct an independent monetary policy.  These factors are the heavy 
reliance on seigniorage; shallow financial markets that often result from government attempts to 
extract revenue through such forms of financial repression as interest rate ceilings, high reserve 
requirements, sectoral credit policies, and compulsory placements of public debt; and fragile 
banking systems (Manson, et al., 1998). The lack of the requisites for adopting inflation targeting 
in developing countries may perhaps contribute to the current inflationary pressure that most 
African countries with inflation targeting regime as their primary monetary policy objective are 
experiencing. An example is the case of Rwanda.  
Additionally, according to Jonsson (1999), the primary disinflation process caused by the 
introduction of inflation targeting may result in short-term output costs if private agents do not 
find the policy framework credible. Likewise, contrary to the exchange rate or monetary targeting 
regime, it is difficult to control inflation and the policy tools demonstrate their effects on inflation 
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with long and variable lags (Tutal, 2002). The developing countries are faced especially with this 
problem when inflation rates are brought down from high levels, as the situation will lead to large 
forecast errors, and frequent target misses will be inevitable (Tutal, 2002). Kadioglu, et a.l, (2000) 
argue that as a consequence, the central bank will have some difficulties in explaining the causes 
for the deviations from the target and in achieving credibility, which is a key fundamental to the 
inflation-targeting framework. Lastly, the inflation-targeting regime entails exchange rate 
flexibility, which may result in financial instability (Mishkin, 2000). 
3.3 Empirical Literature   
A number of studies have been carried out on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
The readily accessible studies are mainly on industrialised countries (see for example Kakes and 
Sturm, 2002; Suzuki, 2004 and Hulsewig et al, 2006). However, the studies about the way money 
shocks are transmitted to the real economy in underdeveloped countries in general and Africa 
specifically have not received much attention.  This section reviews few studies about the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy on developing countries and some on African 
countries.  
A number of studies have employed measuring tools such as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression and Panel data analyses to test the role played by 
bank-lending in the monetary transmission mechanism (see Romer, et al., 1990; Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000; Walker, 2012). Nevertheless, none of these econometric methods allow investigations 
into how the effects of shock(s) on the monetary policy are transmitted to each of the variables in 
the model, which is most important in studies on the bank-lending channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. The technique that permits those estimates is the VAR approach, through 
impulse response and variance decomposition analyses, that assesses the dynamic responses of 
economic activity variables to monetary policy shocks. Given the use of the impulse response and 
variance decomposition functions, in recent years, VAR analysis (which treats all variables as 
endogenous) has become a popular tool in the empirical studies on the bank-lending channel. 
Ramlogan (2004) used a Vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology in a study on the money 
channel, exchange rate channel and the credit channel in four of the Caribbean countries namely, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana. 
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According to Ramlogan (2004), the capital market in each country is either at an early phase of 
development or is absent, which is different from countries where the capital market is well 
established. In those countries, commercial banks remain the main source of external finance and 
capital controls and limitations on holding foreign exchange curbed the extent to which domestic 
residents could hold foreign assets in the four countries (Ramlogan, 2004). The study used 
quarterly data from Central Bank publications and the International Financial Statistics. The data 
for Trinidad and Tobago covers 1970:1 to 2000:2 whereas for Jamaica and Barbados the sample 
period is 1970:1 to 1999:4, and for Guyana the data extends from 1972:1 to 1998:4 (Ramlogan, 
2004). The study includes six variables namely Reserves (in these Caribbean countries the policy 
instrument used is the required reserve) deposits, loans, exchange rate, GDP (output) and Prices. 
The empirical results are based on the variance decompositions analysis and show that the money 
channel plays a relatively insignificant role in explaining output variability in each of the 
Caribbean countries, while the credit (a shock in loans) and the exchange rate channels are more 
important in transmitting impulses from the financial sector to the real sector of the economy.  
Ramlogan argues that the findings support the idea that in countries where the money market is 
relatively less developed, the money market will not be the main conduit of monetary policy 
innovations. His findings are in line with Buigut (2009) who examined the importance of the 
interest rate channel for the three East African Community countries of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, and found that the interest rate channel is not important for this region. In each country, 
except Barbados, the credit channel accounts for over 28 per cent of the variance in output over 
the long run. In Jamaica, credit shocks are more important in the long-term while exchange rate 
shocks are more important in the short to medium term. In Trinidad and Tobago credit shocks are 
at least as important as the exchange rate early on and more so in the long run. In Barbados, 
although credit shocks are not as important as exchange rate shocks at any time frame, a shock to 
loans remains large in explaining output variability compared to the role of money shocks. The 
lesser impact of loans in Barbados results from the dominance of services (tourism and financial 
services) in the industrial structure of the country (Ramlogan, 2004). Similarly, the results from 
the variance decompositions functions indicate that in each of the Caribbean countries credit and 
exchange rate channels are relatively more important in explaining price variability than money 
channels. 
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In the Asian context, Gupta (2004) investigated the presence and significance of bank-lending 
channel of the monetary policy transmission in India and Pakistan using the Structural Vector Auto 
Regression (SVAR) methodology. In those countries, the financial sector has still not matured 
sufficiently and banks dominate the financial system (Gupta, 2004). The study uses data from the 
Country Tables of the International Financial Statistics for India and Pakistan and the series runs 
from Q1:1957 to Q1:2004. Impulse responses and variance decomposition analyses findings prove 
the presence of a significant bank-lending channel in both countries.  
The VAR model uses the following variables: output, prices, exchange rate, loans, deposits, 
money, spread, interest rate. The interest rates available for India are Money Market Rate, Bank 
Rate, and Lending Rate, while for Pakistan they are the Money Market Rate, Discount Rate, and 
Treasury Bill Rate. The results from impulse responses indicate that the bank-lending channel 
appears to be operative in both countries. The shocks in interest rates and money have influences 
on the credit variable, it goes down and then goes up (further than the initial level).  
The final level of loan volume after the interest rate innovation is above the starting level for 
Pakistan whereas for India it is rather below the initial value. Variations in money bring a change 
in loans and the real sector variables react to these private sector loans changes. While the output 
returns to the initial level, the effects on prices are persistent. The outcomes from the variance 
decomposition of the VAR model show that the exchange rate and money play more important 
roles than the interest rate or term spread in explaining loans variability. An innovation in loans 
affects the output somewhat significantly, but not the price levels. The results are similar for both 
the countries and agree with impulse responses findings.  
Apart from the above cases of the South American and Asian countries, this section discusses 
another case from the SADC countries. A study by Lungu (2007) has examined the existence of a 
bank-lending channel in five SADC countries,namely Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa 
and Zambia. The study used a VAR framework and it covereds the sample period that runs from 
1990 – 2006. The VAR analysis employs eight variables: GDP (output), M2 and MB (broad money 
and narrow money respectively), CPI (Consumer Price Index), BR (short-term interest rate), BC 
(bank loans), LR (loan rate) and DR (deposits rate). The results are based on the impulse response 
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and variance decomposition analyses and the general results reveal the existence of a bank-lending 
channel in all five SADC countries (Lungu, 2007).  
The impulse response outcomes show that bank loans drop in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana 
and Malawi with an unexpected increase in short-term interest rate although the size and take off 
for the decline differ across countries. These results corroborate the results of Uanguta and Ikhide 
(2002) who did a study on the interest rates and the bank-lending channels in Namibia in a similar 
framework using a sample from 1997-1999. In South Africa, the loans take off decline is seen after 
six months, in Botswana it is apparent after 20 months, while in Namibia and Malawi it is 
immediately apparent.  
In Zambia, loans appear to be insensitive to a monetary policy innovation. The relationship 
between the interest rate and the supply of loans is positive but insignificant. However, a policy 
rate has an immediate positive and significant impact on loan and deposit rates.  The variance 
decomposition results indicate that in Malawi a shock in short-term interest rates accounts for 
about four percent of variation in loans up to the fourth quarter, whereas in South Africa it accounts 
for two percent, one point two percent for Zambia; thirteen percent for Botswana and about one 
percent change for Namibia in loans. The output drops in all countries after a rise in the policy rate 
within the first quarter and continues to drop all the way through. Prices decrease in Botswana, 
Zambia and South Africa but only as far as just past the half-year mark after which any monetary 
policy shock appears to lead to a rise in prices. The price level responds positively to a short-term 
interest rate innovation in Namibia and Malawi, which suggests that a monetary tightening 
mechanism yields inflation. 
Buigut (2010) used a structural VAR (Vector Autoregression) analysis to investigate the bank-
lending channel in Kenya. The study uses five variables, real GDP, CPI (Consumer Price Index), 
TB (Treasury bill) rate (short term interest rate), loan quantity and lending rate and it covers the 
period from 1979 to 2008. Some conclusions were published, based on the outcomes of impulse 
response functions, and it was found that the bank-lending channel is effective in Kenya. The 
results show an increase in the lending rate following a contractionary monetary policy, which 
diminishes after the second year to a long term effect of about 2.15 basis points above the base 
line (Buigut, 2010). The loan volume declines immediately by about 8.8 basis points but settles 
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after about two years to a long term effect of around 8.2 basis points below the baseline. The GDP 
shows a decline from the baseline value and settles at about 1.1 basis points below the baseline 
after the third year, although the impact of decline seems to be relatively small (Buigut, 2010). The 
inflation rate rises in the first year but settles after the second year at a negligible 0.35 basis points 
above baseline level after an increase in the short- term interest rate, leading to the conclusion that 
a monetary contraction results in a temporary increase in prices, but has no noticeable effect in the 
long-run (Buigut, 2010).  
This result is similar to the result of a study done in five SADC countries where it was found that 
the price level responds positively to a short-term interest rate innovation in Namibia and Malawi. 
This outcome is the opposite to what was expected from a monetary tightening policy and became 
known as the “price puzzle”. Sims, (1992) argues that the price puzzle could be a result of not 
including a rich enough sample of required information accessible to policymakers. According to 
Piffanelli (2001), the price puzzle may be a result of using the incorrect operating target in the 
analysis.  
Ngalawa and Viegi (2011) investigated the process through which monetary policy affects 
economic activity in Malawi using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. The study 
employs monthly time series data for the period 1988:1 to 2005:12. The analysis was performed 
at three levels. Firstly, a generic model including the country’s monetary policy objectives (output 
and the price) and operating target (bank rate and reserve money) is estimated. At the second level 
of analysis, three different transmission processes, are separately estimated. These are bank-
lending, exchange rates and aggregate money supply. At the final level of analysis, all variables 
found to contain important information in the country’s monetary transmission process are united 
and a combined SVAR is estimated.  
The first level comprises of four variables: GY (output), CP (price level), BR (bank rate, i.e. short-
term interest rate) and RM (reserve money). The second level is composed of 3 models: (1) the 
bank-lending model with 5 variables: GY, CP, BR, RM and BL (commercial bank-lending); (2) the 
exchange rate model with 5 variables: GY, CP, BR, RM and XR (exchange rate); (3) the money 
effect model with also 5 variables: GY, CP, BR, RM and M2 (Aggregate money supply). The third 
and final level of analysis includes 7 endogenous variables namely GY, CP, BL, XR, M2, BR and 
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RM. The outcomes of each level of the study are based on impulse response and variance 
decomposition functions.  
The findings from the Generic Model illustrate that given the two policy goals, variations in both 
the bank rate and reserve money are dominated by an innovation in consumer prices, reflecting 
that the primary goal of monetary policy in Malawi is price stability. The results also show that 
the bank rate is a more effective instrument of monetary policy than reserve money. 
The second level of the study demonstrates that bank-lending; exchange rates and aggregate money 
supply hold important additional information on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
the country. Putting everything together, the results from a multiple model of monetary 
transmission process in Malawi illustrate that the bank-lending and money effect channels are 
important channels of monetary transmission mechanism in Malawi but that the transmission 
process is slightly weak. M2 and Bank-lending react significantly to bank rate innovations, even 
though the M2 response is only slightly significant. Bank-lending responds to an unexpected 2.2% 
rise in the bank rate with a drop, bottoming at 1.7% below baseline after 2 years while M2 responds 
to this shock with a rapid decline of 0.8%, before increasing in the next 6 months and declining 
afterwards. Output reacts significantly to unanticipated fluctuations in bank-lending and M2. An 
unexpected 5.7% rise in bank-lending causes output to increase, peaking at 1.3% above baseline 
after 15 months. An unanticipated 5.8% rise in M2 also causes output to increase, peaking at 1.6% 
above baseline after 5 months. Consumer prices, however, respond insignificantly to shocks 
originating from both bank-lending and M2. Exchange rates respond insignificantly to all monetary 
variables in the model but they show speedy significant responses in both output and consumer 
prices.  
Other empirical literature talks about the case of Nigeria. Ogun and Akinlo (2010) examined the 
bank credit channel of monetary transmission in Nigeria using Structural Vector Autoregressive 
(SVAR) technique and the data from the International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of 
Nigeria for the period 1986:1 to 2006:4. The VAR model includes 8 variables: lcpi (consumer 
price index); lrgdpt (real gross domestic product) (or lipi i.e.  industrial production); lr (average 
lending rate of banks); lsh (securities holdings of banks); ltla (banks’ total loans and advances); 
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lbtd (bank deposits); ltbr (Treasury bill rate) and lner (nominal exchange rate). The outcomes are 
based on variance decompositions and impulse response functions. 
The impulse response results show that an unexpected increase in Treasury bill rate (unanticipated 
monetary policy shock) leads to a decline in deposit by about 2.2% after 13 quarters, an immediate 
rise in bank securities holding by 2% and thereafter a decline of 1.2% after the first and second  
quarters and a positive innovation is noted thereafter. With respect to bank credit, the impulse 
response estimates indicate that the bank credit increases by 1%, and declines by approximately 
0.4 after the second quarter and the decline reaches 2.2% after the 19th quarter following a 
monetary policy contraction. The impulse response results further indicate that the prices decline 
by approximately 2.4% after the 5th quarter and that the real GDP falls immediately with a 
maximum impact of 1.3% drop arising after 3 quarters following a sudden increase in Treasury 
bill rate.  
The conclusion drawn from the impulse response results specifies that the responses of bank 
portfolios of assets and liabilities to monetary policy innovation are either insignificant or different 
from the theoretical expectation (Ogun and Akinlo, 2010). The point that the average lending rate 
of banks increased immediately after a monetary policy tightening coupled with the initial increase 
in bank credit after a monetary policy innovation shows that the bank credit channel is very weak 
in the Nigerian economy (Ogun and Akinlo, 2010).  
As one of the basic goals of monetary policy in Nigeria is to ensure exchange rate stability, the 
study also investigated the behaviour of exchange rate variable to shock in Treasury bill rate. The 
impulse response outcomes show that the nominal exchange rate in the beginning depreciates. only 
to appreciate later. The results under the forecast error variance decomposition confirm those 
obtained under the impulse response analysis.   
The ineffectiveness of the bank credit channel in Nigeria is explained by the fact that the banking 
system in Nigeria is characterized by excess liquidity and banks do not find it costly to enlarge 
loan supply after a monetary policy tightening (Ogun and Akinlo, 2010). Furthermore, the recent 
adoption of liability management in the Nigerian banking sector makes banks less reliant on 
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demand deposit as a main source of bank funds, as the banks can target their assets growth by 
issuing liabilities as the need be (Ogun and Akinlo, 2010). 
Coming back to the case of Zambia, Munacinga (2004) has done a paper on the financial sector 
reforms and monetary policy in Zambia. The study involves four chapters, (1) Financial Sector 
Reforms and Monetary Policy in Zambia; (2) Monetary Policy Reforms and the Transmission 
Mechanism in Zambia; (3) Can money tell us About Inflation? Evaluating the information content 
of money for predicting inflation in Zambia; (4) Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Exchange 
Rate in Zambia. The analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism in Zambia estimates VAR 
systems for two periods, pre-reform (post-independence Zambia) and post-reform periods. The 
variance decompositions and impulse response analyses are done to prove whether there are any 
changes noted in the monetary transmission mechanism after the reforms. The VAR methodology 
includes the following variables: real GDP (output), CPI (price),  money aggregates (M2, base 
money=base), treasury bill rate (as short term interest rate) weighted savings rate, the lending rate, 
liquid asset ratios, the official exchange rate (NER), and total commercial bank-lending, and uses 
the sample from 1970-1980 and from1994- 2002 for pre and post-reform periods respectively. 
The results from the variance decompositions functions show that in the pre- reform period, the 
exchange rate channel seems to be the most important for improvements in prices, explaining 29% 
variability in price after a year and 41% after two years. For developments in output, the lending 
and exchange rate channels are the important channels before the reforms explaining each 29% of 
output movements after two years. In post-reform period however, the lending view becomes weak 
as results of current high lending rates and the exchange rate becomes important and explains as 
much as 55% of price variations after one year and 48% after two years and 17% of the output 
developments within half a year. Conclusions are consistent with the impulse responses outcomes. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the effect of monetary policy on prices and income and highlighted the 
views of the classical and the Keynesian economists on the causality from money to the real sector. 
According to the classical school, a change in money supply in the economy causes a proportionate 
change in the price level leaving output unchanged in the short run. In this chapter, we have seen 
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that under the new Keynesian view with slow adjustment of the price level, an increase in money 
supply raises both output and the price level in the short run. Both schools however, argue on the 
neutrality of money in the longer term.  
While Keynesian theories believed in Phillips curve i.e. an inverse relationship between inflation 
and unemployment, Friedman showed that economic agents will adapt their inflation expectations 
to a new monetary policy and output will remain constant in response to a change in money supply. 
Thus the Philips curve was revised in the form of an expectations augmented Philips curve to take 
into consideration future inflation expectations.  
Additionally, we have discussed how, although expected monetary policy can be anticipated, the 
Lucas-Sargent–Wallace model showed that unexpected changes in the money supply cannot be 
anticipated, causing a change in both prices and real output.  
In addition to the traditional view of the interest rate channel, this chapter also mentioned the bank-
lending channel, placing emphasis on the consequences of the imperfections feature of capital 
markets. The chapter highlighted the special role played by banks in reducing those consequences 
and making loans available to bank dependent borrowers who have few or no other alternative 
sources of finance other than bank loans. Finally, the chapter discussed some theories on the 
inflation targeting. An empirical literature review illustrated the discussions in this chapter. The 
empirical studies presented in this chapter used a VAR analysis, which is the recent popular tool 
in the empirical studies on the bank-lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
The VAR approach is indeed useful in this context because it provides the use of impulse response 
and variance decomposition analyses, which will allow the estimation of the response of economic 
activity variables to monetary policy innovations. Given these advantages, the current study also 
uses the VAR methodology.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
The preceding review of the literature on the bank-lending channel emphasised the role played by 
banks in the monetary policy transmission. This chapter builds on that background to set the 
methodological structure that was used in this research, and is divided into five sections. Section 
4.2 uses the literature on the bank-lending channel to model the impact of monetary policy on bank 
loans and therefore on economic activity and the price level. In section 4.3 presents definitions of 
variables and data sources. Section 4.4 presents a review of the relevant statistical estimation 
concepts and techniques for this study, while section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Model specification  
The objective of this research is to investigate the role of banks in the monetary transmission 
process by estimating the impact of monetary policy on loans. Thus, the basic VAR model contains 
the loans variable. As argued by Lungu (2007), quoting Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the inclusion 
of loans supplied by banks incorporates the bank-lending channel into the goods and money market 
equilibrium framework. The fundamental argument is that bonds and loans are not perfect 
substitutes as in the IS-LM framework. In Rwanda, deposits are the main source of funding for the 
banking sector. Hence, the model is extended to include the deposits as a variable. The model also 
includes the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to measure the level of domestic economic 
activity. In the present context, the inclusion of real output is particularly vital as it allows for the 
evaluation of the potential role of banks in propagating financial shocks to the real sector (Mansor, 
2006).  
Currently, the NBR uses repo as a monetary policy instrument. In Rwanda, the use of the repo rate 
as a monetary policy tool started in August 2008 and the data for repo is only available from 2008 
to date. Thus we suggest the use of the discount rate, as the data used in this research covers the 
period from 1996. Hence, the discount rate is included in the model as a policy variable to measure 
a policy stance. As the Central Bank of Rwanda’s ultimate goal is guaranteeing price stability by 
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setting the short-term rate, the price level as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is also 
included.  
In this way, the NBR controls the inflation rate by changing the repo rate. If for example, the NBR 
feels that there is surplus liquidity in the money market, it increases its repo rate and the 
commercial banks react to this contractionary monetary policy by increasing their lending rates. 
The expected outcome is a fall in the price level.  
Thus, the model that describes the loan section of the banking sector is based on equation 1 below, 
which presents a general VAR model. 
tttt YLAY   1)( ………………………………………………………………………...  (1) 
where tY  is a vector of endogenous variables described below, )(LA  is a matrix of polynomials in 
the lag operator, t  is a vector of constant terms and t  is a vector of error terms that are assumed 
to be white noise. The variable vector tY  contains five variables: 
),,,,( tttttt BDBLBRCPIGDPY  …………………………………………………………..  (2) 
where GDP  stands for real output, CPI  is the price level, BR  for the discount rate (bank rate) 
controlled by the NBR, BL  for aggregate bank loans, BD for the total bank deposits.   
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms except for interest rates which are expressed in 
nominal terms.  
4.3 Definitions of variables and data sources   
This study investigates the bank-lending channel in Rwanda. To this end, the study uses quarterly 
Rwandan data covering the period 1996Q1 to 2011Q4. Data information is obtainable in the 
quarterly and annual reports of the numerous publications of the National Bank of Rwanda. 
Discount rate: The current NBR’s main tool of monetary operations is the repo (Repurchase 
Agreement Operations) transactions with commercial banks. Thus, the repo (bank rate) is defined 
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as the rate at which the central bank provides short-term loans to commercial banks. In Rwanda, 
the use of the repo rate as a monetary policy instrument started in August 2008 and the data for 
the repo is available only from that date till now. For that reason, we were not able to collect the 
data on the repo over the study period and we suggest the use of the discount rate, the interest rate 
that commercial banks are charged to borrow short-term funds directly from the central bank.   
Real income (REAL GDP): Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the main 
macroeconomic variables that reflect the effects of monetary policy. The quarterly Gross Domestic 
Product data from the first quarter of 1996 to the last quarter of 2011 was used. According to the 
National Bank of Rwanda, Real GDP in Rwanda is composed of three activities. These are the 
agriculture sector (food crops, export of crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries), the industry sector 
(mining and quarrying, electricity and water, manufacturing, and construction) and services in the 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport and communication, finance and 
insurance, real estate and business services, public administration, education, health and other 
personal services (NBR, 2012: 31). Currently, the service sector occupies the first position in 
contributing to GDP, followed by the agriculture sector (NBR, 2012). 
Furthermore, when estimating the impact of monetary policy on loans, the inclusion of output 
levels is vital as it allows evaluation of the potential role of banks in propagating financial shocks 
to the real output (Mansor, 2006).  
Consumer price index (CPI): Another main macroeconomic variable that reflects the effect of 
monetary policy is the price as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The price level is 
used in the model as a variable, given the fact that the final goal of the NBR is to achieve price 
stability. In Rwanda, the Consumer Price Index comprises a wide range of goods and services, 
including food, non-alcoholic and alcoholic beverages, clothing, housing, gas, water, electricity, 
furnishing, restaurants, and hotel services (NBR, 2009: 132). 
Bank Loans: Since the aim of this study is to investigate the impact of monetary policy on bank 
assets, namely loans, the model includes the main component of private sector funding and loans 
from banks are specifically used. In the same way, Roternburg and Woodford (1998) and 
Christiano, et al., (2004) include bank loans from banks’ balance sheets to estimate changes in 
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loan supply as a result of a change in monetary policy. Indeed, this variable captures commercial 
bank-lending practices and advances. It therefore enters the econometric model as an intermediate 
target of monetary policy.   
Loans data from all 9 commercial banks in the Rwandan banking sector are used. These banks are 
the KCB (Kenya Commercial Bank), the ACCESS BANK (Rwanda) Ltd., the COGEBANK 
(Compagnie Générale de Banque), the BCR (Banque Commerciale du Rwanda/ Commercial Bank 
of Rwanda), the BK (Bank de Kigali/ Bank of Kigali), the BPR ( Banque Populaire du Rwanda), 
ECOBANK, FINA BANK and EQUITY BANK), the development bank (BRD), the microfinance 
banks (Urwego Opportunity Bank (UOB), UNGUKA Bank Ltd and AGASEKE Bank Ltd) and 
the cooperative bank (Zigama CSS),.  
Other small microfinance institutions provide loans to small businesses in rural areas in Rwanda 
but they are still at the starting stage, and consequently working under provisional registration. 
Hence, under this working condition, their data was unavailable at the time of data collection. Only 
data from the three best performing microfinancers as mentioned above and in chapter two was 
available.  
Deposits: In Rwanda, the main source of funding for the banking sector is the deposit. For this 
reason, the deposit variable is included in our econometric model. All deposits to the banking 
sector were used. The compositions of the total deposits of the banking industry include 
transferable, nontransferable and foreign deposits. Transferable deposits constitute the largest part 
while foreign deposits are the smallest part of the total deposits in the Rwandan banking sector. 
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms except for interest rate which is already in 
percentage terms and therefore doesn’t need any transformation. According to Maddala and Kim 
(1998: 88), the transformation of macroeconomic time series data into the natural log form is 
standard practice, as the non-transformed data generally trends upwards and unit root tests 
undertaken on these time series may by mistake conclude they are non-stationary. Furthermore, a 
natural logarithm transformation of time series data enables interpretation of results since in the 
natural logarithm transformation any responses are subsequently specified in percentage change 
instead of in measured units.   
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4.4 A review of the relevant statistical estimation concepts and techniques    
The assumptions of the classical regression model require that all the variables to be included in a 
regression be stationary. In fact, most of economic indicators are non-stationary in a way that 
estimations based on this method will be spurious, i.e. meaningless (Maddala and Lahiri, 2009: 
484). For non-stationary variables, the data may be first differenced in order to obtain a stationary 
series to which the classical regression techniques can be applied, but this has the disadvantage of 
losing useful long run information that may be in the data. Thus, the concept of models based on 
co-integration and error correction modelling arose to deal with these problems. There are also 
numerous co-integration based methods, but the Johansen technique is preferred in this study. The 
Johansen (1991, 1995) method has become a fundamental tool in the estimation of models that 
involve time series data. This approach is preferred because it identifies more than one co-
integration relationship that may exist amongst the variables and makes the co-integration tests 
more powerful since it leads to smaller variances even in the cases of a single co-integrating vector. 
This section will also talk about the diagnostic tests, and it will end with a discussion of Granger-
causality tests, impulse responses and variance decomposition analyses. 
4.4.1 Empirical testing for Stationarity/ unit root  
A series is said to be (weakly or co-variance) stationary if its mean and variance are constant over 
time and the value of the co-variance between the two time periods depends only on the distance 
or lag between the two time periods, not on the time at which the co-variance is computed 
(Gujarati, 2010:381). If not, the series is non-stationary. Additionally, a series is said to be 
integrated of order d, and is denoted as I (d). The order of integration is the number of differencing 
operations it takes to make series stationary. According to Gujarati (2003), when a shock (a 
possibly change of economic policy for example) affects a stationary time series, it decays 
progressively and disappears over time, while for non-stationary time series, this shock persists 
over time (Gujarati, 2003: 811).  
The significance of auto-correlation and partial auto-correlation co-efficients show how a time 
series is correlated with its own lags as time progresses and can generally inspire about the 
presence of stationarity within a time series (Box and Pierce, 1970). Brooks (2008) defines auto-
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regressive (AR) process as a model where the current value of a variable, ty  depends upon only the 
values that the variable took in previous periods plus an error term. Stationarity is a desirable 
property of an estimated AR model, because a model whose co-efficients are non-stationary will 
reveal the unfortunate property that the previous values of the error term will have a non-declining 
effect on the current value of ty  as time progresses (Brooks, 2008: 215). 
Indeed, the empirical work based on time series data assumes that the underlying time series is 
stationary. Most of the time series are non-stationary. If standard regression techniques are applied 
to non-stationary data, however, the regression will produce spurious results (nonsense 
regression). A spurious regression has a higher value of R2 (resulting from a regression between 
two unrelated time series variables but trending together over time) and t- statistics that appear to 
be significant, but the results are without any economic meaning (Enders, 2004: 171; Brooks, 
2002: 367-368). Thus, to avoid obtaining the biased results from a spurious regression, before 
attempting any regression analysis using time series, the first step undertaken by researchers is to 
check the existence of unit root or stationarity or otherwise (Gujarati, 2003: 792; Brooks, 2002: 
367 and Hill, et al., 2008: 340).    
There are several tests for stationarity including an auto-correlation function and correlogram, a 
graphical analysis of the series, unit root tests and those that directly test for stationarity, among 
others. The unit root tests, i.e. Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and Phillips-
Perron (PP), and a stationarity test, Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), will be 
considered in this research in order to differentiate between series which are trend stationary and 
those which are difference stationary.   
4.4.1.1 Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
The stationarity of a time series can be tested directly with a unit root test. The Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are the commonly used unit-root tests.  The DF test 
estimates the following equation: 
ttt tayay    210 ......................................................................................................  (3) 
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where Δ represents the first difference operator, t is the time or trend variable, Y is the relevant 
time series, t  is the error term and 1tY is the one-period lagged value of the variable Y (Enders, 
2010: 206). The Dickey–Fuller test can also be conducted without the intercept and the 
deterministic trend (by leaving out 0a and ta2  in the equation (3)) or without a linear time trend 
(by deleting the term ta2  in equation 3). 
 The DF tests (also known as  (tau) tests) are based on testing the hypothesis  = 1 in equation 3, 
against the alternative that  < 1. Thus, the hypothesis in equation 3 is that there exists a unit root 
in the time series (non-stationary time series), which is H0:  =1, against the alternative hypothesis 
that the time series is stationary (no unit root), which is H1:  < 1.  
If in an application the calculated statistic is greater (in absolute terms) than the critical DF values, 
which are used by the E-views 7.2 software, the null hypothesis is rejected and will therefore mean 
that the said time series is stationary. The opposite is true when the calculated statistic is less than 
the critical values. 
The DF tests are valid only if t   are white noise errors (Maddala and Lahiri, 2009: 556). In 
particular, t  are assumed to be independent (not to be auto-correlated) and have a constant 
variance (Enders, 2010: 215). However, if there was auto-correlation in the dependent variable of 
the regression ( tY ) in equation (3) ( t is not white noise); results based on the DF test will be 
biased. To solve this problem, the ADF can be used to augment the test using p lags of the 
dependent variable. 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests involve estimating the equation 
t
p
i
titt ytayay  

 
2
11210
................................................................................   (4) 
The equation 4 is an alternative model of equation 3. According to Brooks (2002: 379-380), the 
lags of ty come in the regression model of equation 4 to correct any auto-correlation in the 
dependent variable  ty  and to make sure that auto-correlation in t  is removed, to avoid the 
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oversize of the test statistic which can lead to incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis of the unit 
root. The ADF test uses the same test critical values as for the Dickey-Fuller test, i.e. the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour of stationarity or one fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root if the test statistic is greater or less than the DF critical values at a given significance 
level respectively. To determine the optimal number of lags of the dependent variable  ty , the 
Akaike information criterion1 (AIC), or Bayesian information criterion2 (BIC), can be used. 
However, even if the information criteria such as AIC and BIC may be used, they have been found 
to select a low value of the lag length p and Phillips and Perron suggest nonparametric alternatives 
to the ADF test  
4.4.1.2 Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
In addition to the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, Phillips and Perron (PP) use 
nonparametric statistical methods to take care of the serial correlation in the error terms without 
adding lagged difference terms, and their tests are known as PP tests of unit root non-stationarity 
(Maddala and Lahiri, 2009: 557). It is worth noting that Econometric software package Eviews 7.2 
allows for calculating the PP tests statistic and it provides the critical values at different 
conventional levels. 
Yet, both tests give the same conclusions and suffer from the same limitations of rejecting less 
frequently (fail to reject) the null hypothesis of unit root in the case of stationary process (Gujarati, 
2003: 819). Brooks (2008: 330) shows that unit root tests have low power if the process is 
stationary but with a root close to the non-stationary boundary. This could occur either because 
the null hypothesis was correct or because there is insufficient information in the sample to enable 
rejection. Since the increase in sample size could be limited by the unavailability of the data, 
                                                          
1  
T
k
AIC
2
ˆln 2    
2   T
T
k
BIC lnˆln 2   , ), where 2ˆ   is the variance of residuals (also equivalent to the residual sum of 
squares divided by the number of degrees of freedom kT  ; k  is the number of parameters estimated and T is the 
sample size ) (see Maddala and Kim, 1998: 77). 
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Brooks (2008: 331) suggests using stationarity test in addition to a unit root test. One of such a test 
is described below. 
4.4.1.3 The Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test 
Stationarity tests have stationarity under the null hypothesis, thus reversing the null and alternative 
hypotheses under unit root tests (Brooks, 2008:331). Hence, under stationarity tests, the data will 
appear stationary by default if there is little information in the sample (Brooks, 2008: 331). There 
are many tests with stationarity as a null, but the most common one is the KPSS test due to 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992).  
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) proposed a test (referred to as the KPSS test) of the 
null hypothesis that an observable series ty  is stationary around a deterministic trend (Mahadeva 
and Robinson, 2004). The series is the sum of deterministic trend, random walk ( tr ), and stationary 
error ( t ), and the test is the LM test of the hypothesis that the random walk has zero variance 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).  
KPSS use the components model: 
ty ttrt  +z,                t= 1, 2 ...T .........................................................................          5 
The test statistic is constructed on the residuals denoted as te , form a least squares of ty on an 
intercept and linear trend (Syczewska, 1997). If the partial sum process of the residuals is defined 
as:   
 
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Then the test statistic is given as      
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/  ..............................................................................................................       7  
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where T is the sample size and 2
 is the estimate of the error variance from this regression, i.e. 
the sum of squared residuals, divided by T (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).   
To confirm if a time series is stationary or not, the computed LM statistic is compared with the 
KPSS (1992) critical values. If the computed LM statistic is greater than the KPSS critical values, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclusion is that the time series is non-stationary 
(Syczewska, 1997). On the other hand, if the computed LM statistic is less than the KPSS critical 
values, the null hypothesis is accepted and the conclusion is that the time series is stationary.  
The econometric package Eviews 7.2 allows for calculating the LM test statistic under KPSS tests 
and it also provides the critical values for the KPSS tests. 
4.4.2 Co-integration, error correction model (ECM) and weakly exogenous 
The classical regression model deals with the relationship between stationary variables, but many 
economic time series are clearly non-stationary in the sense that the mean and variance depend on 
time, and they tend to depart ever further from any given value as time goes on (Maddala and 
Lahiri, 2009: 266). One procedure that is often used to convert a non-stationary series to a 
stationary series is successive differencing. However, this procedure of differencing results in a 
loss of valuable long run information in the data. The concept of co-integrated series has been 
suggested as one solution to this problem.   
A set of non-stationary variables, I (1) is defined as co-integrated if a linear combination of them 
is stationary or is I (0). Many time series are individually non-stationary but move together over 
time, that is, there are some influences in the series (for instance, market forces), which means that 
the two or more series are bound by some relationship in the long-run (Brooks, 2008:336). Also, 
co-integrating variables imply having a long run equilibrium relationship, since they do not drift 
too far apart from each other over time (Maddala and Lahiri, 2009: 564). Thus, the concept of co-
integration is used to capture the notion that non-stationary variables may nevertheless possess 
long-run equilibrium relationships, so that they tend to move together in the long-run (Johansen, 
1988).  
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In most cases, the linear combination of two variables that are I (1) will also be I (0). More 
generally, if variables with differing orders of integration are combined, the combination will have 
an order of integration equal to the largest (Brooks, 2008:335). According to Brooks, a linear 
combination of I (1) variables will only be I (0), in other words, stationary, if the variables are co-
integrated. Indeed, even though two or more variables may be trending upward in a stochastic way, 
they may be trending together.  
Therefore, while dealing with time series, one must make sure that the individual time series are 
either stationary or that they are co-integrated in order to avoid running a spurious (nonsense) 
regression analysis. 
After determining that the long-run co-integrating equation between the variables exists, there is a 
corresponding error correction equation which describes both the short-run dynamic behaviour of 
the model and the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium relationship.  
If ty  and tx are co-integrated variables, with co-integrating co-efficient , the error correction 
model may be described as: 
ttttt xyxy    )( 1121   .................................................................................        8 
 and 11   tt xy   is the error term correction,  
where   defines the long run relationship between x  and y , while 1 describes the short run 
relationship between changes in x  and changes in y , and 2  describes the speed of adjustment 
back to the equilibrium which measures the proportion of last period’s equilibrium error that is 
corrected for (Brooks, 2008:338-339).  
In a co-integration system, it is possible that a variable does not respond to the discrepancy from 
the long run equilibrium. In that case, the speed of adjustment is zero and that variable is said to 
be weakly exogenous (Enders, 2010: 407).  
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For example if 2  in equation 6 is zero, one should note that  ty does not respond to the deviation 
 11   tt xy   from equilibrium and  ty  is weakly exogenous. 
Note that the error correction model implies a single equation. In the case of the multivariate co-
integrated equations, the error correction model is referred to as the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM).   
4.4.2.1 Tests for co-integration: The Engle-Granger approach  
One way to check for co-integration is to examine the residuals from the long run relationship 
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987).  In this way, the DF or ADF tests can be used on residuals 
of a model in consideration.  If the variables are co-integrated, the residual from the OLS 
regression, which is equal to the linear combination of the variables, will itself be stationary and 
if they are not co-integrated, the residuals will be I (1)  (Keith et al, 2000). Since the unit root tests 
will be applied to residuals, the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root (Maddala and Lahiri, 
2009: 572). Thus, the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root in the potentially co-integrating 
regression residuals or the variables are not co-integrated while the alternative is that the variables 
are co-integrated.  
Nevertheless, the Engle-Granger methodology suffers from numerous problems. Brooks and 
Kremers et al. highlighted some of them as the usual finite sample problem of a lack of power in 
unit root and co-integration tests, the lack of ability to perform any hypothesis tests about the actual 
co-integrating relationships and their failure to detect more than one co-integrating relationship 
that may exist in a model (Brooks, 2008:342) and (Kremers et al.:1992).  Given all of these 
problems with Engle and Granger co-integration test statistic, the Johansen procedure is currently 
the most reliable test for co-integration and has better small sample properties than most commonly 
used procedures (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). In light of this, the Johansen methodology is 
preferred in this research.   
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4.4.2.2 Testing for Co-integration in multivariate systems using the Johansen technique 
Johansen (1988) and Stock and Watson (1988) devised a maximum likelihood estimators based 
method for testing the presence of multiple long run relationships that may exist between a set of 
non-stationary time series variables, through co-integrating vectors, as well as any short run 
dynamics in these variables, in the VECM. Moreover, these tests allow one to test restricted 
versions of the co-integrating vector(s) and the speed of adjustment parameters to determine 
whether it is possible to verify a theory by testing restrictions on the magnitudes of the estimated 
co-efficients (Enders, 2010: 386). If a long-run co-integrating equation between the variables 
exists, the corresponding vector error correction equation is formed.  
Johansen’s methodology takes its starting point in the vector auto-regression (VAR) of order 
k given by  
tktkttt zAzAzAAz   ....... 22110 .....................................................................          9 
Where tz  is a (nx1) vector of unrestricted variables that are I (1) and which are thought may be 
co-integrated, 0A  is a (n x 1) matrix of intercept terms, iA  is a (n x n) matrices of coefficients and 
t  is a (n x 1) vector of error terms (Enders, 2010: 402 & Hjalmarsson and Osterholm, 2007).  
According to Brooks (2008:350) and Harris (1994:77), to be able to apply the Johansen test, the 
VAR (11) needs to be reformulated into a VECM form:  
tktkttktt zzzzAz   1122110 .......... ...........................................       10      
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)( ,     (i=1, ... , k-1)   and where 
I is a (n x n) identity matrix.               
This way of specifying the system contains information on both the long run and short run 
adjustment to changes in tz  through the estimates of   and  respectively (Harris, 1994: 77).   
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The key feature in equation 10 is the rank (r) of the matrix . The test for co-integration between 
the tz  is computed by looking at the rank of the   matrix through its characteristic roots (also 
called eigenvalues) (Brooks, 2008:350). If rank   = 0, the matrix is null and there is no co-
integration at all, implying that there is no linear combinations of the tz that are I (0). Instead, if   
is of rank n, (r = n), the vector process is stationary and it is an uninterested case in the current 
context since it implies that there is no problem of spurious regression and the appropriate 
modelling strategy is to estimate equation 9 (Harris, 1994:79). In intermediate cases, if rank =1, 
there is a single co-integrating vector in the model (10).   
On the other hand, if the coefficient matrix   has reduced rank (r<n), then there exists (n x r) 
matrices   and   each with rank r such that: 
  ...........................................................................................................................        11 
where  represents the matrix of the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium (adjustment 
parameters), while   is the is a matrix of long run coefficients such that the term ktz   in (8) 
represents up to n co-integration relationships in the multivariate model which ensure that the tz  
converge to their long run steady state solutions ( Harris, 1994: 77-79). 
To test for the rank of  , Johansen approach uses two co-integration tests statistics:  
   


n
ri
itrace Tr
1
ˆ1ln       and        1max ˆ1ln1,  rTrr   
 where r is the number of independent co-integrating vectors under the null hypothesis 
          iˆ  is the estimated value for the i
th ordered eigenvalue from the   matrix   
          T  is the sample size (Brooks, 2008:351). 
The trace statistics ( trace ) test the null hypothesis that the number of co-integrating vectors is less 
than or equal to r  against the unrestricted alternative that there are more than r , while the 
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maximum eigenvalue statistics ( max ) test the null that the number of co-integrating vectors is r
against the alternative of 1r  co-integrating vectors (Enders, 2020: 391). Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) provide the critical values for the two statistics. To find the number of co-integrating vectors 
among variables, the test statistic is compared with the critical value from Johansen’s tables. If the 
calculated value exceeds the critical value from Johansen’s tables, reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternative, and if the test statistic is less that the critical value, the opposite occurs 
(Brooks, 2008:352).  
It is worth noting that the Eviews 7.2 software offers the values of both the maximum eigenvalue 
and the trace test statistics and their critical values at different conventional levels.  
After identifying the number of co-integrating vectors in the model, a VECM (equation8) can be 
estimated by specifying the number of co-integrating vectors, and normalising the model on the 
true co-integrating relation(s) so that the coefficient of a given selected variable in the co-
integrating vector is one. After normalising, it may be possible to examine the accuracy of 
restrictions inspired by economic theory. Like this, software package, Eviews 7.2 helps in testing 
restrictions placed on the co-efficients by providing the test statistic that has a 
2 distribution with 
a degree of freedom equal to the number of restriction imposed on co-efficients (Enders, 2010: 
395). The restriction set in the null hypothesis is binding if the calculated value of the test statistic 
exceeds that in a 
2  table (Enders, 2010: 395).  
Hence, the estimation of a VECM entails the restriction of the long run behaviour of the variables 
to converge to their co-integrating relationship while allowing both the short-run dynamic 
behaviour of the model and the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium relationship.    
Once the estimation is done, the residuals of the vector error correction equations must be assessed 
for model adequacy by performing the diagnostic checks.  
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4.4.3 Diagnostic Checks 
In this research, the mis-specification tests such as residual heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation, 
and normality, among others will be undertaken.   
WHITE’S TEST FOR HETEROSCEDACTICITY  
One of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model (CLRM) is that the variance of the 
errors is constant, i.e. homoscedasticity. If the variance of errors changes over time, they are stated 
as heteroscedastic. If the errors are heteroscedastic, the standard error estimates could be wrong 
(Brooks, 2008:386). A test of this assumption is therefore required.  
There are a number of formal statistic tests for heteroscedasticity, but in this study, the White’s 
test will be used to test for heteroscedasticity. The White’s test for heteroscedasticity involves the 
auxiliary regression of the squared residuals on a constant, all the original regressors (explanatory 
variables), all the squares of the regressors and their cross products (Harris, 1995: 68). It tests the 
null hypothesis that the errors are both homoscedasticity and independent of the regressors and 
that there is no problem of mis-specification (Takaendesa, 2006). 
AUTO-CORRELATION LM TEST  
Another assumption of the CLRM is that the errors are uncorrelated with one another. If errors are 
not uncorrelated with one another, they are said to be auto-correlated or that they are serially 
correlated. As in the case of heteroscedasticity, the presence of serial correlation can also lead to 
the standard error estimates that are wrong. A Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test used in this research 
is proposed as a more general test for auto-correlation up to the specified lag order. 
The LM test is conducted by estimating an auxiliary regression of the residuals on all the regressors 
of that model (variables) and the lagged residuals (Brooks, 2008: 149). If the calculated value from 
this auxiliary regression exceeds the critical value from a 
2  table, reject the null hypothesis of 
no auto-correlation and accept the alternative of auto-correlated residuals (Enders, 2010: 437). 
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TEST FOR NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS: JACQUE-BERA TEST  
The normality assumption is also necessary to be able to conduct hypothesis tests about the model 
parameters. One of the most commonly applied tests to find out whether a sample is drawn from 
a normal distribution or not, is the Jarque-Bera, and is the residual normality test that will be used 
in this research. The Jacque- Bera test is based on the third and fourth moments of a distribution 
called the skewness and kurtosis (Mantalos, 2010). Skewness measures the extent to which a 
distribution is not symmetric about its mean value and Kurtosis measures how fat the tails of the 
distribution are (Brooks, 2008: 161).  
The Jacque- Bera statistic is based on the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors. If the 
residuals are normally distributed, the histogram should be bell-shaped and the p-value given at 
the bottom of the normality test screen should be bigger than 0.05 to not reject the null of normality 
at the 5% level, while the Jacque-Bera test statistic would not be significant (Brooks, 2008: 163).  
4.4.4 Granger-causality tests 
Granger-causality statistics examine whether lagged values of one variable help to forecast another 
variable (Stock and Watson, 2001).  If changes in x1 cause changes in x2, lags of x1 should be 
significant in the equation for x2 and it would be said that  x1 “Granger causes” x2 or that  x1 does 
improve the forecasting performance of x2 ( Enders, 2004: 283).  
Consider a bivariate VAR model of two variables ty1  and ty2  (Brooks, 2008: 297): 
tttttttt yyyyyyy 1321231112212211112121111101    …………………12 
tttttttt yyyyyyy 2322231212222212112221121202    ……………….13   
If the estimates of the coefficients of the lagged variable ty1  , i.e. 11 , 11 and 11 are not 
significantly different from zero in equation (12) we can conclude that lags of ty1 do not explain 
current ty1 . Similarly, if the estimates of the coefficients of the lagged variable ty2 : 12 , 12 and 
12 are equal to zero in equation (12) we can conclude that lags of ty2  do not explain current ty1 . 
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In the same way, if the coefficients on the lags of variables ty1 and ty2 , in equation (13) are not 
jointly significantly different from zero, then it is said that the lags of ty1  
and the lags of ty2  
do 
not explain current ty2 . In other words, the lagged values of ty1 and ty2  in equations 12 and 13 do 
not help to predict the current ty1  
and ty2 .   
4.4.5 Impulse response and variance decomposition 
Since the primary concern in this study is to investigate if monetary policy has an impact on the 
real sector, the next stage will be finding out the actual response of any variable to a stochastic 
shock in another variable and to establish the relative importance of each random innovation 
affecting the variables of the VECM. An examination of causality in a VAR will prove which of 
the variables in the model have statistically significant influences on the future values of each of 
the variables in the model. However, causality test will not reveal whether changes in a value of a 
given variable have a negative or positive effect on the other variables in the system, or how long 
it would take for the effect to work through the system (Brooks, 2008:299). Such information is 
provided by an analysis of the VAR’s impulse responses and variance decompositions. 
GENERALISED IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS  
The generalized impulse response approach is used to investigate the impact of monetary shock to 
each of the variables in the model. The generalised impulse responses show the impact of a change 
in the innovations of one endogenous variable on the actual levels of another endogenous variable 
of the VAR (Ludi and Ground, 2006). In this way, an innovation to a variable in a VAR affects 
that variable and all other endogenous variables in the VAR system. Indeed, the generalised 
impulse responses help to find out how the macroeconomic variables react over time to a one-time 
structural shock. So, for each variable from each equation separately, a unit shock is applied to the 
error, and the effects upon the VAR system overtime are observed. Hence, if there are n variables 
in a system, a total of n2 impulse responses could be created (Brooks, 2008: 299).  
Unlike the traditional impulse response analysis, the generalized impulse response technique does 
not require orthogonalization of shocks and is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1998). According to Pesaran and Shin (1998), the generalized impulse 
85 
 
responses are unique and fully take account of the historical patterns of correlations observed 
amongst the different shocks (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). 
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS  
Another important procedure used to establish the relative strength of the bank-lending channel is 
the estimation of the variance decompositions. Variance decompositions establish the relative 
importance of different underlying shocks in explaining the variability of the series at different 
time horizons (Ramlogan, 2004). A shock to the variable will not only directly affect that variable, 
but will also be transmitted to all other variables in the system through the dynamic structure of 
the VAR (Brooks, 2008:300). Thus, variance decompositions provide the proportion of the 
movements in the dependent variables that are due to their ‘own’ shocks, versus shocks to the other 
variables (Enders, 2010: 314). The Choleski approach is used in estimating the variance 
decompositions.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodological structure and data used to examine the impact of 
monetary policy on the Rwanda banking system and real economy. We have seen in this chapter 
that based on the economic theory, and on the previous empirical researches undertaken in similar 
studies, an empirical model that specifies the bank-lending channel in Rwanda was formed. Since 
this research uses time series data, this chapter highlighted that the first step undertaken is to check 
the existence of stationarity or otherwise. This will be done using Dickey-Fuller and the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test, and the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity test. 
Moreover, in this study, the Johansen methodology based on the determination of the rank of the 
matrix of the coefficients in a multivariate system has been chosen as the preferred parameter 
estimation method. To test the appropriateness of the estimated model, the diagnostic checks such 
as residual heteroskedasticity, auto-correlation, and normality tests are performed. Finally, after 
testing for causality; the impulse response and variance decomposition analyses, using the 
generalized impulse response technique and the Choleski approach respectively, are used to 
investigate the impact and magnitude of monetary shock to each of the variables in the model.  
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To accomplish the objectives of this research, and answer the research questions posed in section 
1.3 of Chapter 1, the statistical estimation techniques discussed in this chapter will be applied to 
the available data collected from the National Bank of Rwanda for a period starting from 1996Q1 
until 2011Q4. The empirical findings are presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results and discussions of the estimated models.  The second section 
summarises the descriptive statistics of the data, the third section presents the results of 
stationarity/unit root tests while the fourth one represents and talks about the VAR model lag 
length selection outcomes. In the section five the cointegration test results are discussed. Granger 
causality test results are provided in the sixth section, while impulse response and variance 
decomposition analyses findings are presented in the seventh and eight sections, respectively. The 
last section provides the conclusion of this chapter.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics  
This section deals with the preliminary results by underlining the basic statistical properties of the 
data. Descriptive statistics of the series are presented in Table 5.1, namely: The mean, median, 
maximum and minimum values, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-
Bera test for normality. 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of the time series data.  The sample period starts 1996Q1 to 
2011Q4. From the table 5.1 it is observed that the mean for the discount rate is 12.411%. This 
means that the average of the values of discount rate time series data is 12.411%. The Median, 
which is the middle value in series of ordered discount rate values, is 12.500 %. The biggest value 
in a set of discount rate observations, maximum, is 16.000 %, while the lowest amount (minimum) 
that can be charged in interest rate (discount rate) set of data is 9.630 %.  The standard deviation 
measures how spread out numbers are. The standard deviation for our discount rate is 1.513%. 
This indicates that our values are spread wide away from our mean of 12.411%. From the table 
5.1, it is also observed that the skewness for the discount rate is 0.574%. Skewness is a measure 
of the degree of asymmetry of a distribution. Skewness coefficient of 0.574% indicates that the 
distribution is fairly positively skewed as observations are distributed to the right. On the other 
hand, Kurtosis is a statistical measure of the peakedness of a distribution. The Kurtosis statistics 
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of 3.147% in discount rate variable shows that the Kurtosis of normal distribution is 3.147%. The 
Jarque-Bera test which is a measurement of  whether a sample is drawn from a normal distribution 
or not, accepts normality distribution in discount rate series as the distributed the p- value of the 
Jacque-Bera test statistic (0.167) is  bigger than 0.05. 
Table 5. 1 Summary statistics of the data, 1996Q1- 2011Q4  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Discount rate                      
(%) 
Deposit 
(billion Rwf) 
Loans    
(billion Rwf) 
GDP   
(billion Rwf) 
CPI 
Mean  12.411  5.072  4.717  5.705  4.171 
Median  12.500  4.931  4.579  5.612  4.065 
Maximum  16.000  6.519  6.567  6.887  4.723 
Minimum  9.630  3.818  3.217  4.531  3.734 
Std. Dev.  1.513  0.781  0.824  0.699  0.306 
Skewness  0.574  0.198  0.324  0.222  0.472 
Kurtosis  3.147  1.831  2.316  1.714  1.782 
Jarque-Bera  3.574  4.057  2.371  4.934  6.334 
Probability  0.167  0.131  0.305  0.0847  0.042 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
In table 5.1, it is also shown that the mean and median for the deposit variable are 5.072 billion 
Rwf and 4.931billion Rwf respectively. The maximum value for the deposit series is 6.519 billion 
Rwf while the minimum value is 3.818 billion Rwf.  The standard deviation for deposit 
observations is 0.781 billion Rwf, indicating that the data points are spread out over a large range 
of values. With regards to the skewness, table 5.1 reveals that deposit variable has positive 
skewness i.e. the value of 0.198.  The kurtosis coefficient in deposit variable specifies platykurtic 
distribution as the value of 1.831 is less than 3. For normality, the p- value of 0.131 of the Jacque-
Bera test statistic discloses that  the deposit series data is normally distributed i.e. the p- value of 
0.131 is bigger than 0.05.   
Regarding the statistics for the loans variable, it is observed from the table 5.1 that the average of 
loan series data is 4.717 billion Rwf and median is 4.579 billion Rwf.  The maximum value in a 
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set of loan observations is 6.567 billion Rwf while the minimum number is 3.217 billion Rwf.  The 
standard deviation is 0.824 billion Rwf, showing that the values are spread out. Concerning the 
Skewness and Kurtosis statistics for loan data, table 5.1 displays that the distribution is positively 
skewed (a value of 0.324) while the Kurtosis coefficient signposts platykurtic distribution (a 
number of 2.316). The Jacque-Bera test confirms a normality distributed loan data as the p-value 
(0.305) is bigger than 0.05.   
The statistical properties of the GDP data indicate that mean and median values for GDP 
observations are 5.705 billion Rwf and 5.612 billion Rwf respectively. The maximum number in 
GDP series is 6.887 billion Rwf while the minimum value is 4.531 billion Rwf as it is shown in 
the table 5.1. The standard deviation value for Gross Domestic Product variable is 0.699 billion 
Rwf and it also an indication of the spread out of the data points. The GDP series has positive 
skewness (the value of 0.222) while the Kurtosis statistics shows a platykurtic distribution. About 
the Jacque-Bera statistic, the p-value appears to be greater than 0.05 (0.084) as it is revealed in the 
table5.1. Thus, the Jarque-Bera test accepts normality distribution in GDP series.    
Finally, the summary statistics of the Consumer Price Index series as it illustrated in the table 5.1 
demonstrates that the mean and median values for the variable are 4.171 and 4.064 respectively. 
The maximum number in CPI data is 4.723 whereas the minimum value is 3.734. The standard 
deviation equals 0.306, indicating that the values are spread wide away from the mean (4.171). 
The Skewness value of 0.472 shows that the CPI data is positively skewed and the Kurtosis 
coefficient (1.782) specifies a platykurtic distribution as its value is less than 3. The CPI series 
found to be violating the normality assumption as the p- value of the Jacque-Bera test for normality 
is less than 5% (0.042). This is shown in the table 5.1. 
Taking all variables together, table 5.1 displays that the discount rate has the highest mean value 
followed by GDP, deposit and loans, while CPI has the lowest mean value. The CPI variable also 
has the lowest standard deviation, while discount rate displayed the highest standard deviation 
thereafter loans, deposits and GDP. Relative to other variables, the discount rate data points are 
more spread out over a large range of values. Regarding the Kurtosis statistics, it is observed that 
the kurtosis coefficients of loans, deposits, GDP and CPI indicate platykurtic (flat) distribution 
whereas the Kurtosis statistic in discount rate variable show that the variable is leptokurtic (thin). 
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The Skewness coefficients in all variables indicate that the distribution is fairly positively skewed 
and the Jarque-Bera test accepts normality distribution in all series except for the CPI which is not 
normally distributed.     
5.3 Stationarity tests  
Before undertaking the formal test of unit roots, a visual plot of the variables is performed. This 
graphical analysis of the series is crucial as it permits the detection of any data capturing errors, 
and structural breaks and provides an idea of the trends and stationarity of the data set (Gujarati, 
2010). Figure 5.1 below plots the five variables of this research against time
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Figure 5.1 Stationarity/unit root test results 
 
   Discount rate (%), 1996Q1 – 2011Q4                                                             
 
   Log GDP (Rwf), 1996Q1 – 2011Q4 
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From the Figure 5.1, it is observed that the four variables, i.e. CPI, GDP, DEPOSIT and LOANS, 
appear to be trending upward with fluctuations over time. The four variables have a time variant 
mean and variance suggesting a unit root in these series. However, discount rate doesn’t show any 
trend, but also appears to be fluctuating over time. The interest rate variable changes closely around 
its mean, but its variances are clearly inconstant as time goes on. 
In order to enrich the analysis and to be sure about the stationarity status of the variables, the 
second step is to identify formally the presence of unit roots using the ADF, PP, and KPSS 
(detailed previously in chapter four, sections 4.4.1.1; 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.1.3) stationarity tests and the 
output is reported in table 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below.   
Table 5.2: ADF stationarity test results  
      
 
Variables                         
       ADF test in level  ADF test in first differenced  
  Test 
statistic 
Critical value    Test 
statistic 
   Critical values 
1% 5%  1% 5% 
Discount rate                         -3.35 -4.11 -3.48 -8.36* -4.11 -3.48 
Deposit                          1.46 -4.11 -3.48 -8.41* -4.11 -3.48 
Loans                           -2.60 -3.60 -2.93 -5.72* -3.56 -2.91 
 GDP -2.52 -4.13 -3.49 -1.01 -4.21 -3.52 
 CPI -0.70 -3.54 -2.90 -4.75* -3.54 -2.90 
Note: *** denotes significant at 1%. Log GDP is not significant in level and in first difference. All the 
variables are in logarithm (log) except for the discount rate 
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Table 5.3: PP stationarity test results 
         
 
Variables                      
       PP test in level  PP test in first differenced  
  Test 
statistic 
Critical value    Test 
statistic 
   Critical values 
1% 5%  1% 5% 
Discount rate                         -3.35                             -4.11 -3.48                              -8.35*                                -4.11 -3.48                            
 Deposit                          1.93                                   -4.11 -3.48                                      -8.41*                                    -4.11 -3.48                          
 Loans                           1.20                                  -3.53 -  2.90                            -6.47* -3.54 -2.90 
GDP 0.30                                   -4.11 -3.48                              -4.40*                                   -4.11 -3.48                             
 CPI 1.13 -3.53 -2.90                              -4.75* -3.54 -2.59                   
Note: *** denotes significant at 1%.   All the variables are in logarithm (log) except for the discount rate  
 
Table 5.4 KPSS stationarity test results 
            
 
Variables                   
      KPSS test in level  KPSS test in first differenced  
  Test 
statistic 
Critical value    Test 
statistic 
   Critical values 
1% 5%  1% 5% 
Discount rate                         0.07* 0.22 0.15         0.04* 0.21 0.14 
Deposit                          0.26 0.22 0.15                   0.12* 0.22 0.15                   
Loans                           0.87                                     0.74 0.46         0.67* 0.74 0.46        
GDP 0.26   0.22 0.15                           0.11* 0.22 0.15                   
CPI 0.92                                   0.74 0.46                  0.36*            0.74 0.46                   
Note: *** denotes significant at 1%. Discount rate is stationary in level and in the first difference. All the 
variables are in logarithm (log) except for the discount rate  
 
94 
 
 
Table 5.2 presents the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test while table 
5.3 shows the results from the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test. The results from the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity test are also shown in the table 5.4. The 
tests were conducted with level and first difference series.   
The results for the ADF and PP tests in table 5.2 and in table 5.3 show that none of the series is 
stationary in levels, since their test statistics are all smaller than their critical values at 5 per cent 
significant levels. When the tests are applied to first differences of the variables, they all become 
stationary, except GDP under ADF test, suggesting that they are all I (1).  From Table 5.4, the 
results based on the KPSS unit root test show that all the variables appear to be non-stationary at 
levels, with the exception of discount rate, but stationary when differenced once.  Discount rate 
becomes stationary in level as its LM test statistic of 0.07 is less that its critical value of 0.15 at 
5% level and of 0.22 at 1% significance level. Recall that the KPSS has as its null hypothesis that 
the series is stationary while the ADF and PP tests test the null hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis under the KPSS means the series has unit root, while a rejection of 
the null hypothesis under the ADF and PP is interpreted as evidence of stationarity in the data.   
Regarding the GDP variable which is still non-stationary when differenced once using ADF test, 
it is also taken as being stationary after differenced once as it is indicated by both the PP and KPSS 
tests. Indeed, the KPSS stationarity test is more reliable test for unit root test than ADF and PP 
tests.  
We conclude therefore that the results from the formal unit root tests indicate the existence of unit 
root in all variables under study, discount rate included. Although KPSS test found discount rate 
to be stationary in level, the informal analysis examining the plots indicates that albeit the interest 
rate variable may move closely around its mean, but its variance is not constant over time.   
5.4 Vector Autoregressive model lag length selection  
The specification of VAR models requires us to determine the optimal lag length of the variables 
in the VAR.  The importance of lag length determination is confirmed by Braun and Mittnik (1993) 
who demonstrate that impulse response functions and variance decomposition are inconsistently 
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derived from the estimated VAR when the lag length differs from the true lag length.  Additionally, 
Lutkepohl (1993) shows that selecting a higher order lag length optimal than the true lag length 
results in an increase in the mean square- forecast errors of the VAR model and that inappropriate 
lag length often produces autocorrelated errors. 
In order to determine the appropriate lag lengths a number of information criteria are used: LR 
(Likelihood Ratio test), FPE (Final Prediction Error test), AIC (Akaike information criterion), SC 
(Schwarz information criterion) and HQ (Hannan-Quinn information criterion) statistics and 
keeping the number of lags which correspond to the optimum value of the LR, FPE, AIC, SBIC 
and HQ statistics.  Similarly, Enders (2004: 358) proposes that researchers should begin with a lag 
length equal to T 3
1
, where T is the number of the observations, and select between one up to this 
number, as the order of the VAR corresponding to the optimum value of LR, FPE, AIC, SBIC and 
HQ. Regarding the optimum value, some literatures (Brooks, 2008: 304; Omer and Douglas, 1999) 
suggest retaining the minimum value of LR, FPE, AIC, SBIC and HQ. 
Thus, in determining the order of the VAR model as specified in chapter four section 4.2, the first 
step is to set the maximum order using Ender’s formula.  Since there are 64 observations in the 
sample, we have: (64) 3
1
= 4. After selecting lag 4, a VAR model is estimated. Since the objective 
is to estimate the impact of policy rate (discount rate) on loans and of the loans on real output, two 
VAR models, i.e. VAR1 and VAR2 are estimated. All the variables entered the VAR models in 
their logarithmic form except the discount rate.  
Using the LR, FPE, AIC, SBIC and HQ tests, the lag lengths were estimated to determine the lag 
order for VAR1 and VAR2 models (the results are reported in appendix1). Note that the 
econometric software package Eviews 7.2 assists in determining the value of LR, FPE, AIC, SBIC 
and HQ at different lag levels of each VAR model.  
The results show that LR, FPE, AIC and HQ select order 2 as optimal lag length while SBIC 
chooses a VAR (1) (see appendix 1). Therefore the lag order equals 2 is selected as suggested by 
four out of five Lag Length information Criteria. According to Enders (2010: 216-217) and 
Asteriou and Hall (2011: 372), after selecting the optimal lag order, the researcher must inspect 
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the diagnostics concerning autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and normality of the residuals. In 
this way, autocorrelation LM, normality and white heteroskedasticity (no cross terms) tests for 
residual tests are performed. In testing the serial correlation, the number of lags to be included in 
the test is specified. If the p-value of the specified lag is less than 0.05 for a 95% confidence 
interval, the null of serial correlation is rejected and we conclude that serial correlation is present. 
For normality, the Jacque-Bera test is used. If the residuals are normally distributed the p- value 
of the Jacque-Bera test statistic should be bigger than 0.05 to not reject the null of normality at the 
5% significance level. A white test is also used to test for heteroscedasticity (a case where the 
errors do not have a constant variance). If the computed p-value is less than 0.05 we reject the null 
and conclude that there is significant evidence of heteroscedasticity. 
Thus, after setting the lag order equals to 2 as suggested by LR, FPE, AIC and HQ tests, the model 
was estimated and the properties of the residuals from the estimated VAR were examined.  The 
residuals of the estimated model found to be violating the normality assumption as the p- value of 
the Jacque-Bera test for normality is less than 5% (0.000) ( see appendix 2). The lag order = 1 was 
also used as it was indicated by SBIC test but still the results show the evidence of non-normality. 
We tried lags order equals 3 and 4 but still the residuals of the estimated model cause a rejection 
of the normality assumption.  
The optimal lag of order 5 was selected and a VAR models were estimated. Using the LR, FPE, 
AIC, SBIC and HQ tests, the lag lengths were estimated again to determine if the lag order equals 
5 is confirmed by the five Lag Length information Criteria and the results are reported in table 5.5 
below. 
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Table 5.5: Determining the lag order in loan supply model and in output response model 
Lag LR FPE AIC SBIC HQ 
0 NA   1.21e-07 -1.737540 -1.561477 -1.668812 
1  684.8746  6.93e-13 -13.81224  -12.75587*  -13.39988* 
2  56.94780   5.03e-13* -14.15120 -12.21451 -13.39519 
3  28.26149  6.38e-13 -13.96099 -11.14399 -12.86134 
4  24.06966  8.67e-13 -13.74694 -10.04963 -12.30366 
5   47.40717*  5.65e-13  -14.33606* -9.758438 -12.54914 
Note:* indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR denotes Likelihood Ratio, FPE denotes Final 
prediction error, AIC denotes Akaike information criterion, SBIC denotes Schwarz information criterion 
and HQ denotes Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
Conferring to the table 5.5, it is seen that LR and AIC tests choose the lag of order 5, SBIC and 
HQ tests choose the lag order equals 1 and FPE test chooses the lag of order 2. From the discussions 
above, the lag order equals 1 and the lag order equals 2 were rejected as the residuals of the 
estimated model using lag of order 1 and lag order equals 2 found to be violating the assumption 
of normality.  
After using the lag of order 5 as suggested by LR and AIC the diagnostic checking was conducted 
and the results show that the residuals of the estimated model follow a white-noise process. After 
performing autocorrelation LM test, it was found that the p-value of 0.97 at lag 5 is bigger that 
0.05 (see appendix 3). Thus, there is no evidence that autocorrelation is present as the p-value is 
considerably in excess of 0.05. Also, the outcomes from performing  the Jacque-Bera test for 
normality, using inverse Square Root of Residual Covariance Matrix showed that the p-value 
appears to be greater than 0.05 (0.10) as indicated in the appendix 4. Thus, the residuals are 
normally distributed. In conducting heteroscedasticity test, the p-value was 0.2969 and therefore 
there is no evidence for the presence of heteroscedasticity (see appendix 5).  Therefore the lag 
order equals 5 is used in this research as selected by LR and AIC VAR Lag order selection 
information Criteria. Indeed the residuals from the estimated model using the lag order equals 5 
are Gaussian.  
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5.5 Tests for Cointegration 
Cointegration analysis is conducted using the Johansen methodology to determine whether there 
is a long run equilibrium relationship among the variables. In order to carry out the Johansen 
procedure, it is needed to consider trend underlying the data. In this way, distinct specification 
models are considered, but the model allowing for a linear deterministic trend in the data and 
unrestricted constant in cointegrating space is the one most used in empirical research and is 
therefore the one used in this research. In addition to the deterministic trend specification, the 
Johansen cointegration test also requires us to specify the lag order for the VAR. According to 
Brooks, 2008: 350, if a VAR containing “g” variables with “k” lags is estimated, in order to use 
the Johansen test, the k-1 lags should be used for differenced variables. Thus, as lag equals 5 was 
used to estimate the VAR1 model, the lag order equals 4 is used for Johansen technique.  
5.5.1 Identification of the Cointegrating vectors in loan supply VAR model and in output   
response VAR model 
The cointegration analysis examines the presence of cointegrating relationships between the 
variables of the VAR model. In a loan supply VAR, the objective is to estimate a loan supply 
equation. Thus the cointegrating equation is normalised with respect to loans, so as to reflect a 
loan equation. The variables are ordered as: loans, deposit, discount rate, GDP and CPI. The aim 
here is to analyse the transmission from interest rate to loans. On the other hand, the output 
response VAR intended at estimating GDP equation, and the cointegrating equation is therefore 
normalized with respect to real output to examine the transmission from loans to GDP. The 
variables for the output response VAR are ordered as: GDP, deposit, discount rate, loans and CPI. 
The results from the identification of the cointegrating vector in both VARs are summarised in 
table 5.6 below. For details, one can see the appendix 6 and the appendix 7. 
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Table 5.6: Johansen eigenvalues and associated test statistics: Loans supply VAR and GDP 
VAR 
Null hypothesis Test statistics 5% critical value 
 Eigen value 
Trace test, 
(λtrace) 
Maximum 
eigenvalue test 
(λmax) 
Trace test 
 
λtrace 
Max test 
 
λmax 
r = 0  149.419*  66.008*  88.803  38.331 
r ≤ 1  83.410*  37.790*  63.876  32.118 
r ≤ 2  45.620*  24.029  42.915  25.823 
r ≤ 3  21.591  14.186  25.872  19.387 
r ≤ 4  7.405  7.405  12.517  12.517 
Note: *denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
Starting with the trace test, the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors is rejected, since the test 
statistic of about 149.41 is greater than the 5 per cent critical value of approximately 88.80. In the 
same way, the null hypothesis that there are at most 1 and that there are at most 2 cointegrating 
vectors (relationships) is rejected, since their test statistics are bigger than their 5 per cent critical 
values. But the null hypothesis that there are at most 3 cointegrating relationships cannot be 
rejected, since the test statistic of 21.59 is now less than the 5 per cent critical value of about 25.90. 
Also, the trace test fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent significance level that there 
are at most 4 cointegrating relationships. However, the trace test indicates 3 cointegrating 
relationships at the 5 per cent level in the VARs models. The maximum eigenvalue form of the 
Johansen test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent significance level that there are none or 
one cointegrating relationship, but  max test fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent 
significance level that there are two (the test statistic of about 24.03 is less than the 5 per cent 
critical value of 25.82), three (the test statistic of 14.18 is less than the 5 per cent critical value of 
19. 38) and four cointegrating relationships in the VAR model as it is shown in the table 5.7.  The 
maximum eigenvalue test suggests that there are two cointegrating relationships in the model.  We 
retain two cointegrating relationships in the loan supply VAR model as it is indicated by  max 
test, because in loans equation the relationship between loans and interest rate, which is one of the 
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objectives of this study is specified (see appendix 6).  
In the same way, the two cointegrating relationships in the output response model as indicated by 
maximum eigenvalue test, show a relationship between loans supplied by banks and real output, 
which is another objective of this research (see appendix 7).  In table 5.7, the non-normalised 
VARs are presented while table 5.8 and 5.9 present normalisation with loans and normalisation 
with GDP respectively.  
Table 5.7 Banking sector loans supply VAR and output response VAR (non-normalised)  
                       Standardised eigenvalues of 

 
  Cointegrating vectors Loans Deposit Discount rate GDP CPI 
              
1

 -17.704  8.634  0.658 -77.577  85.441 
             
2

  14.765  16.463  1.936  40.847 -61.551 
             3

  6.952 -9.263 -0.269  10.450 -6.066 
             
4

  23.719 -24.437  0.831  116.874 -103.078 
             5

 -5.906 -14.102 -0.783  8.991 -9.766 
      
  Adjustment terms                      Standardised eigenvalues of 

 
            1

 -0.013 -0.011 -0.017 -0.001 -0.004 
            2

  0.006 -0.019  0.000  0.010  0.007 
            3

 -0.363 -0.035  0.023 -0.160  0.109 
            4

  0.004  0.002 -0.004 -0.000  0.001 
            5

 -0.005  0.004 -0.003  0.004  0.001 
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Table 5.8: Banking sector model 1 with normalisation on loans 
                         Standardised eigenvalues of 

  
Cointegrating 
vectors  
Log loans Log deposit Discount rate Log GDP Log CPI Trend 
             
1

 
 1.000  0.000  0.014  3.890 -4.625 
 
-0.114 
               
2

 
 0.000  1.000  0.105 -1.007  0.410 
 
-0.009 
       
Adjustment 
terms 
                        Standardised eigenvalues of 

   
               1

  0.072 -0.410  5.911 -0.049 0.166  
               2

 -0.301 -0.261 -3.721  0.077 0.028  
 
Table 5.9: Banking sector model 2 with normalisation on GDP  
                         Standardised eigenvalues of 

  
Cointegrating 
vectors  
Log GDP Log deposit Discount rate Log loans Log CPI Trend 
             
1

 1.000 0.000 0.003 0.257 -1.189 -0.029 
             
2

 0.000 1.000 0.108 0.259 -0.788 -0.039 
Adjustment 
terms 
Standardised eigenvalues of 

 
 
               1

 -0.269 -1.333 26.749  0.583 0.620  
               2

  0.077 -0.261 -3.721 -0.301 0.028  
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Following the results of the normalisation with loans (table 5.8) and those of the normalisation 
with GDP (table 5.9), the equation of loans and the equation for GDP in Rwanda over the study 
period may be written as: 
Log loans = – 0.014Discount rate –3.89Log GDP + 4.63Log CPI+ 0.114trend  
Log GDP = – 0.0037Discount rate – 0.26Log loans + 1.19Log CPI+ 0.029trend 
The estimated loans function above represents the long-run relationship among the variables in the 
loan supply model variables in Rwanda. The role of discount rates in the loans function emphasizes 
the potential of interest rates in the conduct of monetary policy in Rwanda.  It would seem from 
the loans equation above that the coefficient of discount rate variable in the loans model is 
significant and has a correct sign as expected by the theory, even though the impact is small. Also 
the estimated GDP equation signifies the long-run relationship among the real output model 
variables in the country. The loans coefficient in the GDP function is significant but has an 
incorrect sign as an increase/ decrease in loan volume is expected to increase/decrease output level.  
In tables 5.10 and 5.11 the results from the test of significance of the coefficients of the variables 
in the both VARs models are summarized  
Table 5.10: Model 1: loans supply VAR 
Variables Coefficients  χ2  test statistic χ2  critical 
value at 5% 
p-value for  test 
statistic  
Loans  1 20.628 5.991 0.000** 
Discount rate  0.014 12.821 5.991 0.002** 
GDP  3.890   17.137 5.991 0.000** 
CPI -4.625  20.99 5.991 0.000** 
Linear trend -0.114 21.31 5.991 0.000** 
 Note: ** denotes Reject the null hypothesis. Ho: Null hypothesis: ?̂?𝑖 = 0 
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Table 5.11:  Model 2: Output VAR 
Variables Coefficients  χ2  test statistic χ2  critical 
value at 5% 
p-value for  test 
statistic  
GDP 1.000 17.137    5.991       0.000** 
Discount rate 0.003 12.821                          5.991       0.002** 
Loans 0.257 20.628       5.991       0.000** 
CPI -1.189 20.999    5.991       0.000** 
Linear trend -0.029 21.315 5.991       0.000** 
Note: ** denotes Reject the null hypothesis. Ho: Null hypothesis: ?̂?𝑖 = 0 
According to Brooks (2008), when testing the significance of the estimates of the coefficients in a 
cointegrating equation, it is suggested using χ2-test statistic since the usual t-test statistic can result 
in incorrect conclusions as we use non-stationary time series. It is observed from table 5.10 and 
table 5.11 that in all variables, χ2 test statistics are greater than their critical values at 5% level and 
p-values are below 0.05. Thus, the significance of each variable in the VARs is confirmed. 
5.5.2  Results from the stability tests of the loan supply VAR model and the output 
response VAR model 
Suggestions of economic policy stand for the accurate estimation of the relationships among 
variables (Talas et al, 2013). Indeed stability of the estimated model is crucial for prediction and 
econometric inference. In the context of Rwanda, if the model is stable, it may be useful to the 
policy makers for future economy policy. 
In case of cointegrating equations estimated from a VAR model, Hansen and Johansen (1993, 
1999) suggest using forward recursive test and backward recursive test for stability. The backward 
recursive stability test start with the estimation of the eigenvalues using a sub-sample covering the 
last coming observations in the whole sample period and recursively continues to estimations by 
increasing the sub-sample length with recent backward observations. Contrary in applying the 
forward recursive estimations, the sub-sample is first fixed on the first coming observations in the 
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full sample and then the eigenvalues are recursively estimated by increasing the size of the sub-
sample on current forward data.  
The forward and backward recursive tests are based on the X-form model established from 
equation tX  below, and R-form model that re-estimates only the long-run parameters (𝛼) and (𝛽) 
after concentrating out all short-run dynamics represented by 𝐷𝑡 variable in equation tX  Dennis et 
al. (2005).  Normally, the R-model behaves in a more stable manner than the X-form as it is 
corrected for the short-run variations Dennis et al. (2005). 
,.....11 ttktktt DXAXAX        Tt ,.........1  
Figures 5.2 (figure 5.2.1 to figure 5.2.6) and 5.3 (figure 5.3.1 to figure 5.3.6) indicate that over the 
sample period, the path (green line) of the estimates of the coefficients in Loans and GDP models 
fluctuated under the rejection line. Thus the tests performed showed for stability of loans and GDP 
estimated models. To perform stability tests the CATS in RATS software, by Dennis et al. (2005) 
was used.   
Figure 5.2: Forward recursive estimations 
1. Loans model                       
                                          Figure 5.2.1        
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                                                            Figure 5.2.2 
 
                                                              Figure 5.2.3  
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2. GDP model 
                                                   Figure 5.2.4 
 
                                                                 Figure 5.2.5 
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                                                               Figure 5.2.6 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Backward recursive estimations 
1. Loans model 
                                              Figure 5.3.1 
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                                                                Figure 5.3. 2 
 
                                                            Figure 5.3.3 
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2. GDP model 
                                              Figure 5.3.4 
 
                                                              Figure 5.3.5 
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                                                          Figure 5.3.6 
 
5.5.3  Discussion of Results obtained from the Cointegrating vector in the loan supply 
model and in the output response model 
According to Mishkin (1995), The bank lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism 
lending view suggests that a monetary tightening by the central bank directly constraints the ability 
of banks to make new loans, shifting the supply schedule of bank loans left, and therefore forcing 
bank dependent borrowers to reduce investment. The results may lead to a fall in both, real output 
and the price level. This outcome confirms with the findings of Gupta (2004) in investigating the 
bank lending channel in India and Pakistan using a VAR approach. The implication of the bank 
lending channel is that monetary policy has greater effects on bank loans. Finally, the policy action 
will have a significant impact on the real output through bank loans.  
In the case of Rwanda, the statistical significance and the correct sign of the estimate for the 
coefficient of the discount rate in the long-run relationship with the loans supplied by commercial 
banks confirm the bank lending channel literature that an increase in the interest rate decreases 
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bank loans. However, the results show a negative relationship between real GDP and bank loans, 
which is inconsistent with expectation. This may be attributed to the significant number of non- 
performing loans that characterizes the economy of Rwanda. According to the NBR 2012, the 
banking sector in Rwanda is still suffering from a big number of non- performing loans. This is 
not a surprise outcome as the Rwandan financial system is categorized by underdeveloped 
financial markets with the lack long term investments available to the private sector, equity 
markets that are small and securities markets that are still developing. The Rwanda Stock 
Exchange started operations in 2008 and the National bank of Rwanda is currently busy teaching 
the public on long term investments and setting up regulations for Small and Medium Enterprises 
wishing to raise long-term capital through the capital market.  Due to lack of long term resources 
in the Rwandan financial sector, banks chose to finance, on a short term basis, projects that 
normally require a financing of a medium or long term horizon, which increased the borrowers’ 
financing charges who had to incur large monthly payments (principal and interests) that are not 
in line with the level of their available revenues. Additionally the inflation pressure that the country 
is presently experiencing may also contribute to the growth of non-performing loans in Rwandan 
economy. Indeed one of the negative effects of inflation on an economy includes uncertainty over 
future inflation which may discourage investment and savings. Inflation impacts the cost of doing 
business and borrowing money and this may obviously rise the number of nonperforming loans as 
individuals and businesses are forced to take credits from commercial banks at a higher price since 
there is no other alternative source of getting funds to finance their projects.  
On the side of the customers, there are many arguments that many businesses present projects 
without proper market feasibility studies and some risk takers borrow money from banks making 
it a bad debt. Probably there is a lack of professional evaluators operating on the basis of 
recognized evaluation standards and inadequate monitoring relating to the effective credits 
disbursement.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the sample of data shows that the estimated coefficient of interest rate 
in the long-run equation of real output is statistically significant and has the expected negative 
sign. This is an ambiguous result as the monetary policy should impact real economy through 
financial intermediation institutions. This may also be explained by the absence of a strong 
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institutional environment, so that loan contracts are protected and the channel is conducted via 
formal financial markets. 
5.5.4  Weak exogeniety  
In a cointegration system, a variable is said to be weakly exogenous if that variable does not 
respond to the discrepancy from the long run equilibrium. Table 5.12 and table 5.13 indicate the 
p-values of the test statistic for testing if variables included in the model 1 and model 2 are weakly 
exogenous. A weakly exogenous variable is verified by testing the null hypothesis that the 

component of a corresponding 

 variable is not significantly different from zero. The results 
found loans to be weakly exogenous as its p-value for the test statistic is not below 5% (see table 
5.12 and 5.13). The implication is that discount rate, GDP, deposit and CPI will adjust over time 
to restore the long-run equilibrium after external shocks that leads to deviation of the system from 
its long run equilibrium.  
Table 5.12: Tests for weak exogeneity: loans supply VAR  
Variable χ2 (2) P – value for the Test statistic 
Loans 0.928 0.629** 
deposit 9.059 0.011 
Discount rate 9.708 0.008 
GDP 16.416 0.000 
CPI 13.855 0.001 
Note: ** denotes reject the null hypothesis  
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Table 5.13: Tests for weak exogeneity: Output VAR 
Variable χ2 (2) P – value for the Test statistic 
GDP 16.416 0.000 
deposit 9.059 0.011 
Discount rate 9.708 0.008 
loans 0.928 0.629** 
CPI 13.855 0.001 
Note: ** denotes reject the null hypothesis 
5.5.5  Vector error correction modelling  
The Johansen methodology shows that there is a long-run equilibrium between the variables in the 
VAR models. Thus the next step is to estimate error-correction models which describe both the 
short-run dynamic behaviour of the models and the adjustment process towards the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. Table 5.14 and table 5.15 give the summary of the preferred models for 
the loan supply model (VECM1) and for the GDP model (VECM2) functions. Other variables in 
the over-parameterised models functions (see appendix 8 and appendix 9) are insignificant and are 
therefore difficult to interpret. The insignificance of variables were found based on the t-
distribution table at 30 degree of freedom (number of observation after adjustment, i.e. 58 – 
number of estimated coefficients, i.e. 28) and at 0.05% significant level ( 1 tailed). The t-value at 
30 degree of freedom and at 0.05% is 1.69. Thus the variables that have t-values less than 1.69 (in 
absolute term) were taken as insignificant and they were dropped from the model, except for the 
cointegration equation1 in both functions.   
The main outcomes are as follows, the coefficients of all lagged variables contained in the VECM1 
model show that past variables are significant determinant of loans supply in the short run. For 
example the coefficient of - 0.53 for lagged 4 deposits found to be potential in the loan changes. 
Also the coefficient of - 0.03 for lagged 2 discount rate is effective in loans movement. According 
to the table 5.15 it is important to mention that short -run changes in loans do not help much to 
restore the long-term loans equilibrium, this equilibrium is rather restored through changes in 
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discount rate (policy rate), deposits, CPI and changes in GDP.  
From table 5.15, it is also observed that only the coefficients of lagged GDP, deposits and discount 
rate variables and a constant term are significant element of real output in the short run, whilst  
loan changes do not seem to impact GDP in the short run. This may be again explained by a large 
number of non- performing loans in Rwandan banking system. This situation constraints the 
economy from growing. 
The error correction term‘s coefficients equal to -0.22 per cent per quarter for VECM1 and -0.15 
per cent per quarter for VECM2. However both estimates are not statistically significant at 5% 
significance level as their t-value is less than 1.69.  Nevertheless, Gujarati (2003: 825) highlights 
that an error correction term which is insignificant can be taken as a coefficient of a 
macroeconomic relationship which diverges from an equilibrium in a certain time frame and 
adjusts toward its long-run equilibrium over the same time frame.  Therefore, based on Gujarati‘s 
view, the estimation results of the VECM1 and VECM2 models can be interpreted as: over the 
sample period, if loans supply and real output in the economy of Rwanda deviate from their 
equilibrium in any quarter, they will adjust to their equilibrium level in the same quarter. In this 
way, we can say that the policy tool, the interest rate (discount rate) used by NBR can impact 
output through loans.  
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Table 5.14: Banking sector parsimonious error correction model, VECM1, 1996:1 - 2011:4  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. error T-value 
 loans t-2   0.469   0.251   1.862 
deposit t-1  -0.603   0.201  -2.999 
deposit t-4  -0.531   0.166  -3.190 
discount rate t-2  -0.030   0.013  -2.253 
discount rate t-3   -0.027   0.014  -1.904 
CPI t-1  -1.809   0.781  -2.315 
GDP t-2   2.095   0.814   2.573 
GDP t-4   1.503   0.727   2.067 
VECM:[ l + 0.016i + 3.77g – 4.74c – 0.10t –    3.22] t-1   -0.227   0.210  -1.084 
VEMC:[d + 0.056i – 0.56g– 0.28c –0.012t – 0.94] t-1   0.461   0.156   2.955 
Note: l denotes loans, d denotes deposits, i denotes discount rate, g is GDP, c denotes CPI and t is trend 
Table 5.15: Banking sector parsimonious error correction model, VECM2, 1996:1 - 2011:4  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. error T-value 
GDP t-1  0.463 0.223  2.074 
GDP t-4 -0.600 0.203 -2.949 
deposit t-1 -0.107 0.056 -1.899 
deposit t-2 -0.099 0.054 -1.833 
discount rate t-2 -0.009 0.003 -2.524 
VECM: [ g + 0.004i + 0.264l – 1.254c – 0.02t – 0.85] t-1  -0.157 0.235 -0.670 
VECM: [d + 0.058i – 0.15l– 0.99c  – 0.028t – 1.42] t-1  0.134 0.043  3.069 
Constant  0.038 0.013  2.741 
Note: l denotes loans, d denotes deposits, i denotes discount rate, g is GDP, c denotes CPI and t is trend 
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5.5.6 The diagnostic test of the models VECM1 and VECM2  
The results from the tests (see appendix 10 and appendix 11) for the homoscedasticity of the 
residuals, the normality of residuals and variable‘s serial correlation tests show that both the 
VECM1 and the VECM2 models are in of good quality. A non-rejection of the null hypotheses for 
all he tests for the VECM1 and VECM2 models are revealed in appendix 10 and appendix 11. For 
example we fail to reject the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity of residuals in the VECM1 and 
the VECM2 models since we have χ2 (810) = 833.3355 with a p-value = 0.2773 for VECM1 and 
χ2 (810) = 833.8604 with a p-value = 0.2730 for VECM2.  Also the Jacque-Bera test indicates the 
non-rejection of the null hypothesis for normality as the p- values are 0.1552 for VECM1 and 
0.2406 for VECM2 (see appendix 10 and appendix 11).   
5.6 Granger-causality tests 
As discussed in Chapter four, Granger causality measures whether current or past values of one 
variable help to forecast future values of another variable. More specifically, the Granger causality 
test will examine whether the monetary policy does granger cause credit variable or whether credit 
variable does granger cause macroeconomic activity. In other words, if the p value is lower than 5 
percent (or lower than 10 percent), the null hypothesis can be rejected. The p-values for these tests 
are reported in Table 5.16.   
From the summary of the granger-causality results for the five-variable VAR in table 5.16, it is 
found that the discount rate helps to predict loans at the 5 percent significant level. However, the 
credit variable does not help to predict output as the p-value is 0.67. In contrast, GDP helps to 
forecast loans at the 5 percent significant level, thus there is unidirectional causality from GDP to 
loans. The results as shown in the table 5.16 indicate that there is no relationship between discount 
rate and GDP. This means that the real output is not influenced by the interest rate used by the 
NBR.  From the table 5.16, it can also be observed that the credit variable does not help to predict 
the price level as the p-value is 0.57. GDP does improve the forecasting performance of deposit at 
the 5 percent significant level and it helps predicting CPI at the 1 percent significant level. CPI 
granger causes discount rate at the 5 percent significant level while discount rate does not granger 
cause CPI. There is unidirectional relationship between discount rate and CPI.  
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Table 5.16: Granger-causality test results 
 H0 Hypothesis  Chi-squared Probability  
Discount rate does Granger Cause Loans 
Deposit does not Granger Cause Loans 
GDP does Granger Cause Loans 
CPI does not Granger Cause Loans 
 
  12.412 
  7.728 
  11.378 
  7.965  
 0.029** 
 0.171 
 0.044** 
 0.158 
Discount rate does not Granger Cause GDP 
Deposit does not Granger Cause   GDP 
Loans does not Granger Cause GDP 
CPI does not Granger Cause GDP 
 
 8.943 
 3.842 
 3.198 
 6.962 
 0.111 
 0.572 
 0.669 
 0.223 
Discount rate does not Granger Cause CPI 
Deposit does not Granger Cause   CPI 
Loans does not Granger Cause CPI 
GDP does  Granger Cause CPI 
 8.562 
 9.015 
 3.829 
 26.395 
 0.127 
 0.108 
 0.574 
 0.000*** 
Discount rate does not Granger Cause Deposit 
Loans does not Granger Cause Deposit 
GDP does  Granger Cause Deposit 
CPI does not Granger Cause Deposit 
 
 4.093 
 0.365 
 15.603 
 7.277 
 0.536 
 0.996 
 0.008** 
 0.200 
Deposit does not Granger Cause Discount rate 
Loans does not Granger Cause Discount rate 
GDP does Granger Cause Discount rate 
CPI does  Granger Cause Discount rate  
 2.254 
 2.804 
 8.480 
 17.990 
 0.812 
 0.730 
 0.131 
 0.003** 
Note: ** indicates significant at 5% level, *** indicates significant at 1% level 
In addition to the granger causality estimate, impulse response functions are shown in the 
following sub-section. The generalised impulses are used, which help to address the ordering 
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dependence of impulse response functions. Innovations in the short-term interest rate are 
interpreted as unanticipated monetary policy shocks. 
5.7 Impulse responses functions  
Figures 5.4 to 5.6 present generalized responses of the different variables to shocks in interest rate 
(discount rate), generalized responses of variables to bank loans and generalized responses of 
variables to real GDP. The simulation period covers a horizon of 20 quarters. For each variable, 
the horizontal axis indicates the number of quarters after the impulse in the policy tool has been 
introduced. The vertical axis measures the response of the relevant variables. For instance, a value 
of 0.04 corresponds to 4 basis points. The solid lines represent impulse responses while the dotted 
lines are 90% error bounds, based on asymptotic calculation. From the figure 5.4, we observe a 
negative response of the supply of bank loans to a monetary shock.  The loan volume falls 
immediately following unanticipated short-term interest rate, with a maximum impact of 3% 
decline occurring after 3 quarters. The minimum impact of monetary occurs when this variable 
declines by about 0.2% after 9 quarters. The monetary policy chock shows a positive innovation 
in the long run. 
As it is indicated in figure 5.4, the real output is not sensitive to a monetary policy shock, as the 
effect of discount rate on GDP appears to be positive. But, this is not a surprising outcome given 
the poor performance of the financial sector of the Rwandan economy. With respect to the impact 
of monetary policy on prices, the impulse response function in figure 5.4 demonstrates that the 
unanticipated monetary policy shock measured as the discount rate produces positive innovation 
in consumer prices. Prices decline by only 0.1% after the 3th quarter and a positive innovation is 
recorded afterwards. The rise in inflation is in opposition with the most commonly accepted 
macroeconomic theories, as unexpected increase in the short-term interest rate is expected to be 
followed by a decrease in the price level.  An increase in price level after an increase in the policy 
rate seemingly suggests that a monetary contraction creates inflation.  The positive relationship 
between the short-term interest rate and inflation has become known as the “price puzzle” 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992 and Sims (1992).  The “price puzzle” appears in various VAR-based 
studies (see for example Barran et al. 1997), Lungu (2007) and Buigut (2010). According to Sims 
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1992, the price puzzle could be a result of failing to include sufficient information specification 
available to policymakers. In the case of the current study, may be there are variables that contain 
valuable information about future inflation that are not known and therefore are not included in 
the VAR model.   
Figure 5.4: Generalized impulse responses due to a monetary policy shock  
  
 
 
 
Furthermore, the impulse response functions in figure 5.4 show that the unanticipated monetary 
policy shock produces positive innovation in bank deposits. The bank deposits started increasing 
after the 2 quarters and the maximum impact of monetary policy occurs when this variable 
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increases by about 2 % after 16, 17 and 18 quarters. According to the economic theory of the bank 
lending channel, the bank deposits fall immediately in response to monetary shock (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992). Thus, this outcome is also inconsistent with theoretical expectation.  
Figure 5.5: Generalized responses of variables to bank loans 
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Figure 5.6:  Generalized responses of variables to real GDP 
 
 
  
 
From Figure 5.5, we note no significant effect from loans to real output. In figure 5.6 however, we 
observe a positive and significant bank loans response to innovation in real output. The positive 
response of loans supplied by banks to real GDP shocks is as expected since an increase in GDP 
raises both supply and demand for loans. A growth in GDP means that banks have more funds to 
make loans as deposits are more likely to expand. Additionally, the standard investment theory 
proposes the importance of the level of output and its expansion on investment (Mansor, 2006). 
Growth in real output tends to motivate investments and, accordingly, loan demand and loan 
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supply (Mansor, 2006). This means that there exists only a unidirectional causality from real GDP 
to loans as found in the granger causality result. In other words, it looks like a growth in loans 
from the banks is to accommodate real growth. The same outcome of unidirectional causality from 
real GDP to bank loans was revealed by Manson (2006), in analyzing the stock prices and bank 
loan dynamics in Malaysia. The absence of significant influence from bank loans to real output 
level may again be explained by the challenges faced by the Rwandan banking system mentioned 
above.  
5.8 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions. 
In addition to the impulse response functions , Table 5.17  presents the variance decompositions 
estimates for five variables of interest: Loans, GDP, CPI, Deposits and Discount rate generated 
from the unrestricted VAR for forecast period 1 to 20 ( Quarters). In order to simplify the 
presentation of the results only five time horizons are shown and the results for the whole period 
(period 1 to 20) are presented in the appendix 12. One quarter ahead is the short run whereas 20 
quarters ahead is the long run. Quarters four, eight and 12 symbolise the medium term. The 
simulation horizon covers 20 quarters (60 months i.e. three months are reported as quarter 1, or 5 
years) reported as quarter 1 through to 20. The second column of the tables labelled (S.E) reports 
the forecast Standard Error of the variable for each forecast period. The values across the column 
sum up to 100 per cent.  
Table 5.17: Variance decomposition for the bank lending channel 
5.17: Variance decomposition of Loans 
Quarters  S. E Loans GDP CPI Deposits Discount rate 
1  0.042122  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
4  0.088686  74.40190  1.312414  5.307004  2.082385  16.89630 
8  0.108699  65.67480  6.924181  4.297313  2.798623  20.30508 
12  0.117544  66.95358  8.207465  3.851252  3.481524  17.50618 
20  0.137785  51.66240  23.09313  4.383315  5.406172  15.45498 
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5.17.2 Variance decomposition of GDP 
Quarters S.E Loans GDP CPI Deposits Discount rate 
 1  0.012605  1.757016  98.24298  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.036676  0.915690  88.43845  5.724012  2.732858  2.188986 
 8  0.062086  3.562617  63.71570  3.983073  7.379648  21.35896 
 12  0.082401  10.08471  49.64454  4.557836  6.584096  29.12881 
20  0.111648  13.80758  34.85393  16.43833  4.035839  30.86433 
 
5.17.3 Decomposition of CPI 
 Quarters S.E. Loans GDP CPI Deposits Discount rate 
 1  0.018438  0.817884  1.200295  97.98182  0.000000  0.000000 
 4  0.040386  1.913587  34.17472  58.60642  1.694528  3.610748 
 8  0.061642  2.123787  38.19613  34.22856  12.90711  12.54441 
 12  0.078001  9.045089  36.94788  21.57582  11.51886  20.91235 
20  0.095064  16.48498  30.01380  19.06169  8.450920  25.98862 
 
5.17.4 Variance Decomposition of Deposit 
 Quarters  S.E. Loans GDP CPI Deposits Discount rate 
 1  0.049099  1.584214  2.645252  0.886366  94.88417  0.000000 
 4  0.079931  0.931352  37.13206  1.761275  59.71388  0.461433 
 8  0.087703  3.731177  39.66049  1.892312  51.47841  3.237617 
 12  0.096333  4.307745  39.00856  4.489497  42.90574  9.288454 
20  0.125713  7.995342  35.46557  9.638323  27.27864  19.62212 
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5.17.5 Variance Decomposition of Discount rate  
 Quarters S.E. Loans GDP CPI Deposits Discount rate 
 1  0.672924  0.163202  2.916911  1.183870  0.429676  95.30634 
 4  0.836414  2.441192  7.829901  7.520468  3.707094  78.50134 
 8  0.889231  3.343727  9.302994  9.778012  6.013871  71.56140 
 12  0.981418  2.891940  13.05572  19.16734  5.696786  59.18821 
20  1.165757  7.297167  16.36790  18.37509  8.593998  49.36584 
 
From table 5.17.1 we observe that the variations in loans are largely due to discount rate.  Initially, 
the loan variable is not immediately affected by changes in the short-term interest rate. Much of 
the changes in the first quarter are due to itself. But over the medium and longer terms, the role of 
interest rate shocks in the variation of loan volume gains significance. Up to the fourth quarter a 
change in short-term rate accounts for almost 17 per cent variation in the loan volume while it 
accounts for 20.9 per cent in the eight quarter and about 17.50 per cent change in loan volume in 
the twelfth quarter.  A shock in the policy variable accounts for almost 15.5 per cent of the variance 
in credit variable over the long run. This finding is in line with the results from the granger causality 
and those from the generalised impulse response functions that interest rate does influence loans 
supply. Regarding the changes in real output to the variation in loans, the table 5.17.1 indicates 
that shock to GDP contributes 8.2 per cent and  23 per cent to forecast error variance in bank loans 
after the twelfth and twentieth quarters respectively. This finding also supports the granger 
causality results and the outcome from the impulse response functions that real output influences 
bank loans.  
As evident on Table 5.17.2 shocks to loans do not explain much the variation in output. Initially, 
the credit variable contributes only 1.75 percent of the variation in output increasing to 3.5 percent 
in the eighth quarter and 10 percent the twelfth quarter. Over the long run the shocks to loans only 
account for almost 14 per cent in explaining output variability. These results also conform to those 
of the Granger and to those of impulse response analyses that loans don’t have an impact on real 
output. However, the chocks to loans may have a significance impact to the variability in GDP 
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over a very long term, as the evidence show that as time goes on changes to loans in explaining 
the variation in real output increase. In contrast, variations due to discount rate explain the largest 
variation in output in the medium term and long run. Shocks to discount rate contribute 21.35 
percent in the eighth quarter and 29.12 percent in the twelfth quarter to the variance in GDP. In the 
last period, the fluctuations due to short term interest rates account for almost 31 percent. Although 
interest rate shocks here seem to be important in explaining the variation in real output, the granger 
causality test shows that discount rate does not help to predict output as the p-value = 0.11. Indeed, 
the outcome from the impulse responses illustrates an insensitivity of real output to a changes in 
the policy rate.   
 
Regarding the variance decomposition for CPI, table 5.17.3 shows that the variations in consumer 
price index are largely owing to output level followed by interest rate. GDP accounts for almost 
34.2 per cent of the variation in CPI in the fourth quarter while it explains 36.94 percent and 30 
per cent to the forecast error variance in CPI after the twelfth quarter and the long run respectively. 
This outcome supports the finding that GDP does granger cause CPI. The short term interest rates 
contributes 12.54 per cent and almost 21 per cent to forecast error variance in the price level after 
the eight and the twelve quarters respectively, increasing to almost 26 per cent over the long run.  
These findings are in contrast with those from granger causality and impulse response tests where 
interest rate found not to influence the price level.  From table 5.17.3 it is seen that loans and 
deposits don’t account much in the CPI variability. The variations in deposits are largely due to 
GDP with 39.6 percent, 39 percent and 35.4 percent after 8, 12 and 20 quarters respectively (see 
table 5.17.4) while he variations in the discount rate are largely due to GDP and CPI as it is shown 
in the table 5.17.5. Deposits account for a relatively greater proportion compared to that of loans 
(see table 5.17.5). 
 
The findings from granger causality tests and those from the generalized impulse response and 
variance decomposition functions indicate a significance response influence of the monetary 
policy to bank loan changes in the economy of Rwanda.  These results support one hypothesis of 
the bank lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism that small undercapitalized banks 
are unable to raise alternative funds to remain financing loans during contractionary policy. But 
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this result requires an additional assumption. The bank lending channel also entails a major effect 
from loans supplied by banks to real GDP. Indeed, the results from the granger causality, impulse 
responses and variance decompositions analyses show no significant response effect from loans to 
real output.  Furthermore, in estimating the long-run equilibrium among the variables in the GDP 
function, the coefficient of loans in the equation of real output found to have a wrong sign.    
 
Another question that reveals some abnormalities is that according to the bank lending channel, a 
decrease in loans following a monetary policy chock is due to a reduction in deposits as it is not 
possible for small banks to replace the lost funds with funds from other external sources. Yet, the 
results from the impulse responses and granger causality tests confirm no significance reaction 
effect from interest rate to deposits even though the variance decomposition outcomes illustrate a 
significant effect of the discount rate innovations in the deposits variation in the long run. 
Additionally, although the outcome from the variance decomposition analysis shows that the role 
of interest rate shocks in the variation of real output is significant, real GDP seems to be insensitive 
to changes in the monetary policy tool as it is illustrated by the granger causality test and the 
impulse response functions.  
 
From the above discussions, we can state that the bank lending channel in Rwanda is not robust, 
since both hypotheses of the bank lending channel, i.e. a significant effect from policy rate to loans 
and a significant effect from loans to GDP, are not revealed. In fact the results from loan supply 
model show that the monetary policy has little effect on bank lending in Rwanda. Once again, 
these results may be attributed to the weaknesses in the financial sectors of the Rwandan economy, 
which are likely to hamper the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Bank customers bear the 
risk associated with the poor quality of loans and the risk associated with high and variable 
inflation in addition to the lack of long- term investment. These are barriers to the conduct of 
monetary policy by the national bank of Rwanda.  
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5.9 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a description of the empirical estimates and is done together with both a 
presentation and interpretation of the findings. The empirical results started by investigating the 
time series properties of the data using both informal and formal tests for stationarity. Four 
variables were found to be non-stationary in levels and were first difference stationary. For the 
discount rate, the ADF and PP tests found the variable to be non-stationary in level and stationary 
while referenced once, but the KPSS test shows interest rate to be level stationary. However, the 
discount rate variable was taken as being non stationary in level as the informal analysis examining 
the plots indicates that the variable has variance that is not constant over time.  
Furthermore, the Johansen cointegration analysis was done to determine whether there is a long 
run equilibrium relationship among the variables. In a model 1 the cointegrating equation is 
normalised with respect to loans to analyse the transmission from interest rate to loans. In a model 
2, the cointegrating equation is normalized with respect to real output to examine the effect from 
loans to GDP. The results from the identification of the cointegrating vector in loans supply VAR 
model and in output response VAR model indicate that the coefficient of the discount rate variable 
in the loans equation is statistically significant and has a correct sign while the coefficient of loans 
in the GDP equation is statistically significant but has a wrong sign.  
Finally, the findings from causality tests, generalized impulse response and variance 
decomposition functions reveal that loans supplied by banks do respond to innovations in monetary 
policy, but that  real output is insensitive to changes in loans. Thus, since another part of the 
assumption of the bank lending channel is breached, we can conclude that the bank lending channel 
of monetary policy in Rwanda is not strong. This may be resulted from the weaknesses in the 
financial system in Rwandan, which is likely to impede the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusion 
The transmission of monetary policy in developing countries has been the core of monetary policy 
debate in recent years. The methods at which changes in policy stance of the monetary authorities 
are transmitted to their final objectives have posed challenges for the conduct of monetary policy 
in underdeveloped economies. The purpose of this research has been to investigate the bank-
lending channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism in Rwanda during the period 1996-
2011. The study was divided into six chapters: The first chapter was an introduction of the study, 
the second provided an overview of monetary policy, banking and finance in Rwanda, the third 
chapter reviewed the existing literature, the fourth chapter set the methodological structure that 
was used in this thesis, the fifth undertook the empirical analysis and results, while the sixth chapter 
which is the final chapter concluded the study.   
The empirical studies presented in this research used a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, 
which is the recent popular tool in the empirical studies on the bank lending channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. The VAR methodology is useful in this context because it 
provides the use of impulse response and variance decomposition analyses which allow the 
estimation of the response of economic activity variables to monetary policy innovations.  
The VAR model contains five variables: discount rate, deposits, loans, GDP, and CPI. The results 
from the normalisation with loans and those of the normalisation with GDP  disclose that the 
coefficient of discount rate variable in the loans model is significant ( but small) and has the 
expected  sign while the loans coefficient in the GDP function is significant but has a sign which 
is opposite from the expectation. After determining that the long-run cointegrating equations exist, 
the VECM was estimated and it was found that the error correction estimates in loans model and 
in output model are not statistically significant at a 5% significance level. 
The granger-causality tests findings disclose that interest rate granger causes loans at the 5 percent 
significant level while loan does not granger cause real output. This is in line with the results from 
129 
 
 
both the impulse response and variance decomposition functions. The impulse response analysis 
show a negative response of the supply of bank loans to a monetary shock, which is as expected 
and insignificant effect from loans to real output. The findings from the variance decompositions 
also reveal that the variations in the loan volume are largely due to interest rate and that, the loan 
variable accounts for a relatively lower proportion in the variation of GDP.  This suggests a 
response of the supply of bank loans to a monetary shock and a non-significant effect from loans 
to real output. Therefore, one can say that although Rwanda is a bank-dependent economy, the 
operation of the monetary transmission mechanism through the bank lending channel is less 
effective in Rwanda under the period of study.  
Walker (2012), Opolot (2013) and Sichei (2005) employed a panel data in investigating the bank 
lending channel in Countries of the East African Community, Uganda and South Africa 
respectively, whereas this research used a VAR methodology. Municinga (2004) also used a VAR 
approach and found that the bank lending channel in Zambia is weak as results of current high 
lending rates. Thus Municinga’s findings are in line with the results of the current study. These 
outcomes are also almost similar to the results of a study done in Nigeria using a VAR model, 
where Ogun and Akinlo (2010) found that bank credit channel in Nigeria is ineffectiveness given 
the fact that the banking system in Nigeria is characterized by excess liquidity and banks do not 
find it costly to enlarge loan supply after a monetary policy tightening.  Contrary Buigut (2010), 
Abdul (2010) and Ramlogan (2004) using a VAR methodology found the bank lending channel to 
be effective in Kenya, India and in four Caribbean countries: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Barbados and Guyana respectively.   
Romer et al. (1990) used OLS to analyse the bank lending channel in America while Manson and 
Calomiris (2003) examined the role played by bank lending in the monetary transmission 
mechanism in America using OLS and 2SLS.  
The insignificant effect from loans to real output may be explained by the significant number of 
non-performing loans that characterises the economy of Rwanda as mentioned by the National 
Bank of Rwanda. As in the case of Zambia, one of the reasons for the non-performing loans is 
higher lending rates.  In the context of Rwanda – this is confirmed by Gatete (2011), who argues 
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the level of nonperforming loans in Rwanda is due to the upward trend in lending rates relative to 
the level of discount rate in Rwandan economy. Other factors that may contribute to the high level 
of non-performing loans in the economy of Rwanda include the absence of long term resources, a 
lack of professional evaluators operating on the basis of recognized evaluation standards and 
inadequate monitoring relating to the effective credits disbursement among others.  
6.2 Policy recommendations 
In the context of Rwanda, monetary transmission through the bank lending channel could be 
bolstered by (1) monitoring loan repayment, (2) evaluation of the funded projects, and (3) debt 
counseling.   
 A monitoring system must be set in order to provide the information needed to oversee loan 
portfolio quality at any given time, identifying potential problems at the earliest moment possible. 
In the process of addressing that inadequacy of the monitoring in relation with the effective credits 
disbursement, the NBR must put much effort to help commercial banks and microfinance 
institutions to build capacity in their management especially in loan disbursement and collection 
which has been a challenge of most banks and MFIs.  
One of the factors behind the non-performance of the loans is linked to the evaluation of projects 
which get loans.  According to the findings, it seems like in the banking system there is a lack of 
professional evaluators operating on the basis of recognized evaluation standards. Nevertheless, 
since banks or MFIs lend funds in the full expectation of being repaid, significant loan commitment 
represents an implied audit and follow up mechanisms of indebted individual or firm about their 
solvency. My suggestion is for the banker playing an external auditor role, thus - passing judgment 
on the indebted person or firm’s present condition and future prospects for loan repayment. 
Furthermore, there is a need for strengthening the judicial system to improve banks’ ability to 
enforce on collateral. A number of legislative and judicial reforms designed to simplify and reduce 
the cost of foreclosure on assets and strengthen creditor rights must be initiated by the authorities. 
In the loan repayment, commercial banks and micro –finance institutions must not play the police, 
thus - in some cases, the highly indebted firms or persons need debt councillors. Some isolated 
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cases in Rwanda and elsewhere showed that distressed indebted persons end up by suicide, or run 
away from justice. In view of this, in the future financial institutions must consider debt 
counselling. Thus, a trained professional can negotiate with all the credit providers and create a 
plan that will enable borrowers to pay off their debt. This may include reductions in interest rates 
for a period, but it would also mean that people can’t borrow more money while under debt review. 
The reality is, some borrowers have a lot of different debt - a home loan and different other personal 
loans, and they are really struggling to keep up despite earning a regular income. In this case, they 
need breathing space and all their creditors to agree to a workable plan for them to pay back their 
loans.  
6.3 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
This research only used the case study of 3 major microfinances institutions (Urwego Opportunity 
Bank, UNGUKA Bank Ltd and AGASEKE Bank Ltd) which are integral part of the Rwanda’s 
banking sector. However, there are other small microfinances that provide funds to the very small 
businesses in rural areas. It is important to take into consideration their contribution. Although 
their financial situation may be still weak, but they may have a noticeable effect on the economy 
of the country as the majority of the economic agents falls under this category.   
Additionally, there was a serious absence of published academic journals on the Rwandan 
economy and the banking   situation. 
This study attempted to examine the relevance of bank lending channel in Rwandan banking 
system. Based on the research findings, the following areas of future research can be 
recommended:  
(i) The same study could be done to include all microfinances institutions that constitute the 
financial system in Rwanda.  
(ii) The study looking at monetary policy transmission channels with specific emphasis on the 
effectiveness of the interest rate channel in monetary policy transmission. 
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APPENDIXES  
Appendix1: Determining the lag order of VAR model: The optimal lag order = 4  
 
Lag LR FPE AIC  SBIC HQ 
0 
NA   1.21e-07 -1.738932 -1.564403 -1.670664 
1 
 658.5640  1.41e-12 -13.10123  -12.05406* -12.69162 
2 
  60.02990*   9.70e-13*  -13.49300* -11.57318  -12.74205* 
3 
 24.58272  1.34e-12 -13.21836 -10.42590 -12.12608 
4 
 24.65839  1.78e-12 -13.01729 -9.352190 -11.58367 
Note:* indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR denotes Likelihood Ratio, FPE denotes Final 
prediction error, AIC denotes Akaike information criterion, SBIC denotes Schwarz information criterion 
and HQ denotes Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
Appendix 2: Jacque-Bera for normality test; lag order optimal = 2 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  19.89058 2  0.0000  
2  0.414167 2  0.8130  
3  3.830039 2  0.1473  
4  6.523895 2  0.0383  
5  1.881339 2  0.3904  
     
     Joint  32.54002 10  0.000  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
Appendix 3: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  29.96090  0.2258 
2  53.76233  0.0007 
3  36.95463  0.0583 
4  24.89392  0.4683 
5  13.10748  0.9752 
6  23.64297  0.5401 
7  19.90530  0.7518 
8  18.08617  0.8387 
9  18.27154  0.8306 
10  21.25473  0.6783 
11  14.93089  0.9430 
12  32.49926  0.1441 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Jacque-Bera for normality test; lag order = 5 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  1.512984 2  0.4693  
2  0.842107 2  0.6564  
3  41.37169 2  0.0000  
4  1.596693 2  0.4501  
5  6.470201 2  0.0394  
     
     Joint  123.8797 105  0.1007  
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Appendix 5: VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms  
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       770.1675 750  0.2969    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(50,8) Prob. Chi-sq(50) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.876630  1.136907  0.4599  51.72114  0.4064 
res2*res2  0.922715  1.910269  0.1668  54.44021  0.3093 
res3*res3  0.979417  7.613316  0.0025  57.78559  0.2097 
res4*res4  0.963732  4.251597  0.0177  56.86019  0.2349 
res5*res5  0.820857  0.733142  0.7647  48.43057  0.5365 
res2*res1  0.802482  0.650053  0.8320  47.34644  0.5805 
res3*res1  0.903889  1.504743  0.2802  53.32946  0.3475 
res3*res2  0.917318  1.775132  0.1974  54.12178  0.3200 
res4*res1  0.929694  2.115751  0.1304  54.85192  0.2958 
res4*res2  0.887648  1.264091  0.3872  52.37121  0.3821 
res4*res3  0.938351  2.435356  0.0908  55.36273  0.2795 
res5*res1  0.893797  1.346547  0.3463  52.73402  0.3688 
res5*res2  0.956252  3.497300  0.0324  56.41886  0.2475 
res5*res3  0.924777  1.967009  0.1557  54.56184  0.3053 
res5*res4  0.849701  0.904548  0.6244  50.13238  0.4681 
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Appendix 6: Identification of cointegrating vectors in loan supply VAR 
 
 
Date: 10/23/13   Time: 20:37     
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q2 2011Q4     
Included observations: 59 after adjustments    
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted)   
Series: LOANS DEPOSIT DISCOUNT_RATE GDP CPI     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)    
       
       Hypothesized  Trace 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       None *  0.673323  149.4192  88.80380  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.472980  83.41090  63.87610  0.0005   
At most 2 *  0.334538  45.62043  42.91525  0.0262   
At most 3  0.213719  21.59128  25.87211  0.1557   
At most 4  0.117956  7.405257  12.51798  0.3041   
       
        Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)   
       
       Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       None *  0.673323  66.00828  38.33101  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.472980  37.79047  32.11832  0.0091   
At most 2  0.334538  24.02915  25.82321  0.0847   
At most 3  0.213719  14.18602  19.38704  0.2419   
At most 4  0.117956  7.405257  12.51798  0.3041   
       
        Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):    
       
       
LOANS DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E GDP CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
-17.70469  8.634661  0.658485 -77.57773  85.44147  1.942978  
 14.76587  16.46357  1.936342  40.84786 -61.55188 -1.845085  
 6.952086 -9.263128 -0.269939  10.45070 -6.066940 -0.268141  
 23.71914 -24.43731  0.831924  116.8740 -103.0788 -2.713649  
-5.906290 -14.10266 -0.783127  8.991149 -9.766137  0.631273  
       
              
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):     
       
       D(LOANS) -0.013440 -0.011234 -0.017213 -0.001953 -0.004634  
D(DEPOSIT)  0.006918 -0.019502  0.000165  0.010728  0.007636  
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D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE) -0.363449 -0.035412  0.023096 -0.160935  0.109779  
D(GDP)  0.004659  0.002251 -0.004470 -0.000857  0.001798  
D(CPI) -0.005560  0.004637 -0.003776  0.004040  0.001043  
       
              
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  529.5296    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
LOANS DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E GDP CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000 -0.487705 -0.037193  4.381762 -4.825924 -0.109744  
  (0.21774)  (0.01376)  (0.65407)  (0.56146)  (0.01210)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOANS)  0.237948      
  (0.11045)      
D(DEPOSIT) -0.122486      
  (0.12554)      
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  6.434746      
  (1.57199)      
D(GDP) -0.082493      
  (0.03078)      
D(CPI)  0.098431      
  (0.03998)      
       
              
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  548.4249    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
LOANS DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E GDP CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.014031  3.890189 -4.625873 -0.114373  
   (0.00846)  (0.46559)  (0.45272)  (0.01058)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.105030 -1.007932  0.410188 -0.009492  
   (0.01232)  (0.67801)  (0.65927)  (0.01541)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOANS)  0.072066 -0.301002     
  (0.13738)  (0.11078)     
D(DEPOSIT) -0.410453 -0.261339     
  (0.14580)  (0.11757)     
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  5.911856 -3.721265     
  (2.04254)  (1.64709)     
D(GDP) -0.049250  0.077297     
  (0.03916)  (0.03157)     
D(CPI)  0.166901  0.028336     
  (0.04900)  (0.03951)     
       
              
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  560.4394    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
LOANS DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E GDP CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
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 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  4.491143 -5.318632 -0.124548  
    (0.69028)  (0.66992)  (0.01568)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  3.490602 -4.775564 -0.085662  
    (3.32010)  (3.22222)  (0.07541)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -42.83105  49.37414  0.725223  
    (32.8625)  (31.8936)  (0.74639)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOANS) -0.047599 -0.141557 -0.025957    
  (0.12627)  (0.10892)  (0.01082)    
D(DEPOSIT) -0.409309 -0.262862 -0.033252    
  (0.15228)  (0.13136)  (0.01305)    
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  6.072419 -3.935203 -0.314130    
  (2.13143)  (1.83854)  (0.18261)    
D(GDP) -0.080323  0.118700  0.008634    
  (0.03687)  (0.03180)  (0.00316)    
D(CPI)  0.140649  0.063315  0.006337    
  (0.04895)  (0.04222)  (0.00419)    
       
              
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  567.5325    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
LOANS DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E GDP CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.710430 -0.040523  
     (0.60713)  (0.01002)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.193982 -0.020356  
     (0.21850)  (0.00361)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  5.426719 -0.076105  
     (2.07219)  (0.03421)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -1.026064 -0.018709  
     (0.15345)  (0.00253)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOANS) -0.093915 -0.093839 -0.027581  0.175634   
  (0.17692)  (0.16787)  (0.01164)  (0.76670)   
D(DEPOSIT) -0.154858 -0.525017 -0.024327 -0.077823   
  (0.20528)  (0.19478)  (0.01351)  (0.88960)   
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  2.255180 -0.002386 -0.448015  8.181267   
  (2.85507)  (2.70911)  (0.18790)  (12.3730)   
D(GDP) -0.100658  0.139651  0.007921 -0.416411   
  (0.05154)  (0.04890)  (0.00339)  (0.22334)   
D(CPI)  0.236468 -0.035405  0.009698  1.053392   
  (0.06494)  (0.06162)  (0.00427)  (0.28142)   
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Appendix 7: Identification of cointegrating vectors in output response VAR 
Date: 10/24/13   Time: 19:15     
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q2 2011Q4     
Included observations: 59 after adjustments    
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted)   
Series: GDP DEPOSIT DISCOUNT_RATE LOANS CPI     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)    
       
       Hypothesized  Trace 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       None *  0.673323  149.4192  88.80380  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.472980  83.41090  63.87610  0.0005   
At most 2 *  0.334538  45.62043  42.91525  0.0262   
At most 3  0.213719  21.59128  25.87211  0.1557   
At most 4  0.117956  7.405257  12.51798  0.3041   
       
        Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)   
       
       Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       None *  0.673323  66.00828  38.33101  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.472980  37.79047  32.11832  0.0091   
At most 2  0.334538  24.02915  25.82321  0.0847   
At most 3  0.213719  14.18602  19.38704  0.2419   
At most 4  0.117956  7.405257  12.51798  0.3041   
       
        Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):    
       
       
GDP DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E LOANS CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
-77.57773  8.634661  0.658485 -17.70469  85.44147  1.942978  
 40.84786  16.46357  1.936342  14.76587 -61.55188 -1.845085  
-10.45070  9.263128  0.269939 -6.952086  6.066940  0.268141  
 116.8740 -24.43731  0.831924  23.71914 -103.0788 -2.713649  
 8.991149 -14.10266 -0.783127 -5.906290 -9.766137  0.631273  
       
              
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):     
       
       D(GDP)  0.004659  0.002251  0.004470 -0.000857  0.001798  
D(DEPOSIT)  0.006918 -0.019502 -0.000165  0.010728  0.007636  
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE) -0.363449 -0.035412 -0.023096 -0.160935  0.109779  
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D(LOANS) -0.013440 -0.011234  0.017213 -0.001953 -0.004634  
D(CPI) -0.005560  0.004637  0.003776  0.004040  0.001043  
       
              
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  529.5296    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
GDP DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E LOANS CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000 -0.111303 -0.008488  0.228219 -1.101366 -0.025046  
  (0.04200)  (0.00389)  (0.03963)  (0.04692)  (0.00209)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(GDP) -0.361463      
  (0.13671)      
D(DEPOSIT) -0.536704      
  (0.55765)      
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  28.19553      
  (6.98309)      
D(LOANS)  1.042630      
  (0.49064)      
D(CPI)  0.431303      
  (0.17759)      
       
              
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  548.4249    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
GDP DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E LOANS CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.003607  0.257057 -1.189113 -0.029400  
   (0.00298)  (0.03811)  (0.03391)  (0.00129)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.108665  0.259096 -0.788356 -0.039125  
   (0.01764)  (0.22553)  (0.20070)  (0.00762)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(GDP) -0.269501  0.077297     
  (0.15096)  (0.03201)     
D(DEPOSIT) -1.333327 -0.261339     
  (0.56213)  (0.11919)     
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  26.74902 -3.721265     
  (7.87497)  (1.66981)     
D(LOANS)  0.583740 -0.301002     
  (0.52965)  (0.11231)     
D(CPI)  0.620715  0.028336     
  (0.18892)  (0.04006)     
       
              
 
 
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  
 
 
 
 
Log likelihood 
 
 
 
 
 560.4394    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
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GDP DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E LOANS CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.222660 -1.184249 -0.027732  
    (0.03620)  (0.04211)  (0.00120)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.777219 -0.641822  0.011140  
    (0.69155)  (0.80445)  (0.02283)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  9.536782 -1.348492 -0.462568  
    (6.67116)  (7.76028)  (0.22022)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(GDP) -0.316211  0.118700  0.008634    
  (0.13707)  (0.03224)  (0.00320)    
D(DEPOSIT) -1.331607 -0.262862 -0.033252    
  (0.56610)  (0.13317)  (0.01323)    
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  26.99039 -3.935203 -0.314130    
  (7.92343)  (1.86390)  (0.18513)    
D(LOANS)  0.403854 -0.141557 -0.025957    
  (0.46941)  (0.11042)  (0.01097)    
D(CPI)  0.581252  0.063315  0.006337    
  (0.18196)  (0.04280)  (0.00425)    
       
              
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  567.5325    
       
       Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
GDP DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_RAT
E LOANS CPI @TREND(96Q2)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.026064 -0.018709  
     (0.15556)  (0.00257)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.193982 -0.020356  
     (0.22151)  (0.00366)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  5.426719 -0.076105  
     (2.10077)  (0.03468)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.710430 -0.040523  
     (0.61550)  (0.01016)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(GDP) -0.416411  0.139651  0.007921 -0.100658   
  (0.22642)  (0.04958)  (0.00344)  (0.05225)   
D(DEPOSIT) -0.077823 -0.525017 -0.024327 -0.154858   
  (0.90187)  (0.19747)  (0.01370)  (0.20811)   
D(DISCOUNT_R
ATE)  8.181267 -0.002386 -0.448015  2.255180   
  (12.5437)  (2.74648)  (0.19049)  (2.89445)   
D(LOANS)  0.175634 -0.093839 -0.027581 -0.093915   
  (0.77727)  (0.17019)  (0.01180)  (0.17936)   
D(CPI)  1.053392 -0.035405  0.009698  0.236468   
  (0.28530)  (0.06247)  (0.00433)  (0.06583)   
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Appendix 8: VECM1 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 10/24/13   Time: 19:02    
 Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 58 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      LOANS(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DEPOSIT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
DISCOUNT_RATE(-1)  0.016995  0.056340    
  (0.00982)  (0.01510)    
 [ 1.73148] [ 3.73051]    
      
GDP(-1)  3.778402 -0.569110    
  (0.40712)  (0.62643)    
 [ 9.28075] [-0.90850]    
      
CPI(-1) -4.741103 -0.284686    
  (0.40786)  (0.62757)    
 [-11.6242] [-0.45363]    
      
@TREND(96Q1) -0.107511 -0.012033    
  (0.00907)  (0.01396)    
 [-11.8504] [-0.86197]    
      
C -3.227997 -0.941281    
      
      
Error Correction: D(LOANS) D(DEPOSIT) 
D(DISCOUNT_
RATE) D(GDP) D(CPI) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.227853 -0.132007  9.894327 -0.021495  0.202358 
  (0.21015)  (0.23969)  (3.02605)  (0.05886)  (0.07082) 
 [-1.08425] [-0.55074] [ 3.26972] [-0.36522] [ 2.85741] 
      
CointEq2  0.461875 -0.257201 -3.510166  0.134344  0.038313 
  (0.15626)  (0.17822)  (2.25004)  (0.04376)  (0.05266) 
 [ 2.95586] [-1.44314] [-1.56004] [ 3.06981] [ 0.72759] 
      
D(LOANS(-1))  0.469115  0.364971 -4.970855 -0.130321 -0.192440 
  (0.25187)  (0.28728)  (3.62687)  (0.07054)  (0.08488) 
 [ 1.86251] [ 1.27044] [-1.37056] [-1.84743] [-2.26721] 
      
D(LOANS(-2))  0.035865  0.105843 -7.639652 -0.005523 -0.112332 
  (0.17665)  (0.20148)  (2.54373)  (0.04947)  (0.05953) 
 [ 0.20302] [ 0.52531] [-3.00333] [-0.11162] [-1.88695] 
      
D(LOANS(-3))  0.011378  0.115499 -5.023983 -0.043259 -0.070617 
  (0.19313)  (0.22028)  (2.78107)  (0.05409)  (0.06509) 
 [ 0.05891] [ 0.52432] [-1.80650] [-0.79973] [-1.08498] 
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D(LOANS(-4))  0.003028  0.168045 -4.696253 -0.024065  0.049589 
  (0.16634)  (0.18972)  (2.39523)  (0.04659)  (0.05606) 
 [ 0.01820] [ 0.88574] [-1.96067] [-0.51656] [ 0.88463] 
      
D(LOANS(-5))  0.221506  0.133083  2.878898 -0.019672  0.056694 
  (0.16362)  (0.18662)  (2.35609)  (0.04583)  (0.05514) 
 [ 1.35377] [ 0.71311] [ 1.22190] [-0.42929] [ 1.02818] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-1)) -0.603306  0.100702  2.609013 -0.107022 -0.091075 
  (0.20115)  (0.22943)  (2.89650)  (0.05634)  (0.06779) 
 [-2.99926] [ 0.43893] [ 0.90075] [-1.89971] [-1.34354] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-2)) -0.197377  0.199289  5.304896 -0.099321 -0.044987 
  (0.19345)  (0.22064)  (2.78560)  (0.05418)  (0.06519) 
 [-1.02030] [ 0.90322] [ 1.90440] [-1.83320] [-0.69008] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-3)) -0.232023 -0.148061  3.812380 -0.018746 -0.066850 
  (0.17050)  (0.19447)  (2.45513)  (0.04775)  (0.05746) 
 [-1.36084] [-0.76137] [ 1.55282] [-0.39257] [-1.16347] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-4)) -0.531035  0.237793 -0.255617 -0.039418 -0.138753 
  (0.16646)  (0.18986)  (2.39693)  (0.04662)  (0.05610) 
 [-3.19020] [ 1.25248] [-0.10664] [-0.84553] [-2.47352] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-5)) -0.024232  0.016930  3.276255 -0.058140 -0.009640 
  (0.15970)  (0.18215)  (2.29964)  (0.04473)  (0.05382) 
 [-0.15173] [ 0.09295] [ 1.42468] [-1.29989] [-0.17913] 
      
D(DISCOUNT_RATE(-1)) -0.015549  0.006242 -0.411629 -0.005466 -0.009323 
  (0.01306)  (0.01489)  (0.18804)  (0.00366)  (0.00440) 
 [-1.19070] [ 0.41905] [-2.18900] [-1.49449] [-2.11851] 
      
D(DISCOUNT_RATE(-2)) -0.030024  0.017562 -0.201727 -0.009418 -0.014852 
  (0.01332)  (0.01519)  (0.19181)  (0.00373)  (0.00449) 
 [-2.25395] [ 1.15589] [-1.05168] [-2.52443] [-3.30840] 
      
D(DISCOUNT_RATE(-3)) -0.027169  0.035909 -0.115070 -0.005244 -0.006462 
  (0.01426)  (0.01627)  (0.20539)  (0.00399)  (0.00481) 
 [-1.90472] [ 2.20718] [-0.56024] [-1.31271] [-1.34440] 
      
D(DISCOUNT_RATE(-4)) -0.020951  0.013464 -0.166009 -0.006051 -0.006361 
  (0.01319)  (0.01504)  (0.18991)  (0.00369)  (0.00444) 
 [-1.58860] [ 0.89510] [-0.87416] [-1.63812] [-1.43118] 
      
D(DISCOUNT_RATE(-5)) -0.017959  0.019577 -0.186361 -0.004115 -0.001569 
  (0.01068)  (0.01219)  (0.15385)  (0.00299)  (0.00360) 
 [-1.68088] [ 1.60643] [-1.21130] [-1.37525] [-0.43583] 
      
D(GDP(-1)) -0.134833  1.847095 -30.02789  0.463301  0.150340 
  (0.79753)  (0.90964)  (11.4842)  (0.22336)  (0.26876) 
 [-0.16906] [ 2.03057] [-2.61472] [ 2.07419] [ 0.55937] 
      
D(GDP(-2))  2.095023 -0.089296 -41.58575  0.024214 -0.024545 
  (0.81414)  (0.92859)  (11.7233)  (0.22802)  (0.27436) 
 [ 2.57329] [-0.09616] [-3.54727] [ 0.10620] [-0.08946] 
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D(GDP(-3))  0.455510  0.589844 -24.66966  0.267331  0.063449 
  (0.83523)  (0.95264)  (12.0269)  (0.23392)  (0.28147) 
 [ 0.54537] [ 0.61917] [-2.05120] [ 1.14283] [ 0.22542] 
      
D(GDP(-4))  1.503371 -0.922839  4.562091 -0.600778  0.197305 
  (0.72730)  (0.82954)  (10.4729)  (0.20369)  (0.24510) 
 [ 2.06705] [-1.11247] [ 0.43561] [-2.94940] [ 0.80501] 
      
D(GDP(-5)) -1.100866 -0.349459 -8.301566  0.306199  0.321216 
  (0.68865)  (0.78545)  (9.91627)  (0.19287)  (0.23207) 
 [-1.59859] [-0.44491] [-0.83717] [ 1.58760] [ 1.38413] 
      
D(CPI(-1)) -1.809872 -0.478531  39.44088  0.099346  0.487475 
  (0.78159)  (0.89146)  (11.2546)  (0.21890)  (0.26339) 
 [-2.31563] [-0.53680] [ 3.50442] [ 0.45384] [ 1.85076] 
      
D(CPI(-2)) -0.432940 -0.053668  21.01411 -0.018768  0.265399 
  (0.62792)  (0.71619)  (9.04178)  (0.17586)  (0.21161) 
 [-0.68948] [-0.07494] [ 2.32411] [-0.10672] [ 1.25422] 
      
D(CPI(-3)) -0.467661 -0.530434  25.07627  0.054300  0.004101 
  (0.49374)  (0.56314)  (7.10964)  (0.13828)  (0.16639) 
 [-0.94718] [-0.94192] [ 3.52708] [ 0.39268] [ 0.02465] 
      
D(CPI(-4)) -0.520379 -0.471097  25.11579 -0.080781 -0.057616 
  (0.47989)  (0.54735)  (6.91022)  (0.13440)  (0.16172) 
 [-1.08437] [-0.86069] [ 3.63459] [-0.60104] [-0.35627] 
      
D(CPI(-5)) -0.763109  0.688192  12.13066  0.027130  0.003660 
  (0.47039)  (0.53651)  (6.77345)  (0.13174)  (0.15852) 
 [-1.62228] [ 1.28271] [ 1.79091] [ 0.20593] [ 0.02309] 
      
C  0.027968 -0.032546  1.967965  0.038275  0.001322 
  (0.04984)  (0.05685)  (0.71770)  (0.01396)  (0.01680) 
 [ 0.56114] [-0.57251] [ 2.74203] [ 2.74190] [ 0.07870] 
      
       R-squared  0.574728  0.502237  0.670902  0.781123  0.850068 
 Adj. R-squared  0.191984  0.054250  0.374714  0.584134  0.715129 
 Sum sq. resids  0.060924  0.079256  12.63244  0.004779  0.006919 
 S.E. equation  0.045064  0.051399  0.648908  0.012621  0.015186 
 F-statistic  1.501598  1.121098  2.265119  3.965306  6.299639 
 Log likelihood  116.6002  108.9716 -38.09737  190.4180  179.6862 
 Akaike AIC -3.055181 -2.792125  2.279220 -5.600620 -5.230559 
 Schwarz SC -2.060484 -1.797428  3.273916 -4.605924 -4.235863 
 Mean dependent  0.048981  0.041570 -0.034483  0.034284  0.013563 
 S.D. dependent  0.050133  0.052853  0.820623  0.019571  0.028453 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.30E-14    
 Determinant resid covariance  1.59E-15    
 Log likelihood  576.6302    
 Akaike information criterion -14.64242    
 Schwarz criterion -9.242638    
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Appendix 9: VECM2  
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 10/26/13   Time: 14:54    
 Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2011Q4    
 Included observations: 58 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      GDP(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DEPOSIT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
DISCOUNTRATE(-1)  0.004498  0.058900    
  (0.00316)  (0.01910)    
 [ 1.42526] [ 3.08387]    
      
LOANS(-1)  0.264662  0.150622    
  (0.03337)  (0.20193)    
 [ 7.93219] [ 0.74591]    
      
CPI(-1) -1.254790 -0.998800    
  (0.03131)  (0.18951)    
 [-40.0721] [-5.27046]    
      
@TREND(96Q1) -0.028454 -0.028226    
  (0.00112)  (0.00678)    
 [-25.4116] [-4.16521]    
      
C -0.854329 -1.427488    
      
      
Error Correction: D(GDP) D(DEPOSIT) 
D(DISCOUNTR
ATE) D(LOANS) D(CPI) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.157675 -0.352399  39.38242 -1.123777  0.742787 
  (0.23504)  (0.95721)  (12.0846)  (0.83923)  (0.28282) 
 [-0.67083] [-0.36815] [ 3.25888] [-1.33905] [ 2.62639] 
      
CointEq2  0.134344 -0.257201 -3.510166  0.461875  0.038313 
  (0.04376)  (0.17822)  (2.25004)  (0.15626)  (0.05266) 
 [ 3.06981] [-1.44314] [-1.56004] [ 2.95586] [ 0.72759] 
      
D(GDP(-1))  0.463301  1.847095 -30.02789 -0.134833  0.150340 
  (0.22336)  (0.90964)  (11.4842)  (0.79753)  (0.26876) 
 [ 2.07419] [ 2.03057] [-2.61472] [-0.16906] [ 0.55937] 
      
D(GDP(-2))  0.024214 -0.089296 -41.58575  2.095023 -0.024545 
  (0.22802)  (0.92859)  (11.7233)  (0.81414)  (0.27436) 
 [ 0.10620] [-0.09616] [-3.54727] [ 2.57329] [-0.08946] 
      
D(GDP(-3))  0.267331  0.589844 -24.66966  0.455510  0.063449 
  (0.23392)  (0.95264)  (12.0269)  (0.83523)  (0.28147) 
 [ 1.14283] [ 0.61917] [-2.05120] [ 0.54537] [ 0.22542] 
      
D(GDP(-4)) -0.600778 -0.922839  4.562091  1.503371  0.197305 
  (0.20369)  (0.82954)  (10.4729)  (0.72730)  (0.24510) 
 [-2.94940] [-1.11247] [ 0.43561] [ 2.06705] [ 0.80501] 
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D(GDP(-5))  0.306199 -0.349459 -8.301566 -1.100866  0.321216 
  (0.19287)  (0.78545)  (9.91627)  (0.68865)  (0.23207) 
 [ 1.58760] [-0.44491] [-0.83717] [-1.59859] [ 1.38413] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-1)) -0.107022  0.100702  2.609013 -0.603306 -0.091075 
  (0.05634)  (0.22943)  (2.89650)  (0.20115)  (0.06779) 
 [-1.89971] [ 0.43893] [ 0.90075] [-2.99926] [-1.34354] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-2)) -0.099321  0.199289  5.304896 -0.197377 -0.044987 
  (0.05418)  (0.22064)  (2.78560)  (0.19345)  (0.06519) 
 [-1.83320] [ 0.90322] [ 1.90440] [-1.02030] [-0.69008] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-3)) -0.018746 -0.148061  3.812380 -0.232023 -0.066850 
  (0.04775)  (0.19447)  (2.45513)  (0.17050)  (0.05746) 
 [-0.39257] [-0.76137] [ 1.55282] [-1.36084] [-1.16347] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-4)) -0.039418  0.237793 -0.255617 -0.531035 -0.138753 
  (0.04662)  (0.18986)  (2.39693)  (0.16646)  (0.05610) 
 [-0.84553] [ 1.25248] [-0.10664] [-3.19020] [-2.47352] 
      
D(DEPOSIT(-5)) -0.058140  0.016930  3.276255 -0.024232 -0.009640 
  (0.04473)  (0.18215)  (2.29964)  (0.15970)  (0.05382) 
 [-1.29989] [ 0.09295] [ 1.42468] [-0.15173] [-0.17913] 
      
D(DISCOUNTRATE(-1)) -0.005466  0.006242 -0.411629 -0.015549 -0.009323 
  (0.00366)  (0.01489)  (0.18804)  (0.01306)  (0.00440) 
 [-1.49449] [ 0.41905] [-2.18900] [-1.19070] [-2.11851] 
      
D(DISCOUNTRATE(-2)) -0.009418  0.017562 -0.201727 -0.030024 -0.014852 
  (0.00373)  (0.01519)  (0.19181)  (0.01332)  (0.00449) 
 [-2.52443] [ 1.15589] [-1.05168] [-2.25395] [-3.30840] 
      
D(DISCOUNTRATE(-3)) -0.005244  0.035909 -0.115070 -0.027169 -0.006462 
  (0.00399)  (0.01627)  (0.20539)  (0.01426)  (0.00481) 
 [-1.31271] [ 2.20718] [-0.56024] [-1.90472] [-1.34440] 
      
D(DISCOUNTRATE(-4)) -0.006051  0.013464 -0.166009 -0.020951 -0.006361 
  (0.00369)  (0.01504)  (0.18991)  (0.01319)  (0.00444) 
 [-1.63812] [ 0.89510] [-0.87416] [-1.58860] [-1.43118] 
      
D(DISCOUNTRATE(-5)) -0.004115  0.019577 -0.186361 -0.017959 -0.001569 
  (0.00299)  (0.01219)  (0.15385)  (0.01068)  (0.00360) 
 [-1.37525] [ 1.60643] [-1.21130] [-1.68088] [-0.43583] 
      
D(LOANS(-1)) -0.130321  0.364971 -4.970855  0.469115 -0.192440 
  (0.07054)  (0.28728)  (3.62687)  (0.25187)  (0.08488) 
 [-1.84743] [ 1.27044] [-1.37056] [ 1.86251] [-2.26721] 
      
D(LOANS(-2)) -0.005523  0.105843 -7.639652  0.035865 -0.112332 
  (0.04947)  (0.20148)  (2.54373)  (0.17665)  (0.05953) 
 [-0.11162] [ 0.52531] [-3.00333] [ 0.20302] [-1.88695] 
      
D(LOANS(-3)) -0.043259  0.115499 -5.023983  0.011378 -0.070617 
  (0.05409)  (0.22028)  (2.78107)  (0.19313)  (0.06509) 
 [-0.79973] [ 0.52432] [-1.80650] [ 0.05891] [-1.08498] 
      
D(LOANS(-4)) -0.024065  0.168045 -4.696253  0.003028  0.049589 
  (0.04659)  (0.18972)  (2.39523)  (0.16634)  (0.05606) 
 [-0.51656] [ 0.88574] [-1.96067] [ 0.01820] [ 0.88463] 
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D(LOANS(-5)) -0.019672  0.133083  2.878898  0.221506  0.056694 
  (0.04583)  (0.18662)  (2.35609)  (0.16362)  (0.05514) 
 [-0.42929] [ 0.71311] [ 1.22190] [ 1.35377] [ 1.02818] 
      
D(CPI(-1))  0.099346 -0.478531  39.44088 -1.809872  0.487475 
  (0.21890)  (0.89146)  (11.2546)  (0.78159)  (0.26339) 
 [ 0.45384] [-0.53680] [ 3.50442] [-2.31563] [ 1.85076] 
      
D(CPI(-2)) -0.018768 -0.053668  21.01411 -0.432940  0.265399 
  (0.17586)  (0.71619)  (9.04178)  (0.62792)  (0.21161) 
 [-0.10672] [-0.07494] [ 2.32411] [-0.68948] [ 1.25422] 
      
D(CPI(-3))  0.054300 -0.530434  25.07627 -0.467661  0.004101 
  (0.13828)  (0.56314)  (7.10964)  (0.49374)  (0.16639) 
 [ 0.39268] [-0.94192] [ 3.52708] [-0.94718] [ 0.02465] 
      
D(CPI(-4)) -0.080781 -0.471097  25.11579 -0.520379 -0.057616 
  (0.13440)  (0.54735)  (6.91022)  (0.47989)  (0.16172) 
 [-0.60104] [-0.86069] [ 3.63459] [-1.08437] [-0.35627] 
      
D(CPI(-5))  0.027130  0.688192  12.13066 -0.763109  0.003660 
  (0.13174)  (0.53651)  (6.77345)  (0.47039)  (0.15852) 
 [ 0.20593] [ 1.28271] [ 1.79091] [-1.62228] [ 0.02309] 
      
C  0.038275 -0.032546  1.967965  0.027968  0.001322 
  (0.01396)  (0.05685)  (0.71770)  (0.04984)  (0.01680) 
 [ 2.74190] [-0.57251] [ 2.74203] [ 0.56114] [ 0.07870] 
      
       R-squared  0.781123  0.502237  0.670902  0.574728  0.850068 
 Adj. R-squared  0.584134  0.054250  0.374714  0.191984  0.715129 
 Sum sq. resids  0.004779  0.079256  12.63244  0.060924  0.006919 
 S.E. equation  0.012621  0.051399  0.648908  0.045064  0.015186 
 F-statistic  3.965306  1.121098  2.265119  1.501598  6.299639 
 Log likelihood  190.4180  108.9716 -38.09737  116.6002  179.6862 
 Akaike AIC -5.600620 -2.792125  2.279220 -3.055181 -5.230559 
 Schwarz SC -4.605924 -1.797428  3.273916 -2.060484 -4.235863 
 Mean dependent  0.034284  0.041570 -0.034483  0.048981  0.013563 
 S.D. dependent  0.019571  0.052853  0.820623  0.050133  0.028453 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.30E-14    
 Determinant resid covariance  1.59E-15    
 Log likelihood  576.6302    
 Akaike information criterion -14.64242    
 Schwarz criterion -9.242638    
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Appendix 10: Results from the test of quality of the Model 1 (VECM1) 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:21 
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4 
Included observations: 58 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  34.07258  0.1064 
2  45.13792  0.0081 
3  29.14584  0.2579 
4  28.77149  0.2736 
5  35.15029  0.0855 
6  16.60811  0.8955 
7  21.47859  0.6656 
8  18.77121  0.8080 
9  20.94645  0.6956 
10  23.73883  0.5345 
11  12.68929  0.9801 
12  29.99466  0.2245 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
 
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:24   
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4   
Included observations: 58   
 
 
  Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
    
    1  1.946734 2  0.3778 
2  3.095365 2  0.2127 
3  13.27295 2  0.0013 
4  2.087538 2  0.3521 
5  3.885520 2  0.1433 
    
    Joint  119.6704 105  0.1552 
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VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:26    
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4    
Included observations: 58    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       833.3355 810  0.2773    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(54,3) Prob. Chi-sq(54) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.983053  3.222698  0.1822  57.01709  0.3635 
res2*res2  0.961020  1.369685  0.4615  55.73917  0.4092 
res3*res3  0.957734  1.258874  0.4976  55.54858  0.4162 
res4*res4  0.970858  1.850849  0.3433  56.30979  0.3885 
res5*res5  0.952260  1.108167  0.5539  55.23111  0.4279 
res2*res1  0.986339  4.011126  0.1385  57.20765  0.3569 
res3*res1  0.912366  0.578392  0.8280  52.91721  0.5162 
res3*res2  0.956288  1.215376  0.5130  55.46468  0.4193 
res4*res1  0.981242  2.906115  0.2065  56.91203  0.3672 
res4*res2  0.876030  0.392583  0.9346  50.80977  0.5982 
res4*res3  0.964177  1.495284  0.4251  55.92227  0.4025 
res5*res1  0.969548  1.768828  0.3598  56.23380  0.3913 
res5*res2  0.971729  1.909564  0.3321  56.36029  0.3867 
res5*res3  0.965379  1.549137  0.4108  55.99200  0.4000 
res5*res4  0.984110  3.440643  0.1680  57.07836  0.3614 
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Appendix 11: Results from the test of quality of the Model 2 (VECM2) 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:32 
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4 
Included observations: 58 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  34.07258  0.1064 
2  45.13792  0.0081 
3  29.14584  0.2579 
4  28.77149  0.2736 
5  35.15029  0.0855 
6  16.60811  0.8955 
7  21.47859  0.6656 
8  18.77121  0.8080 
9  20.94645  0.6956 
10  23.73883  0.5345 
11  12.68929  0.9801 
12  29.99466  0.2245 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests 
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl) 
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:35 
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4 
Included observations: 58 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  1.762050 2  0.4144  
2  2.703109 2  0.2588  
3  4.065953 2  0.1309  
4  1.488320 2  0.4751  
5  2.685646 2  0.2611  
     
     Joint  12.70508 10  0.2406  
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VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 10/28/13   Time: 12:35    
Sample: 1996Q1 2011Q4    
Included observations: 58    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       833.8604 810  0.2730    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(54,3) Prob. Chi-sq(54) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.974529  2.125603  0.2959  56.52270  0.3809 
res2*res2  0.964791  1.522322  0.4178  55.95788  0.4012 
res3*res3  0.957645  1.256102  0.4986  55.54340  0.4164 
res4*res4  0.983041  3.220370  0.1823  57.01639  0.3636 
res5*res5  0.954875  1.175591  0.5276  55.38275  0.4223 
res2*res1  0.868918  0.368268  0.9463  50.39725  0.6141 
res3*res1  0.964332  1.502039  0.4233  55.93128  0.4022 
res3*res2  0.960353  1.345691  0.4689  55.70046  0.4106 
res4*res1  0.982291  3.081658  0.1924  56.97290  0.3651 
res4*res2  0.988447  4.753239  0.1112  57.32993  0.3527 
res4*res3  0.912180  0.577050  0.8288  52.90643  0.5166 
res5*res1  0.983689  3.350432  0.1737  57.05395  0.3623 
res5*res2  0.973978  2.079395  0.3031  56.49073  0.3821 
res5*res3  0.964482  1.508588  0.4215  55.93994  0.4019 
res5*res4  0.964360  1.503239  0.4229  55.93288  0.4021 
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Appendix 12: Variance decomposition for the bank lending channel 
 Varian
ce 
Decom
position 
of 
LOANS
:       
 Period S.E. LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_R
ATE 
       
        1  0.042122  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.065678  87.10751  1.701254  5.467784  3.155795  2.567653 
 3  0.080529  79.05005  1.254664  5.789622  2.111574  11.79409 
 4  0.088686  74.40190  1.312414  5.307004  2.082385  16.89630 
 5  0.096416  68.80157  3.166019  4.492027  1.824615  21.71577 
 6  0.100789  66.18999  5.470499  4.562317  1.761363  22.01583 
 7  0.105281  65.19539  6.818671  4.482886  2.163740  21.33931 
 8  0.108699  65.67480  6.924181  4.297313  2.798623  20.30508 
 9  0.111906  66.77216  6.694103  4.068182  3.259525  19.20603 
 10  0.114376  67.44277  6.758173  3.977605  3.435375  18.38608 
 11  0.116087  67.53160  7.168827  3.943373  3.482931  17.87327 
 12  0.117544  66.95358  8.207465  3.851252  3.481524  17.50618 
 13  0.119564  65.43833  10.10222  4.017327  3.410954  17.03117 
 14  0.122141  63.35548  12.37141  4.553130  3.317503  16.40248 
 15  0.124873  61.28731  14.72558  4.973332  3.305284  15.70849 
 16  0.127550  59.40342  17.04158  5.042409  3.429001  15.08359 
 17  0.130052  57.65313  18.97413  4.893107  3.723036  14.75660 
 18  0.132569  55.75067  20.54942  4.709553  4.194864  14.79549 
 19  0.135157  53.68896  21.85523  4.542336  4.824297  15.08917 
 20  0.137785  51.66240  23.09313  4.383315  5.406172  15.45498 
       
        Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period S.E. LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_R
ATE 
       
        1  0.012605  1.757016  98.24298  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.020486  0.732266  97.08794  1.123672  0.371329  0.684789 
 3  0.027854  0.661379  93.95144  3.540327  1.136802  0.710049 
 4  0.036676  0.915690  88.43845  5.724012  2.732858  2.188986 
 5  0.043160  1.531028  82.92385  6.316780  4.579087  4.649255 
 6  0.049416  2.085082  77.19776  5.155950  6.071460  9.489750 
 7  0.056021  2.624363  70.61369  4.077338  6.994848  15.68976 
 8  0.062086  3.562617  63.71570  3.983073  7.379648  21.35896 
 9  0.067958  4.852038  57.93894  4.243836  7.574325  25.39086 
 10  0.073292  6.581528  53.85556  4.347762  7.472918  27.74223 
 11  0.077949  8.484597  51.20452  4.406080  7.115370  28.78944 
 12  0.082401  10.08471  49.64454  4.557836  6.584096  29.12881 
 13  0.086589  11.23897  48.45205  4.984104  6.048874  29.27600 
 14  0.090445  11.96984  47.05543  5.814052  5.601806  29.55887 
 15  0.094089  12.42088  45.28227  6.994412  5.266835  30.03560 
 16  0.097599  12.76606  43.16066  8.468760  5.025848  30.57867 
 17  0.101132  13.06850  40.88809  10.22957  4.812343  31.00149 
 18  0.104747  13.34659  38.66574  12.23234  4.562551  31.19277 
 19  0.108318  13.60122  36.62441  14.36041  4.287389  31.12657 
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 20  0.111648  13.80758  34.85393  16.43833  4.035839  30.86433 
       
        Variance Decomposition of CPI: 
 Period S.E. LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_R
ATE 
       
        1  0.018438  0.817884  1.200295  97.98182  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.027122  3.696061  10.98691  80.39752  3.135736  1.783767 
 3  0.034508  2.621005  20.75663  69.60671  2.265208  4.750445 
 4  0.040386  1.913587  34.17472  58.60642  1.694528  3.610748 
 5  0.046798  1.693624  44.80413  48.73631  1.340076  3.425854 
 6  0.051233  1.437015  45.41266  44.28962  2.745633  6.115073 
 7  0.056279  1.409082  41.82404  39.43230  8.418040  8.916543 
 8  0.061642  2.123787  38.19613  34.22856  12.90711  12.54441 
 9  0.066040  3.331092  36.95257  29.98527  13.94654  15.78454 
 10  0.070823  5.081837  37.00010  26.09165  13.13033  18.69608 
 11  0.074920  7.020642  37.28263  23.38702  12.16237  20.14734 
 12  0.078001  9.045089  36.94788  21.57582  11.51886  20.91235 
 13  0.080414  10.70047  36.47976  20.36428  11.10699  21.34849 
 14  0.082459  12.01607  36.02804  19.39066  10.73923  21.82600 
 15  0.084396  12.97955  35.56844  18.63043  10.33841  22.48317 
 16  0.086679  13.60261  34.79139  18.40945  9.839360  23.35719 
 17  0.089130  14.11023  33.56449  18.65488  9.345468  24.32493 
 18  0.091384  14.74477  32.21323  18.89856  8.970904  25.17254 
 19  0.093336  15.58554  31.00934  18.96930  8.713537  25.72228 
 20  0.095064  16.48498  30.01380  19.06169  8.450920  25.98862 
       
        Variance Decomposition of DEPOSIT: 
 Period S.E. LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_R
ATE 
       
        1  0.049099  1.584214  2.645252  0.886366  94.88417  0.000000 
 2  0.063291  0.969417  17.79495  0.751122  80.23079  0.253720 
 3  0.071487  1.012453  24.08457  0.650278  74.03094  0.221763 
 4  0.079931  0.931352  37.13206  1.761275  59.71388  0.461433 
 5  0.084552  2.149062  40.66171  1.763350  54.90859  0.517287 
 6  0.085585  3.253257  40.70368  1.780643  53.70696  0.555456 
 7  0.086632  3.653106  40.31616  1.934515  52.60920  1.487025 
 8  0.087703  3.731177  39.66049  1.892312  51.47841  3.237617 
 9  0.089086  3.738943  38.79634  2.565469  49.94335  4.955894 
 10  0.091737  3.704477  38.14880  4.083623  47.25859  6.804519 
 11  0.094102  3.867558  38.27167  4.624686  44.96356  8.272524 
 12  0.096333  4.307745  39.00856  4.489497  42.90574  9.288454 
 13  0.099066  4.971697  40.10932  4.274161  40.83973  9.805100 
 14  0.102197  5.607049  41.26342  4.017935  38.71579  10.39581 
 15  0.105953  5.901978  42.24883  3.967681  36.30433  11.57718 
 16  0.110412  6.005353  42.09109  4.718840  33.66548  13.51923 
 17  0.114826  6.178884  40.57693  6.105831  31.52071  15.61765 
 18  0.118891  6.573310  38.61262  7.453552  29.91364  17.44688 
 19  0.122459  7.224612  36.85402  8.532109  28.60640  18.78286 
 20  0.125713  7.995342  35.46557  9.638323  27.27864  19.62212 
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 Variance Decomposition of DISCOUNT_RATE: 
 Period S.E. LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT 
DISCOUNT_R
ATE 
       
        1  0.672924  0.163202  2.916911  1.183870  0.429676  95.30634 
 2  0.745233  1.216650  4.397262  0.967314  2.438590  90.98018 
 3  0.819357  1.864204  6.509425  7.352413  2.927605  81.34635 
 4  0.836414  2.441192  7.829901  7.520468  3.707094  78.50134 
 5  0.864232  3.084109  8.763405  7.138836  5.286121  75.72753 
 6  0.866560  3.081581  8.871799  7.156486  5.555390  75.33474 
 7  0.876913  3.432403  9.140737  8.418162  5.425897  73.58280 
 8  0.889231  3.343727  9.302994  9.778012  6.013871  71.56140 
 9  0.903549  3.310693  9.480551  11.76839  5.852766  69.58760 
 10  0.925500  3.243845  10.16499  14.15090  6.026596  66.41367 
 11  0.950666  3.079455  11.24985  16.59675  6.064974  63.00897 
 12  0.981418  2.891940  13.05572  19.16734  5.696786  59.18821 
 13  1.005528  2.758958  13.62658  21.15642  5.988570  56.46948 
 14  1.027997  2.694134  14.18068  21.94194  6.693287  54.48995 
 15  1.054022  2.768170  14.97366  21.65658  7.534277  53.06732 
 16  1.079545  3.150890  15.63753  20.85942  8.002962  52.34920 
 17  1.105486  3.935830  16.03505  19.96190  8.473805  51.59342 
 18  1.129250  5.031070  16.22319  19.23441  8.703753  50.80757 
 19  1.149227  6.216162  16.25327  18.75936  8.732483  50.03872 
 20  1.165757  7.297167  16.36790  18.37509  8.593998  49.36584 
       
        Cholesky Ordering: LOANS GDP CPI DEPOSIT DISCOUNT_RATE 
       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
